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SEEDS OF DISTRUST: FEDERAL REGULATION
OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS
Thomas 0. McGarity*
This Article describes and evaluates the existing federal regulatory regime for pro-
tecting public health from risks posed by foods derived from GM plants. Part I
briefly describes the technology involved in genetically modifying plants and relates
the ongoing debates over the risks and benefits of GM food plants. Part II exam-
ines in detail the regulatory regime that has evolved in the United States to
regulate the safety of GM foods, focusing in particular upon the pervasive role
that the substantial equivalence doctrine has played in that regime. Finally, Part
III suggests a more precautionary approach toward regulating GM foods that
should command a higher level of public trust than the substantial equivalence
approach.
With the aid of modern agricultural biotechnologies, scientists
can cross biological boundaries that have heretofore limited plant
breeders to relatively modest and incremental changes.' Scientists
have already spliced genes from bacteria, viruses, chickens, and
moths into the chromosomes of ordinary potatoes, and the tech-
nology is only in its infancy.2 Spectacular changes in the human
3food supply may lie just around the corner.
* W. James Kronzer Chair in Trial and Appellate Advocacy, University of Texas
School of Law. B.A. 1971, Rice University;J.D. 1974, University of Texas School of Law. This
Article is derived in part from research that the author conducted as a consultant to the
Consumer Federation of America Foundation and to the Pew Initiative on Agricultural Bio-
technology. The analyses and opinions expressed herein, however, are those of the author
alone and not of either of those institutions.
1. See Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Agric., Nutrition and Forestry, 106th Cong. (Oct.
7, 1999) (statement ofJames H. Maryanski, Biotechnology Coordinator, Ctr. for Food Safety
& Applied Nutrition, Food & Drug Admin.) [hereinafter Maryanski Senate Testimony, Oct.
7, 1999]; ORGANISATION FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., SAFETY EVALUATION OF FOODS
DERIVED BY MODERN BIOTECHNOLOGY: CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES 7 (1992) [hereinafter
OECD, SAFETY EVALUATION, 1992] (stating that biotechnology has "vastly increased the
variety of new traits that can be introduced into plants"); Karl-Heinz Engel, Gary R. Takeoka
& Roy Teranishi, Foods and Food Ingredients Produced via Recombinant DNA Techniques, in GE-
NETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS: SAFETY ISSUES 1 (Karl-Heinz Engel et al. eds., 1995)
[hereinafter Engel, Takeoka & Teranishi, Foods and Food Ingredients] ; COMM. ON GENETICALLY
MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETICALLY MODIFIED
PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS: SCIENCE AND REGULATION 22 (2000) [hereinafter NRC GM PEST-
PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT].
2. See NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.
3. Modem biotechnologies can also enhance both the range of food ingredients that
fermentation technologies can produce and increase the efficiency of fermentation produc-
tion of food ingredients that are currently produced through traditional means. SeeJ.B.
Hallagan & R.L. Hall, Safety Assessment of Flavor Ingredients Produced by Genetically Modified
Organisisms, in GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS: SAFETY ISSUES 57, 60-61 (Karl-Heinz Engel et
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Modern gene-splicing techniques were born in controversy, and
the recent introduction of genetically modified (GM) foods into
neighborhood grocery stores has stimulated renewed debates
about their safety and propriety.4 Since food matters a lot to most
people, these debates have attained a high level of public visibility.5
Given the enormous potential for profit in the budding agricul-
tural biotechnology industry, consumer groups worry that
companies unconstrained by appropriate governmental regulation
will rush to the market with products that could pose serious risks
to human health.6 The companies maintain that existing federal
statutes provide more than adequate protection from any health
risks of genetically engineered foods and warn that "over-
regulation" of agricultural biotechnologies may delay or forestall
entirely the enormous benefits that they offer to farmers and con-
7
sumers.
Although the agricultural biotechnology industry has grown at
an extraordinary pace during the past decade, recent controversies
over StarLink® corn in the United States and GM foods in
al. eds., 1995). Because the legal aspects of food production through fermentation tech-
nologies have been widely discussed in the literature, this Article will not analyze that topic
in detail. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Federal Regulation of Agricultural Biotechnologies, 20 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1089 (1987) [hereinafter McGarity, Agricultural Biotechnologies]; Thomas
0. McGarity & Karl 0. Bayer, Federal Regulation of Emerging Genetic Technologies, 31 VAND. L.
REv. 1 (1983).
4. See Organisation for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Proceedings of the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development Conference on the Scientific and Health Aspects of Genetically
Modified Foods (Edinburgh, Scotland, Feb. 28-Mar. 1, 2000), available at
http://www.oecd.org/subject/biotech/ed-prog-sum.html [hereinafter OECD Edinburgh
Conference Proceedings].
5. See Public Meeting on Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (Nov. 30, 1999) (remarks of Carol Tucker Foreman, Consumer Federa-
tion of America) [hereinafter Foreman Remarks, Nov. 30, 1999] ("Since food is so basic to
us both physically and emotionally, it is really not surprising that consumers are extremely
averse to any food-related risk, especially if that risk is perceived as imposed by someone else
beyond our individual control and without any countervailing benefit."); Lars Noah & Rich-
ard A. Merrill, Starting From Scratch?: Reinventing The Food Additive Approval Process, 78 B.U. L.
REv. 329, 330 (1998) [hereinafter Noah & Merrill, Starting from Scratch] (alluding to "the
popular and journalistic salience of putative hazards created by modern food production
methods").
6. See Anthony J. Cavalieri, Paper Presented to the Industrial and Economic Perspectives
Workshop, in NAT'L AGRIC. BIOTECHNOLOGY COUNCIL REPORT 10, AGRICULTURAL BIOTECH-
NOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: GENE ESCAPE AND PEST RESISTANCE 29, 30 (Ralph
WE. Hardy &Jane Baker Segelken eds., 1998) (describing how the vice-president of a major
biotechnology company acknowledges that companies that are "technology generators" are
"more likely to concentrate on their business and their technology, and not have the re-
sources or time to devote to addressing larger societal issues").
7. See NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at xii (noting the be-
lief of many observers that "the risks are minimal, that benefits outweigh risks, and the
current regulatory scheme is too onerous").
8. See infra Part VII.H.
[VOL. 35:3
Seeds of Distrust
Europe' suggest that a protective regulatory regime is a critical
precondition to public acceptance of an industry about which most
consumers currently have serious misgivings.' ° Yet, the adequacy of
the existing U.S. regulatory regime has never been convincingly
established." In part, disagreement over the adequacy of existing
regulatory oversight stems from the fact that the statutes that form
the underlying regulatory framework were not enacted with bio-
technology in mind and therefore leave several serious institutional
and interpretational questions unresolved. 2 Much of the dis-
agreement, however, concerns the way that the relevant federal
agencies have gone about implementing existing regulatory re-
quirements.
With strong encouragement from the White House, the two fed-
eral agencies with primary regulatory jurisdiction over GM foods-
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA)-have relied upon a controversial regula-
tory principle called "substantial equivalence" as the primary
vehicle for assessing and managing the risks that GM foods pose to
human health. As a result, GM crops have gained easy access to
U.S. agricultural markets with very few regulatory constraints. The
speed with which GM foods have entered the food supply has sur-
prised many American consumers.
This Article describes and evaluates the existing federal regula-
tory regime for protecting public health from risks posed by foods
derived from GM plants. Part I briefly describes the technology in-
volved in genetically modifying plants and relates the ongoing
9. See Susan Ladika, Austria Approves One of the Toughest Laws in Europe on Genetically
Modifled Organisms, 21 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 409 (Apr. 29, 1998); France Issues Labeling Rules
to Implement EU's Directive on Genetically Modified Food, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 304 (Feb. 19,
1997).
10. The recent report of an expert committee appointed by the National Research
Council of the National Academy of Sciences concluded that "[w] ith careful planning and
appropriate regulatory oversight, commercial cultivation of transgenic pest-protected plants is
not generally expected to pose higher risks and may pose less risk than other commonly
used chemical and biological pest-management techniques." NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED
PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 47 (emphasis added).
11. See Robert A. Bohrer, Food Products Affected By Biotechnology, 55 U. PITT. L. REv. 653
(1994) [hereinafter Bohrer, Biotechnology]; McGarity, Agricultural Biotechnologies, supra note 3;
McGarity & Bayer, supra note 3.
12. According to one recent report, "[t]he varieties and uses of genetically altered
(transgenic) crops have grown much more rapidly than our ability to understand or appro-
priately regulate them." WINROCK INTERNATIONAL, 1-ENRY A. WALLACE CENTER FOR
AGRICULTURE & ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, TRANSGENIC CROPS: AN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESS-
MENT 5 (2000) [hereinafter WINROCK REPORT ON TRANSGENIC CROPS].
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debates over the risks and benefits of GM food plants.13 Part II
examines in detail the regulatory regime that has evolved in the
United States to regulate the safety of GM foods, focusing in par-
ticular upon the pervasive role that the substantial equivalence
doctrine has played in that regime. Finally, Part III suggests a more
precautionary approach toward regulating GM foods that should
command a higher level of public trust than the substantial equiva-
lence approach.
I. THE DEBATES OVER THE RISKS AND BENEFITS
OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS
Modern gene-splicing techniques allow scientists to introduce
genes from a living organism (called the "donor") into a plant
(called a "host") in several ways, including: (1) direct DNA uptake
by the plant cells mediated by chemical or electrical treatments;
(2) microinjection of DNA directly into plant cells; (3) biolistics, or
firing tiny metal particles coated with the DNA of interest into
plant cells; and (4) infecting the plant with a bacterium that scien-
tists have modified to carry the DNA into plant cells.'4 In each of
these techniques, scientists insert DNA segments from the "donor"
13. Until very recently, the primary focus of public interest in GM foods was on GM
plants intended for human consumption or consumption by animals consumed by humans.
The recent media attention given to a genetically modified "supersalmon" has raised the
possibility that GM animals will soon enter the human food supply. See Frederic Golden,
Who's Afraid of Frankenfood?, TIME, Nov. 29, 1999, at 49 [hereinafter Golden, Frankenfood].
Although the adequacy of the federal regulatory regime for regulating genetically engi-
neered food animals is looming on the horizon, it is beyond the scope of this report. The
relevant agencies will no doubt face even more controversial ethical, environmental and
safety issues when the question of regulating farm animals is concerned.
14. Secondary Direct Food Additives Permitted in Food for Human Consumption;
Food Additives Permitted in Feed and Drinking Water of Animals; Aminoglycoside 3 min-
utes-Phosphotransferase II, 59 Fed. Reg. 26,700 (May 23, 1994) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
paras. 173 & 573) [hereinafter FDA, 1994 Kanamycin Resistance Gene Approval]; ROYAL
SOCIETY OF CANADA, ELEMENTS OF PRECAUTION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE REGULATION
OF FOOD BIOTECHNOLOGY IN CANADA: EXPERT PANEL REPORT OF THE FUTURE OF FOOD BiO-
TECHNOLOGY 17 (2001) [hereinafter ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001]; see also
Engel, Takeoka & Teranishi, Foods and Food Ingredients, supra note 1, at 2; NRC GM PEST-
PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 22 ("Genetic engineering is the transfer of a
[gene] or a few genes into a cultivar with the use ofAgrobacterium tumefaciens, microprojectile
bombardment, electroporation, or microinjection."); MARC LAPPE & BRITT BAILEY,




organism into the chromosome of the "host" plant cells in a semi-
random fashion.
15
A successful transformation occurs when one of the host cells
"takes up" or incorporates a fragment of the donor DNA that con-
tains the desired donor gene and "expresses" the new gene by
producing the protein for which the new gene "codes." The pres-
ence of the protein (or a carbohydrate, fat or oil produced by the
protein) changes the host organism, and the new characteristic (or
"trait") of the host plant brought about by the change should be
perpetuated in succeeding generations as the host plant repro-
duces. To distinguish those cells that have successfully taken up the
donor gene from those that have not, scientists typically attach an
additional DNA segment containing a gene that is capable of ren-
dering the host cell resistant to a particular antibiotic, herbicide, or
other toxic agent. The cells that do not contain the "marker" gene
for antibiotic or herbicide resistance die in the presence of the
toxic agent, and the researcher then tests the surviving cells to de-
termine whether some or all of them express the desired trait as
well as the resistance trait."
Both the number of copies of the inserted gene and its location
along the recipient chromosome can affect its level of expression
(i.e., the amount of coded-for protein that the host cell pro-
duces) 7 The inserted gene can also affect the level of expression
of other genes in the host organism. ' In the case of genetically en-
gineered plants, breeders frequently attempt to ensure greater
genetic stability by using traditional breeding techniques to "back
cross" the modified plant with unmodified plants to produce still a
third plant line in which the new trait is expressed at only one loca-
tion on the modified chromosome. 9 Similarly, since not all plant
lines are equally amenable to genetic engineering techniques, sci-
entists frequently accomplish the gene transfer in a less desirable
15. A gene transfer typically involves more than the mere insertion of a single gene
from one organism into another. For example, the transfer that inserted a gene coding for a
Bacillus thuringiensis toxin into corn also included promoters (genetic material that initiates
transcription of the gene) and terminators (genetic material which stops transcription of
the gene) from a virus and another bacterium. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY &
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY; CEQ AND OSTP ASSESSMENT: CASE STUDIES
OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY, BT MAIZE CASE STUDY 1 (2001)
[hereinafter CEQ/OSTP CASE STUDIES, 2001].
16. See FDA, 1994 Kanamycin Resistance Gene Approval, supra note 14, at 26,702;
ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 18.
17. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984,
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line and then use traditional plant breeding techniques to cross
the gene into more desirable lines.0
Thus genetic engineers can in a generation or two design plants
to produce different types and quantities of proteins, carbohy
drates, fats and oils, the primary building blocks of human food.1
Perhaps more significantly, modern biotechnologies allow scientists
to accomplish genetic exchanges that traditional breeding prac-
tices could never bring about.2 2 The outcomes, however, are not
always predictable. In the new genetic background of the host
plant, the inserted gene may not behave in the same way that it did
in the donor species, and the expression products may likewise re-
act differently in the new host environment. 23 Consequently, gene-
splicing experiments frequently yield unexpected results. 2 4 Most
GM plants are therefore tested extensively in the field for unusual
agronomic characteristics before the sponsoring companies move
to the next stage of scaling up for commercial production.2'
A. The Potential Benefits of Genetically Modified Foods
The agricultural biotechnology business has "come of age."
26
Since the first commercial planting of GM crops in 1995, more
than 40 GM food plants (mostly corn and soy) have been intro-
duced for general use in the United States.2 ' According to one
estimate, global sales of genetically modified crops rose from about
$75 million in 1995 to $1.6 billion in 1998 and increased another
20. Id.
21. Id. at 22,984. Although genes are expressed only as proteins, many proteins are en-
zymes that in turn metabolize other substances to produce fats and oils. See Bohrer,
Biotechnology, supra note 11, at 664.
22. SeeJANE RISSLER & MARGARET MELLON, THE ECOLOGICAL RISKS OF ENGINEERED
CROPS 4-6 (2000).
23. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,986 (noting that the phenotypic
effects of a new trait may not always be completely predictable in the new genetic back-
ground of the host).
24. MARTIN TEITEL & KIMBERLY A. WILSON, GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOOD: CHANG-
ING THE NATURE OF NATURE 11 (1999).
25. House Comm. on Sci., 106th Cong., Seeds of Opportunity: An Assessment of the Benefits,
Safety, and Oversight of Plant Genomics 18 (Comm. Print Apr. 13,2000) [hereinafter U.S. House
Seeds of Opportunity Report] ("By the time a new variety of plant is ready for release or com-
mercialization, it has undergone significant review and testing.").
26. See id.
27. NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at ix-xi, 33.
[VOL. 35:3
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50 percent in 1999 to almost $2.3 billion.28 The size of the world-
wide GM crop increased more than twenty-fold from 1996 to 1999,
when farmers planted about 70 million acres in GM crops in the
U.S. and about 98.6 acres worldwide.29
Proponents predict that the new agricultural biotechnologies
will increase crop yields, reduce pesticide use and generally im-
prove the efficiency of farming throughout the world. 30 Consumers
will benefit from cheaper and more nutritious foods that will taste
better and last longer. The most enthusiastic supporters believe
that agricultural biotechnologies will someday feed starving popu-
lations of developing countries, reduce pressures on sensitive
environmental resources, and provide economic security to U.S.
farmers.3 In their view, the vast potential that agricultural biotech-
nologies offer for improving human life is limited only by the
political threat posed by "well-financed activist groups."
32
The industry's performance to date has only partially borne out
these optimistic predictions.33 Public ambivalence about the bene-
fits of GM foods is partially attributable to the industry's decision to
focus first upon improving "input traits" of plants for the conven-
ience of growers, processors and marketers, rather than modifying
"output traits," such as enhanced nutritional characteristics and
28. Elizabeth Parle, GM Crops: More Food, or Thought?, CHEMICAL MARKET REPORTER,
Mar. 20, 2000, at FR1O [hereinafter Parle, GM Crops] (citing statistics compiled by the Inter-
national Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications).
29. Hearing Before the House Comm. on Agric. Subcomm. On Risk Management, Research, and
Specialty Crops, 106th Cong. (Mar. 3, 1999) (testimony of L. Val Giddings, Vice-President of
Food and Agriculture, Biotechnoogy Industry Organization) [hereinafter Giddings House
Testimony, Mar. 3, 1999]; NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at xi;
Parle, GM Crops, supra note 25, at FR 10 (citing statistics compiled by the International Ser-
vice for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications).
30. See NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at viii ("Genetic engi-
neering of plants for resistance to pests and disease, creating transgenic pest-protected
plants, is one of the many tools for increasing food security.").
31. See Hearing Before the House Comm. on Agric. Subcomm. on Risk Management, Research,
and Specialty Crops, 106th Cong. (Mar. 3, 1999) (testimony of James M. Murphy, Jr., Assistant
U.S. Trade Representative For Agricultural Affairs, Office Of The U.S. Trade Representative)
[hereinafter Murphy House Testimony, Mar. 3, 1999] (arguing that "our ability to market
goods developed with biotechnology is more than just an economic issue"); U.S. House Seeds
of Opportunity Report, supra note 25, at 2 (arguing that "agricultural biotechnology has tre-
mendous potential to reduce the environmental impact of farming, provide better nutrition,
and help feed a rapidly growing world population").
32. U.S. House Seeds of Opportunity Report, supra note 25, at Letter of Transmittal.
33. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, RAPPOR-
TEURS' SUMMARY, PRESENTED AT THE OECD EDINBURGH CONFERENCE ON THE SCIENTIFIC
AND HEALTH ASPECTS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS 3 (Feb. 28-Mar. 1, 2000) [hereinaf-
ter OECD EDINBURGH RAPPORTEURS' SUMMARY] (noting that the potential benefit of GM
foods "has yet fully to be realized and will only be so if the technology is put to use under
appropriate conditions").
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improved food quality, that directly benefit consumers.34 Of the
thousands of field trials that biotechnology companies have com-
pleted to date, 83 percent have involved plants genetically
engineered for pest resistance or herbicide tolerance and only 22
percent tested plants with improved product quality traits. 5 If GM
foods were clearly distinguishable and priced lower than non-GM
foods to reflect the enhanced efficiency of the GM technologies,
the benefits might be more apparent at the grocery store. 36 So far,
however, the agricultural and food processing industries have
strongly resisted segregating GM foods from non-GM foods for any
purpose, including pricing.37
1. Input Characteristics
a. Pest and Disease Resistance-Although human beings have
used chemical pesticides to defend their crops from pests for thou-
sands of years,38 the "green revolution" of the 1950s gave rise to a
chemical dependent agriculture that posed serious risks to human
health and the environment.39 Modern biotechnology offers the
potential to avoid some of the adverse health and environmental
consequences of chemical pesticides by allowing scientists to cus-
tom design plants to be resistant to insect and disease infestations.40
34. See Bohrer, Biotechnology, supra note 11, at 679 (noting that "biotechnology applica-
tions that fill a strongly perceived public need are likely to win acceptance more easily than
those which merely increase producer or farmer profits"); Ray A. Goldberg, Transforming
Life, Transforming Business: The Life-Science Revolution, HARv. Bus. REV., Mar./Apr., 2000, 94,
103 [hereinafter Goldberg, Transforming Lfe] (arguing that GM foods "have not provided
consumers with food that is significantly cheaper, safer, or tastier"); Margaret Kriz, Global
Food Fights, NAT'LJ., Mar. 4, 2000, at 688 [hereinafter Kriz, Global Food Fights] (noting that
"[s]ome supporters of the new technology speculate that the public has been cool to geneti-
cally engineered foods because the products so far have been designed to benefit farmers,
not consumers"); David Stipp, The Voice of Reason in The Global Food Fights, FORTUNE, Feb. 21,
2000, at 164 [hereinafter Stipp, Voice of Reason] (interview with Cordon Conway of the
Rockefeller Foundation) (commenting that "[t]he companies' really big mistake, though,
was to concentrate on things that had no benefit to the consumer").
35. Eric Lichtenberg, Costs of Regulating Transgenic Pest-Protected Plants, NRC GM PEST-
PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at Appendix A, Table A.3. The totals exceed 100
percent, because some field trials were devoted to testing plants that had been modified for
both product quality and one of the input characteristics.
36. See Jim Papanixalaw, GMOs Feel Impact of Softer Ag Sales, CHEMICAL MARKET RE-
PORTER, Jan. 10, 2000, at 3 ("Crops containing output traits are expected to be less
controversial than ones containing input traits, and they should help alleviate concerns
about CMOs.").
37. See infra note 534.
38. See NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 21 (describing
various chemical pesticides in use since 1000 B.C.).
39. See, e.g., RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 16-17 (1962).
40. See NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 48-55; SHELDON
KRIMSKY & ROGER WRUBEL, AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 61
(1996).
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Naturally occurring microorganisms are capable of infecting
and killing insects, and companies have commercially marketed
them for many years. One of the most successful biological pesti-
cide, the Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) soil bacterium, produces more
than 50 different proteins capable of killing several varieties of in-
sects and nematodes by binding to receptors in the insect gut and
disrupting digestion. 4' Because these Bt toxins have been in the
human environment for as long as there have been humans, the
levels ordinarily found in human foods, even foods intentionally
treated with Bt, cause no observable adverse effects in people.
The fact that Bt loses its efficacy within a few days after application,
however, makes it less attractive to many growers and limits it to a
relatively small niche of the pesticide market."
Using modern agricultural biotechnologies, scientists can now
transfer the genes that code for Bt toxins from the bacterium into
plants in such a way that susceptible insects are killed when they
consume the GM plants.4 4 In addition to ensuring that feeding in-
sects are exposed to the Bt toxins even if they feed on parts of the
plant that are hard to treat with chemical pesticides, this technique
retains its efficacy for as long as the plant remains alive.' Genetic
engineering techniques can also render plants resistant to plant
viruses, thus effectively "vaccinating" them against certain plant
diseases. 46 Since an estimated 20 percent of pest-related crop loss in
41. See NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 28-29 (noting that
during the last twenty years scientists have identified about sixty proteins from more than
fifty subspecies of Bt); LAPPE & BAILEY, supra note 14, at 65 (explaining in lay language how
Bt toxins disrupt the digestive processes of insect larvae); DANIELJONES, Paper Presented to the
Research and Development Perspectives Workshop, in NAT'L AGRIC. BIOTECHNOLOGY COUNCIL
REPORT 10, AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: GENE ESCAPE
AND PEST RESISTANCE 11 (Ralph W.E. Hardy &Jane Baker Segelken eds., 1998) (explaining
that "(t] here are more than 50 different Bt proteins with differing toxicities for caterpillars,
beetles, flies, and nematodes"); TEITEL & WILSON, supra note 24, at 24-28.
42. See TEITEL & WILSON, supra note 24, at 25.
43. See NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 29.
44. TEITEL & WILSON, supra note 24, at 26. By 1998, farmers had planted about 25
percent of the total cotton acreage and 21 percent of the total corn acreage in Bt-modified
pest-resistant crops. NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 33.
45. NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 29.
46. See Giddings House Testimony, Mar. 3, 1999, supra note 29 (arguing that
"[b]iotechnology arms disease-protected varieties with the plant equivalent of a 'vaccine'");
NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 53; KRIMSKY & WRUBEL, supra
note 40, at 82-87; Lynn E. Murry, Use of Plant Virus Geners to Produce Disease-Resistant Crops, in
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS: SAFETY ISSUES 113 (Karl-Heinz Engel et al. eds., 1995)
[hereinafter Murry, Disease Resistance]. For example, the chromosomes of many plants con-
tain "race-specific" genes ("R genes") that trigger an immune response within the plant to a
specific pathogen that attacks the plant. Scientists have for many years employed traditional
plant breeding technologies to transfer R genes from one variety of plant to closely related
SPRING 2002]
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the U.S. is attributable to plant viruses, agricultural biotechnol-
ogies may provide an important new weapon for farmers to use in
41protecting their crops.
b. Herbicide Resistance--Cultivated agricultural plants compete
with wild plants for access to the sun, available water and the nutri-
ents that the soil provides. In the latter half of the twentieth
century, scientists developed chemical herbicides that can kill
many varieties of weeds while leaving crop plants comparatively
unaffected."' Currently, more than 90 percent of the U.S. soybean,
corn and cotton acreage receives at least one herbicide treatment
per year.49 Scientists can genetically engineer crops tolerant to her-
bicides by inserting into a host plant a single gene that codes for
the production of an enzyme that neutralizes the herbicide's active
ingredient. 0 Farmers can then kill the weeds in fields containing
herbicide-tolerant crops without fear of reducing crop yields. 1
c. Increased Yields-If fewer plants are lost to insects, weeds and
diseases, farmers should be able to extract more end-use commod-
ity from an acre of planted land. Thus, widespread cultivation of
pest-resistant and herbicide-tolerant crops should result in in-
creased yields of important food and feed crops. 2 If the benefits of
high-yield agriculture are distributed in an equitable fashion,
modern biotechnologies could contribute life-sustaining food to
millions of impoverished human beings. 3 Thus far, however, hard
evidence of increased yields is lacking. For example, a recent ex-
pert panel assessment concluded that "[t]he first generation of
transgenic corn and soybeans, if these crops were to be adopted
varieties. NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 50. In addition to
speeding up this process, modern genetic engineering technologies allow scientists to trans-
fer R genes to entirely unrelated plants. Id. at 50-51; see also KRMSKY & WRUBEL, supra note
40, at 73-76.
47. Murry, Disease Resistance, supra note 46, at 117.
48. See KRIMSKY & WRUBEL, supra note 40, at 29-30, 33-34. The widespread availability
of herbicides made possible "minimum fill" agricultural practices that help protect valuable
topsoil from erosion. See id. at 44.
49. Id. at 30.
50. See id. at 37-38.
51. See id. at 38-40. Not surprisingly, the companies that developed herbicide-resistant
crops were frequently manufacturers of the relevant herbicides. Id. at 35.
52. See Giddings House Testimony, Mar. 3, 1999, supra note 29 (arguing that healthier
pest-resistant plants should "result in higher yields and improved fertilizer efficiency");Jack
Doyle, Biotechnology Research and Agricultural Stability, 2 ISSUES IN SCI. & TEch. 111, 114
(1985); NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 48 ("Crop losses or
damage can be eliminated or minimized resulting in improvement of both yield and qual-
ity.").
53. See U.S. House Seeds of Opportunity Report, supra note 25, at 2 ("Biotechnology will be
a key element in the fight against malnutrition worldwide.").
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globally, would increase production by only an estimated two per-
cent or less," hardly enough to eliminate world hunger. 5
4
d. Improving Crop Adaptability to a Wider Variety of Growing
Conditions-Although conventional breeding techniques have
achieved little success in expanding the range of conditions under
which important crops can survive, scientists employing modern
gene splicing techniques may be able to design crops that can grow
in temperatures, soils, weather and climatological conditions that
prohibit cultivation of natural strains. For example, scientists have
identified "master switch" genes in some plants that control freez-
ing tolerance, and they hope to use this knowledge to improve the
temperature range of commercially important food and feed
crops. 7 Scientists in Mexico discovered that inserting a gene cod-
ing for the production of citric acid into the DNA of papaya and
rice plants allowed them to grow in aluminum-rich local soils that
were otherwise inhospitable to those cultivars. Modern genetic
engineering techniques may also yield economically important
plants with increased tolerance to drought. 5" However, such "su-
percrops" exist today primarily on the drawing board.
e. Improved Food Handling, Distribution and Processing Capabili-
ties-The very first GM food submitted to FDA for approval was a
tomato containing an "antisense" gene that inhibited the action of
an enzyme that causes tomatoes to rot.' ° The presence of the new
54. WINROCK REPORT ON TRANSGENIC CROPS, supra note 12, at 8.
55. See Plant Genome Science: From the Lab to the Field to the Market: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Sci. Subcomm. on Basic Research, 106th Cong (Oct. 5, 1999) (testimony of Michael F.
Thomashow, Michigan State University) [hereinafter Thomashow Testimony, Oct. 5, 1999]
(noting that the temperature range that wheat can survive has not varied greatly during the
last century, despite efforts by scientists using traditional breeding techniques to increase
that range).
56. See U.S. House Seeds of Opportunity Report, supra note 25, at 16; Heating Before the
House Comm. on Agric. Subcomm. on Risk Management, Research, and Specialty Crops, 106th Cong.
(Mar. 3, 1999) (testimony of August Schumacher, Under Secretary for Farm and Foreign
Agricultural Services) (stating that the benefits of biotechnology include "improving plant
adaptability to harsh growing conditions, such as drought, salinity and temperature ex-
tremes").
57. See Thomashow Testimony, Oct. 5, 1999, supra note 55. Another approach to in-
creasing temperature range is to splice into crop plants genes from fish that code for freeze-
resistant proteins. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,986.
58. See Dennis T. Avery, Why Biotechnology May Not Represent the Future in World Agricul-
ture, in NAT'L AGRIC. BIOTECHNOLOGY COUNCIL REPORT 10, WORLD FOOD SECURITY AND
SUSTAINABILITY: THE IMPACTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL CONSOLIDATION 97
(Donald P. Weeks et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter Avery, Biotechnology Future].
59. Robert W. Herdt, Agricultural Biotechnology in the 21st Century: Promises and Pitfalls, in
NAT'L AGRIC. BIOTECHNOLOGY COUNCIL REPORT 9, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CHAL-
LENGED ENVIRONMENTS 33 (Ralph W.E. Hardy et al. eds., 1998).
60. Bohre, Biotechnology, supra note 11, at 671.
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gene allowed ripe tomatoes to remain intact for a longer period of
time, thus increasing their "shelf life" and allowing them to ripen
on the vine before being harvested for market."' Although the
12plant was a failure with consumers, companies continue to use
modern agricultural biotechnologies to develop fruits and vegeta-
bles that have the capacity to stay fresh and firm for longer periods
of time.63
2. Output Characteristics
a. Improved Nutritional Content-Modern agricultural biotech-
nologies are capable of adding nutritional value to commonly
consumed foods by causing plants to produce more or less of a nu-
trient or anti-nutrient.64 For example, scientists are developing a
GM strain of rice that makes both Vitamin A and iron available to
consumers with diets that might otherwise be deficient in those
two important nutrients. Other GM varieties of common staples
that contain enhanced levels of nutrients are on the near-term ho-
66rizon. Some skeptics, however, caution against great expectations
for nutritionally enhanced foods, noting that they may also result
in human diets with less overall variety. One scientist, only half fa-
cetiously, warned that human diets may someday consist primarily
of "Purina human chow."
6 7
61. Calgene, Inc. Request for Advisory Opinion, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,772 (1992).
62. LAPPE & BAILEY, supra note 14, at 21; Parle, GM Craps, supra note 28; see also TEITEL
& WILSON, supra note 24, at 23 (concluding that the endless summer plant did not make it
to the market because it failed its field trials).
63. Parle, GM Crops, supra note 25.
64. Thomashow Testimony, Oct. 5, 1999, supra note 55 (noting that "[glenetic engi-
neering offers a powerful tool to improve the nutritional content of plants through
metabolic engineering and thereby improve the health of individuals throughout the
world"); 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,986 (noting that genetic engineer-
ing techniques can be used "to transfer genetic material for the production of seed storage
protein conferring improvements in nutritional balance of important amino acids in the
new plant varieties").
65. See U.S. House Seeds of Opportunity Report, supra note 25, at 3 ("Biotechnology has
been used to produce a new strain of rice-Golden Rice-that contains both vitamin A (by
providing its precursor, beta-carotene) and iron."); Gordon Conway, Crop Biotechnology: Bene-
fits, Risks and Ownership, presented at the OECD EDINBURGH CONFERENCE ON THE
SCIENTIFIC AND HEALTH ASPECTS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS 8 (Feb. 28 - Mar. 1,
2000) [hereinafter Conway, Crop Biotechnology] (reporting the results of Rockefeller Founda-
tion-funded research on Vitamin A-enhanced rice).
66. See U.S. House Seeds of Opportunity Report, supra note 25, at 3 (predicting near-term
availability of nutritionally enhanced GM varieties of "food staples, such as cassava, corn,
rice, and other cereal grains"); Marc E. Weksler, GM Foods: Opportunities to Improve Human
Health, in OECD Edinburgh Conference Proceedings, supra note 4, at 5 (describing foods contain-
ing enhanced levels of Vitamin E and iron).
67. Lila Gutterman, Scientists Leave the Lab to Defend Bioengineered Food, J. HIGHER EDUC.,
Apr. 14, 2000, at A29, A30.
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b. Improved Food Quality-Biotechnology proponents maintain,
and most opponents acknowledge, that modern agricultural bio-
technologies can improve food quality.'8 Pest-resistant GM crops
will yield better-looking agricultural commodities with less damage
from insects, fungi and viruses.69 Scientists can manipulate the
genes of plants to cause fruits, grains and vegetables to ripen more
uniformly and retain freshness for longer periods of time. ° Spe-
cialty crops with particular traits designed for particular consumer
needs or desires are on the near-term horizon.71
c. Improved Food Safety-While scientists have raised a number of
concerns about the risks that GM foods may present to human
health, proponents note that genetic engineering techniques also
allow scientists to remove from plants the genes that code for natu-
rally occurring toxins.72 In addition, scientists may soon be able to
insert genes that code for proteins that reduce allergenic responses
to GM foods in sensitive people. 3 Both improvements could ren-
der GM foods safer to eat than their natural counterparts.
B. The Risks Posed by Genetically Modified Foods
If agricultural biotechnologies have not yet produced the enor-
mous benefits that some of their proponents envisioned, neither
have they caused the pandemics that worried their detractors. Not
a single confirmed case of disease or illness attributable to those
68. See Hearing Before the House Comm. on Agric. Subcomm. on Risk Mgmt., Research, and
Specialty Crops, 106th Cong. (Mar. 3, 1999) (testimony of Harry Collins, American Seed Trade
Association) [hereinafter Collins Testimony, Mar. 3, 1999]; Donald P. Weeks, Workshop A:
Promises and Problems Associated with Agricultural Biotechnolog, in NAT'L AGRICULTURE BIO-
TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL REPORT 11, WORLD FOOD SECURITY AND SUSTAINABILITY: THE
IMPACTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL CONSOLIDATION 16 (Donald P. Weeks et al.
eds., 1999) [hereinafter Weeks, Workshop A Report] (reporting consensus of participants of a
Workshop sponsored by the National Agricultural Biotechnology Council).
69. See NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 48 ("Crop losses or
damage can be eliminated or minimized resulting in imprtvement of both yield and qual-
ity."); Weeks, Workshop A Report, supra note 68, at 17 (noting that genetic engineering can
add nutritional and aesthetic value to plants).
70. See Parle, GM Crops, supra note 28 (noting that Zeneca Plant Sciences is developing
a mold-resistant banana that will ripen at a time that is more propitious for marketing);
Weeks, Workshop A Report, supra note 68, at 16-17.
71. Weeks, Workshop A Report, supra note 68, at 17.
72. Collins House Testinony, Mar. 3, 1999, supra note 68 ("Benefits that can be ex-
pected in the near future will include: a reduced level of natural toxins in plants. .. ").
73. See NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 36 (citing an ex-
periment in which scientists reduced the major allergen in rice by about 80 percent).
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foods has been reported in the published literature, though two
reports of severe allergenic reactions are under serious investiga-
tion. . 5 Still, this powerful new technology undeniably has the
potential to cause significant harm to human health. Although the
genetic engineers usually detect these undesirable traits during
initial trials and eliminate the plants that bear them before com-
mercialization, they can go undetected until the engineered
plants have become part of the human diet. 77 Most scientists agree
that much more research on the health effects of modern agricul-
tural biotechnologies will be necessary before it is possible to
perform reasonably accurate risk assessments for GM plants.7
s
A recent report of a panel assembled by the National Research
Council of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS Panel) stated
that the panel was "not aware of any evidence that foods on the
market are unsafe to eat as a result of genetic modification.' 8 De-
spite its generally sanguine conclusions, the NAS panel was clearly
troubled by the sparseness of the existing health and safety testing
database for GM foods, and it was especially concerned about the
risks of allergenicity."s A very similar report issued by a panel con-
vened by the Royal Society of Canada (Canadian Royal Society
Panel) came to a similar conclusion."' The following discussion
draws heavily upon the analysis in those reports.
74. John Krebs, Chairman's Report, presented at the OECD EDINBURGH CONFERENCE
ON THE SCIENTIFIC AND HEALTH ASPECTS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS 3 (Feb. 28-Mar.
1, 2000) [hereinafter Krebs, Chairman's Report].
75. During the recent controversy over human consumption of StarLink® corn, see
Section VH., infra, there have been some reports of illnesses allegedly caused by consump-
tion of that corn. See Forty-Four Claim Biotech Corn Caused Illness, WASHINGTON POST, Nov, 29,
2000, at Al0; Marc Katfman, Biotech Corn is Test Case for industry; Engineered Food's Future
hinges on Allergy Study, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 19, 2001, at A01.
76. See Plant Genome Science: From the Lab to the Field to the Market: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Sci. Subcomm. on Basic Research, 106th Cong. (Oct. 5, 1999) (testimony of R.James
Cook, Washington State University) [hereinafter Cook Testimony, Oct. 5, 1999] (arguing
that "it is hard to imagine what more can be done to assure the safety of genetically modifed
crops to people and the environment"); 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at
22,987; Public Meeting on Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (Dec. 13, 1999) (remarks of John Fagan, Chairman and CEO, Genetic ID)
[hereinafter Fagan Remarks, Dec. 13, 1999] (arguing that plant breeders have "developed
extensive systems to evaluate these plants over time and to eliminate those that have traits,
or metabolic changes, that are not beneficial").
77. See Fagan Remarks, Dec. 13, 1999, supra note 76, at 105 (questioning the assump-
tion that industry will identify all harmful GM plants).
78. See Weeks, Workshop A Report, supra note 68, at 18 (reporting "consensus" that more
research is necessary).
79. NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
80. Id. at 7-8.
81. ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 53.
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1. Direct Risks to Human Health-The magnitude of the direct
risks posed by a GM food item is a function of the likelihood that
the inserted gene will code for a substance that is toxic to some or
all human beings, the nature and potency of that substance's toxic-
ity, and the extent of dietary exposure to that substance. s2 The
biotechnology industry and the current leadership of the relevant
U.S. regulatory agencies have gone to great lengths to persuade
the public that modern GM foods pose minimal direct risks to hu-
man health.83 Critics point out that these assurances are not based
upon extensive testing of GM foods in laboratory animals as in the
case of chemical additives and contaminants, but instead depend
heavily upon assumptions derived from knowledge about the risks
posed by non-GM plants.84
a. Pesticides in GM Foods-Since GM pest-resistant plants are de-
signed to be toxic to the target organisms, their potential to affect
human health adversely is of obvious concern. The toxic proteins
produced by Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt toxins) are of the most im-
mediate concern, because the vast majority of pest-resistant GM
crops currently in commerce have been modified to produce those
toxins in plant tissues. Unlike Bt microorganisms, which rapidly
break down in the environment, human consumption of the Bt
toxin in GM plants is virtually assured.85 EPA has required fairly
extensive short-term health and safety testing of the Bt
microorganisms, 86 and most studies have reported no adverse ef-
fects.87 Tests indicating that the toxins do not bind to cells in the
human gut in the same way that they bind to cells in the midguts of
82. NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 55. Because the risk of
allergenicity is fairly unique and because it is one of the more likely risks that consumers will
encounter with respect to GM foods, this Article will address that risk separately. See infra
part l.B.l.b.
83. See Maryanski Senate Testimony, Oct. 7, 1999, supra note 1 (reporting that sub-
stances added to food via biotechnology "are commonly and safely consumed in the diet
and so will be presumptively generally recognized as safe").
84. See LAPPE & BAILEY, supra note 14, at 2 (observing that "no studies exist that meas-
ure the impact of chronic ingestion of finished products containing increased amounts of
transgenic crops").
85. See TEITEL & WILSON, supra note 24, at 51.
86. See NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 65.
87. See P.B. Lavrik et al., Safety Assessment of Potatoes Resistant to Colorado Potato Beetle, in
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS: SAFETY ISSUES 134 (Karl-Heinz Engel et al eds., 1995);
H.P.J.M. Noteborn et al., Safety Assessment of the Bacillus thuringiensis insecticidal Crystal Protein
CRYIA(b) Expressed in 7lansgenic 7bmatoes, in GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS: SAFETY ISSUES
134 (Karl-Heinz Engel, Gary R. Takeoka & Roy Teranishi eds., 1995).
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insect larvae suggest that the mode of toxicity to insects may not be
relevant to human exposures.""
Some scientists, however, have speculated that Bt toxins may be
toxic to human beings at the high exposure levels associated with
GM plants and to individuals with compromised immune systems at
much lower levels. Moreover, it is unclear whether the genes cod-
ing for Bt toxins in microorganisms express precisely the same
proteins when inserted into plants, and very little testing has been
performed on plant-expressed Bt toxins: Finally, EPA has required
very little in the way of long-term toxicity testing of Bt toxins, because
human beings are not chronically exposed to Bt toxins from the mi-
croorganisms. 91 By contrast, chronic exposure is quite likely in the
case of foods containing genes that code for Bt toxins.92 In the words
of the NAS Panel, EPA's current assumption that plant-expressed Bt
toxins are no more toxic to humans than bacteria-expressed Bt tox-
ins is unwarranted in the absence of "clear, scientifically justifiable
criteria for establishing biochemical and functional equivalency"
and such criteria are currently lacking.9-1
In addition to creating Bt pest-resistant plants, scientists can
transfer into food plants resistance genes (R genes) to protect
them from viruses. Although scientists have not thoroughly studied
the health risks of such transfers, many believe that they are quite
low because the proteins that the transferred R genes express are
likely to be in the class of proteins that humans ordinarily encoun-
ter in foods.94 Moreover, since the R genes are usually expressed
only when the plant encounters a specific pathogen, humans will
be exposed to any toxic proteins only when they consume diseased
plants. 95 Modern genetic engineering techniques, however, allow
scientists to cause R genes to express toxic proteins at higher levels
than naturally occur in the host plant and to transfer genes (per-
haps from nonfood plants) that code for proteins that the host
88. See Lavrik et al., supra note 87, at 152; Noteborn et al., supra note 87, at 136-37.
89. See TEITEL & WILSON, supra note 24, at 51.
90. NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 66. In part, this lack of
testing is due to the difficulty scientists face in isolating a sufficient quantity of the proteins
that the Bt genes express from plants to support extensive testing. Id.
91. Id. at 65.
92. Id. at 65; TEITEL & WILSON, supra note 24, at 51.
93. NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 66.
94. Id. at 56 ("Transfer of race-specific R-gene from a nonedible plant species to an
edible species would result in new exposure of consumers and nontarget species to a specific
R-gene product, although not to a new class of proteins.").
95. Id. at 56.
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plant was otherwise incapable of producing." In either case, food
plants containing such genes could pose a risk to human health 7
b. Allergens in GM Foods--Some substances in the environment
cause individuals with allergies to suffer abnormally adverse acute
effects. A food allergy is "an aberrant or hyperimmune response to
non-noxious proteins or glyco-proteins in foods or environment.""'s
The response can be relatively innocuous (e.g., a runny nose) or
quite severe (e.g., anaphylactic shock leading to coma or death)!'
Allergic reactions to foods occur most commonly in infants and
pre-school children."0 Foods that induce allergenic responses in
children include cow's milk, soy, egg, wheat, and peanuts.'' Al-
though foods are not the primary source of allergies in adults,
10 2
they are relatively common.'3 Common adult allergens include
fish, shellfish, tree nuts, corn and tomatoes. 10 The amount of an
allergen in food capable of causing an allergic reaction in suscep-
tible individuals "can be remarkably small."'"
Although sensitive persons can usually minimize the risk of al-
lergenic responses by avoiding particular foods, they may be
caught unawares if GM food manufacturers transfer the genes that
code for allergenic proteins from one food plant to another.'
0 6
Since scientists do not necessarily know which genes code for aller-
genic proteins, they will not always know whether they have
accomplished such a transfer.'7 While the history of the donor and
96. Id. at 56-57.
97. Id.
98. Oscar L. Frick, The Potential for Allergenicity in Transgenic Foods, in GENETICALLY
MODIFIED FOODS: SAFETY ISSUES 100, 102 (Karl-Heinz Engel et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter
Frick, Allergenicity]; see also ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 54. All
food allergens are proteins. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,987.
99. See ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 53 (noting that
"trace amounts of an allergenic food contaminant may cause a severe, potentially life-
threatening allergic reaction").
100. Frick, Allergenicity, supra note 98, at 104; ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001,
supra note 14, at 54.
101. Frick, Allergenicity, supra note 98, at 105; 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17,
at 22,987.
102. Frick, Allergenicity, supra note 98, at 104.
103. NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 67.
104. Frick, Allergenicity, supra note 98, at 105.
105. ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 57.
106. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,987; ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA
REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 53.
107. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,987. For example, scientists work-
ing for Pioneer Hi-Bred transferred into soybeans a gene from Brazil nuts in the hope of
creating a soybean with a higher nutritional value. The experiment produced a soybean that
was allergenic to people who were allergic to Brazil nuts. NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS
REPORT, supra note 1, at 67; TEITEL & WILSON, supra note 24, at 35. The company then de-
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host plants can serve as a rough guide to assessing allergenicity
when both are used in food, the allergenicity of "a large number of
non-food proteins that could be potentially used in genetic engi-
neering is essentially unknown.",08 Unfortunately, the allergenic
potential of any given protein is very difficult to detect and meas-
ure.'' Indeed, there are no standardized scientific tests in
laboratory animals for determining whether or not a particular
protein will or will not be allergenic. ° Thus, most allergenicity
testing is undertaken in human volunteers and is therefore quite
expensive.'
Some scientists believe that the likelihood that a gene transfer
from an allergenic donor plant will result in an allergenic host
plant is extremely small. '1 2 Since only a few hundred of the millions
of proteins found in nature are allergens, it is highly unlikely that
any given protein will be allergenic.113 Thus, even when the donor
is a nonfood plant with an unknown allergenic potential, biotech-
nology proponents believe that the risk of allergenicity host is quite
small. In any event, they are confident that manufacturers will be
able to assess the allergenic potential of transferred genes without





c. Risks Due to Changes in Host Plant Metabolism-Modern genetic
engineering techniques have the potential to change internal plant
metabolic processes in several ways that make them riskier for con-
sumers. First, the transfer of a gene coding for a toxic protein from
a food that is typically cooked to remove that protein to one that is
not generally cooked could pose health risks to unsuspecting con-
cided voluntarily to stop most of its work on the product. NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS
REPORT, at 36; TEITEL & WILSON, supra note 24, at 36.
108. ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 62.
109. See NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 67.
110. See 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,987; ROYAL SOCIETY OF CAN-
ADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 81, at 60 (noting that "[t]here is currently no single assay or
combination that will accurately predict the allergenic potential of proteins from food or
non-food sources not previously identified as being allergenic in human subjects").
111. See NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 139 (recommend-
ing more research on "[m]ethods for more efficiently and accurately identifying potential
food allergens in transgenic pest-protected plants").
112. See Frick, Allergenicity, supra note 98, at 105.
113. See Public Meeting on Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (Nov. 18, 1999) (remarks of Steven Taylor, University of Nebraska) (ar-
guing that "the risk that novel proteins will become allergens is probabilistically very small,
especially when the novel protein is expressed with foods at a very low level").
114. U.S. House Seeds of Opportunity Report, supra note 25, at 46.
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sumers. Second, a genetic modification could cause a plant to
produce a toxic metabolite in much larger quantities than it nor-
mally produces."" Third, the higher levels of amino acids in GM
herbicide-resistant crops could also cause changes in the plants'
metabolisms that render them toxic to humans."7 Fourth, gene
transfers could cause a previously quiescent gene to become acti-
vated and express a toxic protein that the host plant would notS ''8
otherwise contain.
Manufacturers of GM plants can test for some of these possibili-
ties prior to marketing to ensure that foods do not contain novel
proteins in concentrations high enough to be toxic." Because
conventional breeding techniques can also inadvertently produce
plants that contain human toxins, thorough probing of the
makeup of hybrid plants is commonplace among producers of hy-
brid crops. 20 Biotechnology proponents argue that, as in the case
of allergens, foods containing toxins are fairly well characterized,
and companies can be, trusted to approach "carefully and with
thorough testing" gene transfers from potentially toxic donor
plants. 12 It is not clear, however, that existing private testing re-
gimes are up to the challenge of modern biotechnologies. 1
2
d. New Chemicals Not Formerly Present-In many genetic engineer-
ing experiments, scientists attempt to introduce a protein into a
food plant line that differs significantly in structure or function
115. See Id. at 47-48; 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,987; OECD,
SAFETY EVALUATION, 1992, supra note 1, at 7-8.
116. See ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 81, at 46; NRC GM PEST-
PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 71; 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17,
at 22,987.
117. LAPPE & BAILEY, supra note 14, at 115. In the case of soybeans, for example, one of
the primary metabolic products is a class of compounds called "isoflavonoids" that are, in
the view of many scientists, very similar to human estrogens. If these "phytoestrogens" be-
have like human estrogens in the human bod)y consumption of GM soybeans could subtly
affect "sexual differentiation, calcium metabolism, immune function, carcinogenesis, and
blood clotting" in human beings. Since soy products now constitute a large proportion of
the diet of many infants, these subtle changes could have large, but quite subtle long-term
consequences. Id.
118. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,987; NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED
PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 62.
119. NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 63.
120. Id.
121. U.S. House Seeds of Opportunity Report, supra note 25, at 47.
122. For example, it remains to be seen whether manufacturers will know how to test
for inadvertently enhanced levels of previously existing toxic metabolites in food plants.
Public Meeting on Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond &y the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-
tion (Dec. 13, 1999) (remarks of Philip Regal, University of Minnesota) [hereinafter Regal
Remarks, Dec. 13, 1999].
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from the proteins already present in the plant.123 Although the new
protein usually is genetically engineered into the plant for a prede-
termined purpose, the exercise can produce unexpected results.24
Some scientists have suggested that the characteristics of the host
plant may even change over time as the inserted gene moves to
different positions on the host plant's DNA.125 Since it is often im-
possible to tell at the outset whether the new proteins or the new
composition of carbohydrates, fats and oils produced by those pro-
teins could be harmful to consumers, further analysis of the plant's
composition and perhaps toxicity testing (possibly for several gen-
erations) may be required for adequate safety assessment. 1
A cautious manufacturer will attempt to assess the health risks
posed by any new proteins, carbohydrates, fats or oils in GM foods
before putting them on the market. Yet, in many cases, it is not
clear how manufacturers should go about testing for the presence
of unanticipated toxins. 27 Moreover, despite the possibility of latent
manifestation of unanticipated traits, manufacturers seldom test
GM plants for more than a single generation prior to putting seeds
into full production.
2
2. Indirect Risks to Human Health
a. Changes in Levels of Nutrients and Anti-Nutrients--Genetic en-
gineers attempting to design a food plant with one characteristic in
mind might inadvertently produce a plant in which the levels or
bioavailability of important nutrients are altered in significant
ways. 29 For example, in a 1999 paper, two scientists concluded that
Monsanto's Roundup Ready® soybeans were twelve to fourteen
percent lower in phytoestrogens, which are associated with protec-
tion against heart disease, osteoporosis and breast cancer.3 0 It is
123. See 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,987; NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED
PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 60.
124. NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 59 (noting that
"breeding can lead to indirect effects, such as the effects of extraneous genes linked to the
protective genes and pleiotropic effects caused by the protective genes"); LAPPE & BAILEY,
supra note 14, at 14 (noting that "many plant genes produce a variety of effects (called 'plei-
otropy'), where changes in form and function result from a single gene insertion").
125. LAPPE & BAILEY, supra note 14, at 30 (arguing that inserted DNA "may unbalance
or disrupt the normal functioning of the resident genes" and that "it may be several genera-
tions before the resulting disruption is fully realized").
126. See 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,987.
127. See OECD EDINBURGH RAPPORTEURS' SUMMARY, supra note 33, at 5 (alluding to
unanswered questions regarding how safety of "neutraceuticals" should be assessed).
128. LAPPE & BAILEY, supra note 14, at 30-31.
129. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,987.
130. See Hearing on Biotechnology Before the Senate Comm. on Agric., Nutrition & Forestry,
106th Cong. (Oct. 6, 1999) (testimony of Mark Silbergeld, Co-Director, Consumers Union of
the U.S., Inc.), available at http://www.agriculture.senate.gov/Hearings/Hearings-1999/
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also possible that genetic modifications could inadvertently in-
crease the levels of "antinutrients" in foods.'
b. Antibiotic Resistance--Scientists engaged in gene transfer ex-
periments typically enhance their ability to isolate plant cells that
have incorporated the desired gene by physically linking that gene
to a "marker gene" that has the property of antibiotic resistance.
32
Once a plant variety with the desired genetic trait has been isolated
and reproduced, the gene coding for antibiotic resistance no
longer performs any useful function. The GM plants, however,
continue to produce the antibiotic resistance enzyme, and anyone
who eats the plants will consume the enzyme as well. 33 In theory,
the enzyme could deactivate the same antibiotic in human beings,
thus reducing the drug's therapeutic value to persons who con-
sume the GM food. In addition, foods containing marker genes
could transfer those genes to naturally occurring pathogenic bac-
teria. The ultimate result could be a strain of pathogenic bacteria
that is resistant to an important antibiotic or, worse, a whole family
of antibiotics.I3
Noting that the scenario outlined above requires a number of
sequential steps, each of which has a low probability of occur-
rence,3 6 biotechnology proponents argue that such risks are
vanishingly small.3 3 Furthermore, since a pool of antibiotic-
resistant bacteria already exists in most human guts, any addi-
tional risk posed by GM foods is probably trivial by comparison.13
Some biotechnology critics concede that the risk of antibiotic re-
sistance arising out of human consumption of GM foods pales in
sil199107.htm [hereinafter Silbergeld Testimony, Oct. 6, 1999]; TEITEL & WILSON, supra note
24, at 48. The American Soybean Association and Monsanto disputed the study. TEITEL &
WILSON, supra note 24, at 48.
131. See ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 82. Although the
subject of some dispute, anti-nutrients are secondary plant metabolites that "appear to have
deleterious effects over time on animal or human consumers." Id.
132. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,987.
133. See Id. at 22,988.
134. Id.
135. TEITEL & WILSON, supra note 24, at 38; see also Plant Genome Science: From the Lab to
the Field to the Market: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Sci. Subcomm. on Basic Research, 106th
Cong. (Oct. 5 1999) (testimony of Rebecca Goldburg, Environmental Defense Fund) [here-
inafter Goldburg Testimony, Oct. 5, 1999], available at http://www.house.gov/science/
goldburg_100599.htm (noting that antibiotic resistance genes can in theory "be transferred
from genetically engineered food to bacteria that live in the GI tract").
136. U.S. House Seeds of Opportunity Report, supra note 25, at 50.
137. Id. at 49.
138. Id. at 51.
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comparison to risks posed by the enormous overuse of important
antibiotics to prevent diseases in cattle and poultry."l
Other skeptics insist, however, that the consequences of the
emergence of virulent antibiotic-resistant pathogens are so high
that even a small probability is too risky. The Canadian Royal Soci-
ety Panel and the British Medical Association have both
recommended that all use of antibiotic marker genes in GM foods
be prohibited. 14 The OECD Edinburgh Conference on the Scien-
tific and Health Aspects of Genetically Modified Foods concluded
that it was no longer necessary to use antibiotic marker genes to
achieve effective gene transfers in plants, and it recommended that




3. The Search for Scientific Accuracy in the Midst of Large
Uncertainties-The preceding analysis suggests that substantial un-
certainties permeate the existing state of knowledge regarding the
risks and benefits posed by GM foods. Agricultural biotechnology
companies have undertaken very little testing of whole GM foods
and of novel proteins and other products expressed in GM foods)4
Indeed, it is not even clear that animal feeding studies can play a
useful role in assessing the health risks posed by GM foods. 43 The
existing knowledge base concerning reproductive and develop-
mental effects is especially weak. Huge uncertainties still plague
assessments of allergenicity risks of gene transfers from donor or-
ganisms that are not known to be allergenic. 145 In the final analysis,
a genetically engineered plant remains a "black box" containing
139. See Goldburg Testimony, Oct. 5, 1999, supra note 135 (arguing that "the current
use in animal agriculture of 40 to 50% all antibiotics in the United States poses a far larger
human health threat from antibiotic resistance than the use of antibiotic resistance genes as
selective markers").
140. BRITISH MED. ASS'N, THE IMPACT OF GENETIC MODIFICATION ON AGRIC, FOOD AND
HEALTH (1999), available at http://www.global-reality.com/biotech/articles/othemewsOl2.htm;
ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 49.
141. OECD EDINBURGH RAPPORTEURS' SUMMARY, supra note 33, at 3.
142. See Hearing Before the House Comm. on Sci. Subcomm. on Basic Research, 106th Cong.
(Oct. 19, 1999) (testimony of Stephen L. Taylor, University of Nebraska) [hereinafter Taylor
Testimony, Oct. 19, 1999] (noting that "toxicologists rarely attempt to assess the safety of
whole foods").
143. Id. at 4 (noting that it is unclear whether animal feeding studies will be useful for
GM foods).
144. See id. (noting "uncertainty about the potential long-term effects of GM food on
human health and on worker safety").
145. See id. (noting that current methods for testing toxicity and allergenicity "leave
some uncertainties and need to be improved").
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many unanswered questions, some of which may never be fully re-
solved.1
4 6
Biotechnology proponents frequently take the public position
that regulatory decision-making regarding GM foods should be a
matter of "sound science."'' 7 Critics complain that the "sound sci-
ence" rhetoric ignores both the fact that considerations other than
science have always played profound roles in determining the
foods that people choose to eat and the fact that existing scientific
studies cannot answer some basic questions that arise in assessing
the health risks of GM crops. Even when testing has been con-
ducted and data are available, experts often disagree about how to
interpret those data. In an era in which much of the attraction of
agricultural biotechnology research is the prospect of reaping fi-
nancial rewards, it is not always clear that the scientists in the
companies and the universities can be trusted to interpret equivo-
cal data in an unbiased way. To the extent that science cannot
definitively answer the critical questions that arise in assessing the
health risks of GM foods, regulatory agencies must answer them on
the' basis of sound public policy."'
Lacking accurate information on the risks posed by GM plants,
regulatory decision makers must employ fallback or "default"
146. See LAPPE & BAILEY, supra note 14, at 14 (arguing that "genetically modified plants
may be much more of a black box than the pseudoscientific terminology of 'transgenic' and
implied genetic control connotes").
147. See 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,987; Public Meeting on Biotech-
nology in the Year 2000 and Beyond by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (Nov. 30, 1999)
(remarks of Samuel B. Lehrer, Tulane University) (arguing that "we should base any deci-
sions on sound scientific principles").
148. See Ralph Nader, Foreword to MARTIN TEITEL & KIMBERLv A. WILSON, GENETICALLY
ENGINEERED FOOD: CHANGING THE NATURE OF NATURE at ix (1999) (arguing that "[g]enetic
engineering-of food and other products-has far outrun the science that must be its first
governing discipline").
149. See TEITEL & WILSON, supra note 24, at 7 (arguing that "[b]ecause so many experts
seem to be tied to personal gain from their involvement in the new technologies, we have to
be careful where to look to find objective and fair information"); EU-U.S. BIOTECHNOLOGY
CONSULTATIVE FORUM, FINAL REPORT 6 (Dec. 2000) (noting that when technological devel-
opments "offer the possibility of considerable immediate benefits and revenues the
tendency--or even temptation-to underestimate potential longer-term risks and dangers is
there").
150. See ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 8 (observing that
"[i] t is now generally recognized in the scholarly literature on the nature of risk analysis that
many aspects of the task of assessing the magnitude of technological risks and managing
them within the limits of safety involve judgments and decisions that are not themselves
strictly scientific"); EU-U.S. CONSULTATIVE FORUM, FINAL REPORT, supra note 149, at 5
("judgments about risk cannot be reduced to scientific assessment alone").
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assumptions in assessing those risks.1 5' To some extent default as-
sumptions depend upon general scientific understandings of how
biological organisms interact with themselves and their environ-
ments. Given the novelty of modern biotechnology and the
aforementioned difficulty in assessing the health risks of GM
plants, however, these understandings may not offer a reliable basis
for deciding how to manage those risks. The fallback assumptions
must therefore depend to a very large degree upon the policies
underlying the relevant regulatory programs. 152 If a program is de-
signed primarily to foster new technologies, then the agency
should employ "realistic" assumptions that do not overestimate the
risks that the technologies pose to health and the environment. If
the program is designed primarily to protect human health and
the environment, then the agency should adopt "conservative" as-
sumptions that avoid underestimating risks.
II. THE SCIENCE AND POLICY OF "SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE"
Almost any food can cause harmful effects in human beings if
care is not taken in its preparation and consumption. Meat must
be cooked to eliminate dangerous microorganisms, some vegeta-
bles must be cooked to neutralize natural toxins that they contain,
and spoiled fruit can make anyone ill. Hence, safety evaluation of
whole foods ordinarily draws on long-time experience with existing
foods and begins with the not unreasonable assumption that foods
prepared and used in traditional ways are generally safe for human
consumption.1 5 3 Thus, few traditionally eaten foods have under-
gone the sort of extensive safety testing that is required for
registering new food additives or new pesticides for uses on food
crops.
Proponents of modern agricultural biotechnologies have at-
tempted to quell what they believe to be irrational public fears by
stressing that genetic engineering is nothing new. 54 It is only the
151. See NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE
FED. GOV'T: MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983) [hereinafter NAS RED BOOK].
152. See ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 8 (risk assessment
involves "value judgments related to such issues as the appropriate way to handle uncertain-
ties in scientific data and results, assignment of the burden of proof among stakeholders in
risk issues, standards of proof, definition of the scope of the risk issue ... and, of course, the
central issue... of what levels of risk should be considered 'acceptable' ").
153. See OECD, SAFETY EVALUATION, 1992, supra note 1, at 10.
154. See, e.g., Cook Testimony, Oct. 5, 1999, supra note 76 (noting that "genetic modifi-
cation of plants for food, agriculture, and the environment is nothing new").
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most recent tool made available through a constantly evolving
process of using scientific knowledge to make safer and higher
quality food available to more human beings.5 5 A regulatory
agency should therefore focus its attention on the product that a
manufacturer is marketing and not upon the process used to make
the product.5 6 Furthermore, there is no particular reason to be-
lieve that the "offspring" of modern genetic engineering
techniques will be any more dangerous that the foods that have
resulted from traditional breeding technologies.5 7 Thus, if the GM
food product is "substantially equivalent" to a non-GM food that
has a history of safe use, it should not be regulated any more strin-
gently simply because it resulted from the novel process.158
Critics believe that modern gene splicing techniques are sui
generis and therefore reject the major premise underlying the "sub-
stantial equivalence" doctrine.1 59 Although traditional breeding
techniques are not strictly "natural," they do "take advantage of
nature's vast storehouse of information, accumulated over millions
of years of experimentation, as to what works and what doesn't,"
thus greatly reducing the potential for catastrophic mistakes.' 60
Modem gene splicing tools, by contrast, can accomplish in a single
generation changes that could never occur in nature. 6' Because
modern genetic engineering is a hit-or-miss process that "dis-
rupt[s] the existing genome in a random way," it is more likely to
155. See Giddings House Testimony, Mar. 3, 1999, supra note 29 (arguing that "biotech-
nology represents another step along the continuum"); U.S. House Seeds of Opportunity Report,
supra note 25, at Letter of Transmittal (stressing that "this technology represents the latest
tool in the continuum of techniques that plant breeders have developed and adopted over
centuries"); OECD EDINBURGH RAPPORTEURS' SUMMARY, supra note 33, at 3.
156. See Public Meeting on Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (Nov. 30, 1999) (remarks of Peter Day, Rutgers University) (agreeing
with FDA focus on product, rather than process); NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 26 ("the products, not the process, would be regulated").
157. See Cook Testimony, Oct. 5, 1999, supra note 76 (finding "no scientifically-based
reason to discriminate against food from genetically modified crops"); U.S. House Seeds of
Opportunity Report, supra note 25, at 3 (finding "nothing to substantiate scientifically the view
that the products of agricultural biotechnology are inherently different or more risky than
similar products of conventional breeding").
158. See Engel, Takeoka & Teranishi, Foods and Food Ingredients, supra note 1, at 7; see also
US. House Seeds of Opportunity Report, supra note 25, at 51.
159. See OECD EDINBURGH RAPPORTEURS' SUMMARY, supra note 33, at 3 (noting that
some see genetic modification "as a fundamental change in the way new crops are pro-
duced").
160. TEITEL & WILSON, supra note 24, at 12.
161. See Goldburg Testimony, Oct. 5, 1999, supra note 135 (noting that traditional
breeding techniques can import desirable traits from a wild variety of potato into potatoes
used for crops, but they "cannot add viral, insect, moth or chicken genes to potatoes");
Engel, Takeoka & Teranishi, Foods and Food Ingredients, supra note 1, at 3-4.
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create unexpected, unintended side effects than the conventional
approaches. 162 Convinced that modem agricultural biotechnologies
represent a "radical departure from traditional plant breeding,"
many critics argue that the regulatory agencies should focus espe-
cially carefully on the potential health risks of GM foods.1 6
Assuming that the substantial equivalence doctrine is correct in
theory, its practical implementation raises a number of conceptual,
policy and institutional questions. Since the purpose of the genetic
engineering exercise is to change the engineered plant in some
commercially useful way (and thereby render the changed plant
not equivalent to the unchanged plant in at least that regard), the
"substantial equivalence" determination requires some exercise of
judgment as to the "substantiality" of the change. What criteria
should guide that exercise of judgment? What evidence is neces-
sary to support a substantial equivalence determination? Who is
qualified to make a substantial equivalence determination? Can it
be made generically for whole classes of GM foods or must each
product be evaluated separately on a case-by-case basis? The legiti-
macy of substantial equivalence as a guiding regulatory principle
depends importantly upon the answers to these questions as well as
on the plausibility of the theory as a scientific matter.
The "substantial equivalence" concept as applied to GM foods
was the brainchild of a 1992 Working Group established by the Or-
ganisation of Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)
to study how countries should go about evaluating the safety of GM
foods.16' Drawing on material from several international confer-
ences and intergovernmental consultations, the OECD Working
Group decided that "substantial equivalence" was "the most practi-
cal way to address the issue of food safety at this time."" The
Working Group suggested that the substantial equivalence deter-
mination should be based upon three primary factors:
(1) knowledge of the composition and characteristics of
the traditional or parental product or organism;
162. Fagan Remarks, Dec. 13, 1999, supra note 76, at 90; see also Conway, Crop Biotechnol-
ogy, supra note 65, at 3; IkITEL & WILSON, supra note 24, at 12.
163. TnITEL & WILSON, supra note 24, at 12.
164. OECD, SAFETY EVALUATION, 1992, supra note 1 at 11; see also ROYAL SOCIETv OF
CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 179.
165. OECD, SAFETY EVALUATION, 1992, supra note 1, at 6. The idea of comparing a
modified plant with the unmodified predecessor to assess the effects of the changes in the
plant is the traditional way of assessing the novel traits of hybrid plants designed through




(2) knowledge of the characteristics of the new compo-
nent(s) or trait(s) derived... ;
(3) knowledge of the new product/organism with the
new components or trait(s) .... .66
For GM foods and food components determined to be substan-
tially equivalent to the parental products, the Working Group
believed that further safety concerns were likely to be "insignifi-
cant" and the GM food could be treated for regulatory purposes
just like the natural counterpart. For foods and food components
determined not to be substantially equivalent, the Working Group
recommended that the regulatory agency focus on the identified
differences between the GM food and its natural counterpart. Only
when there was no basis whatsoever for comparisons with unmodi-
fied foods should the GM food be evaluated on the basis of "its
own composition and properties."
1 67
Several aspects of the Working Group's list of decision-making
criteria are noteworthy. First, the fact that the change was accom-
plished through genetic engineering, rather than traditional plant
breeding, is noticeably absent from the list because the baseline
assumption of the substantial equivalence doctrine is that there is
nothing inherently novel about plant breeding through modern
genetic engineering. Second, the fact that the decision maker must
make the determination upon knowledge of a highly technical
character strongly suggests that the decision maker must be an ex-
pert in understanding the composition and characteristics of
plants and in comparing plant traits. Third, the determination ap-
parently may be based upon existing knowledge, and additional
scientific study of the characteristics of the modified plant is re-
quired only when comparisons are otherwise impossible. Finally, it
is not clear on the face of the criteria whether generic, rather than
individual, determinations are generally acceptable.
Proponents of agricultural biotechnologies are strong support-
ers of the "substantial equivalence" doctrine.16 They caution that
"[d]etermining conclusively that genetic modification-whether
done through traditional breeding techniques or biotechnology-
has not resulted in any unexpected events in the plant is extremely
166. OECD, SAFETY EVALUATION, 1992, supra note 1, at 11.
167. Id. at 11-12.
168. U.S. House Seeds of Opportunity Report, supra note 25, at 51; Engel, Takeoka & Teran-
ishi, Foods and Food Ingredients, supra note 1, at 7.
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difficult." 169 For starters, it could require testing of whole foods in
laboratory animals, a practice that is very difficult to accomplish in
the real world and may not in any event yield useful results.1° The
substantial equivalence doctrine represents a more "practical"
(and, incidentally, less expensive) approach, because it does not
require a great deal of testing and modeling.17 1 It makes little sense,
in their view, to go to the trouble of toxicity testing for GM foods
that are substantially equivalent to unmodified foods when the GM
foods are not likely to be any more dangerous that their unmodi-
fied counterparts.
72
For someone less concerned about the cost of winning approval
for new foods, however, "there would appear to be an intrinsic con-
tradiction between the presence of 'novelty' in a new plant
genotype and a designation of 'equivalence.' ,173 Critics of the sub-
stantial equivalence doctrine argue that a regulatory system based
upon substantial equivalence is not "set up to identify unexpected
changes in food." 74 They do not trust expert decision makers em-
ploying the substantial equivalence doctrine to take into account
all of the subtle changes in delicately balanced biochemical path-
ways within genetically engineered plants that may affect the safety
or environmental impact of those plants.175 Since it is sufficient un-
der the substantial equivalence doctrine to compare the modified
organism with any varieties within the same species, the modified
organism "could have the worst characteristics of all the varieties
and still be considered substantially equivalent."
176
The most disturbing aspect of the substantial equivalence doc-
trine to its critics is its subjectivity. No standardized objective tests
for determining equivalence and measuring substantiality exist,
and the OECD criteria are sufficiently vague and flexible to permit
169. U.S. House Seeds of Opportunity Report, supra note 25, at 52.
170. Taylor Testimony, Oct. 19, 1999, supra note 142 (arguing that laboratory animal
testing of whole GM foods "would be tremendously unfocused, wasteful of laboratory animal
resources, and unlikely to detect any harmful substances, even if they were present").
171. OECD, SAFETY EVALUATION, 1992, supra note 1, at 11.
172. See Taylor Testimony, Oct. 19, 1999, supra note 142 (arguing that "testing would be
tremendously unfocused, wasteful of laboratory animal resources, and unlikely to detect any
harmful substances, even if they were present").
173. ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 181.
174. Andy Coghlan,Judging Gene Foods, NEW SCIENTIST, Apr. 15, 2000, at 4 (quoting Sue
Mayer of GeneWatch UK).
175. Regal Remarks, Dec. 13, 1999, supra note 122 (arguing that inserted genes may
change "delicately balanced biochemical pathways").
176. Mae-Wan Ho, Dangerous Liaison-Deadly Gamble, in NAT'L AGRic. BIOTECHNOLOGY
COUNCIL REPORT 10, AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: GENE
ESCAPE AND PEST RESISTANCE 105, 107 (Ralph W.E. Hardy & Jane Baker Segelken eds.,
1998) [hereinafter Ho, Dangerous Liaison].
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a great deal of discretion. 7 To the extent that the expert decision
makers work for the regulated industries, they cannot be trusted to
exercise their discretion in the broader public interest. To the ex-
tent that they are relatively low-level agency employees, industry
lobbyists can quietly but effectively influence discretionary deci-
sion-making. Because it is based in large part on a policy
determination that agencies and companies should not have to
waste resources on unnecessary testing and evaluation, the substan-
tial equivalence doctrine is not so much a "scientific" risk
assessment tool as it is an excuse for regulatory agencies to avoid
their responsibilities.
7 8
Despite these criticisms, the substantial equivalence doctrine is
the bedrock principle underlying the current regulatory regime
for biotechnology in the United States. The initial regulatory
structure for biotechnology was erected in a 1986 "Coordinated
Regulatory Framework" devised by an Administration that was very
reluctant to impose regulatory restrictions on a rapidly developing
new industry. The bedrock principles underlying that framework
were that the "techniques of biotechnology are not inherently risky
and that biotechnology should not be regulated as a process, but
rather that the products of biotechnology should be regulated in
the same way as products of other technologies."' 79 Toward the end
of the first Bush Administration, the White House Office of Sci-
ence and Technology Policy published a "Statement of Scope" for
regulating biotechnology that adopted a "risk-based approach"
under which regulatory oversight would focus on the "characteris-
tics and risks of the biotechnology product-not the process by
which it was created. """' In a private meeting, Vice President Dan
Quayle ensured representatives of the biotechnology industry that
the new policy was designed to provide "regulatory relief' for the
177. See id. at 107 (noting that "there are no defined tests that products have to go
through to establish substantial equivalence").
178. See id. at 107 (substantial equivalence doctrine is "the stuff of farce"); TEITEL &
WILSON, supra note 24, at 68 (an agency applying substantial equivalence doctrine "has de-
cided in advance not to conduct the prudent steps toward protecting public health and
safety that would in fact fulfill the agency's mandate"). The Royal Society of Canada expert
report concluded that, in practice, the substantial equivalence doctrine "does not function
as a scientific basis for the application of a safety standard, but rather as a decision proce-
dure for facilitating the passage of new products, GM and non-GM, through the regulatory
process." ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 182.
179. NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 26.
180. Office of Science and Technology Policy, Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of
Statutory Authority: Planned Introductions of Biotechnology Products Into the Environment, 57 Fed.
Reg. 6753 (1992).
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fledgling industry so that it would remain a world leader."" The
Clinton Administration did nothing to change that approach until
its waning moments when FDA proposed regulations that implicitly
rejected the major premise in requiring companies to provide no-
tice to the agency of their plans to market new GM foods.12 The
current Bush Administration, however, has not finalized that pro-
posal.
The following description of the programs established by FDA
and EPA for regulating GM foods reveals an almost impenetrable
complexity that is easily capable of discouraging all but the most
determined efforts by the uninitiated observer to ascertain how the
agencies are fulfilling their regulatory responsibilities. The ob-
server's somewhat surprising reward for the effort is the discovery
that for all its complexity, the regulatory regime requires remarka-
bly little of the companies that develop and market GM foods. The
sponsor of a GM food can at all critical junctures either substan-
tially diminish regulatory oversight or avoid it altogether by
successfully invoking the principle of substantial equivalence.
III. FDA REGULATION OF GM FOODS
FDA's authority to regulate GM foods ultimately flows from its
authority to regulate "adulterated foods." Under Section 402 (a) (1)
of the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA), a food is deemed
adulterated if it "bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious
substance which may render it injurious to health."'8 3 Foods that
are adulterated are subject to the full range of enforcement meas-
ures under the act, including seizure, injunction, and criminal
prosecution. 4 Interestingly, the statute does not define "poisonous
or deleterious," and the FDA has consistently declined to provide a
definition for those terms in its implementing regulations.185
181. Warren E. Leary, Cornucopia of New Foods Is Seen as Policy on Engineering Is Eased, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 1992, at A16.
182. See discussion infra Part 11I.C.
183. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1)(1994). According to the statute and FDA regulations, the
word "food" means "(1) articles used for food or drink for man or other animals, (2) chew-
ing gum, and (3) articles used for components of any such article." 21 U.S.C.
§ 321 (f)(1994). The term includes human food, substances migrating to food from food-
contact articles, pet food, and animal feed. 21 C.ER. § 170.3(m).
184. See 21 U.S.C. § 333 (1994) (penalties); 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1994) (seizure).
185. See Poisonous or Deleterious Substances, 42 Fed. Reg. 52,814, 52,816 (Sept. 30,
1977); Noah & Merrill, Starting from Scratch, supra note 5, at 335 n.17.
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Although a GM pest-resistant plant might otherwise fall within
FDA's authority to regulate adulterated foods, the agency in 1992
announced that it had ceded to EPA all regulatory authority over
plants genetically modified to express pesticidal substances so long
as they have not also been modified to express nonpesticidal sub-186
stances. FDA and EPA agree that such plants are in fact pesticides
and thus subject to EPA's exclusive jurisdiction. Questions over
whether a particular genetically engineered plant species is or is
not subject to EPA's exclusive jurisdiction are to be raised with
EPA, not FDA.' 8 Plants genetically engineered to enhance plant
resistance to chemical herbicides, on the other hand, are generally
not pesticides and are therefore subject to FDA's exclusive jurisdic-
tion.
189
A substance in food that is not an added substance (a "naturally
occurring substance" in FDA parlance),0 does not render the food
adulterated if the quantity of that substance in the food does not
ordinarily render the food "injurious to health."'' FDA reads the
statute to impose a legal duty on those who introduce food into the
market place, including food derived from new crop varieties, to
ensure that the introduced food satisfies the "injurious to health"
standard. 2 The agency has relied almost exclusively upon this




190. Id. at 22,988.
191. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a) (1) (1994). A food is also deemed adulterated if it "bears or con-
tains any added poisonous or added deleterious substance (other than a pesticide, a food
additive, a color additive, or a new animal drug) that is unsafe within the meaning of section
406." 21 U.S.C. § 342(a) (2) (A) (1994) (emphasis added). Section 406 in turn provides that
any "poisonous or deleterious substance" deliberately added to any food must be deemed
unsafe tinder section 402(a) (2) (A), unless it is "required in the production" of the food or
"cannot be avoided by good manufacturing practice," in which case FDA must promulgate
regulations limiting the quantity of the added substance to the extent "necessary for the
protection of public health," after which any quantity exceeding those limits must also be
deemed to be unsafe. 21 U.S.C. § 346 (1994). In setting "tolerances" limiting the quantity of
added stbstances in food, FDA must "take into account the extent to which the use of such
substance is required or cannot be avoided in the production of each such article, and the
other ways in which the consumer may be affected by the same or other poisonous or dele-
terious substances." 21 U.S.C. § 346 (1994). This provision will probably not be applicable to
GM foods in the near term, because any added substances resulting from genetic modifica-
tion are probably not required in the production of most foods and can be avoided merely
by allowing the food to go unmodified. It could become relevant in the fuiture as manufac-
turers use modern genetic engineering techniqtes to design new foods that did not exist
prior to the genetic modification. It is, for example, conceivable that some substance result-
ing from the genetic modification might be required in the production of the GM food or
otherwise unavoidable.
192. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,988.
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legal obligation "to ensure the safety of whole foods." 9 FDA has
rarely taken regulatory action with respect to naturally occurring
substances in whole foods because, in FDA's experience, "such
cases are typically well known and carefully avoided by food pro-
ducers." 
194
Under Section 402(b) (1) of the FDCA, a food is deemed adul-
terated if "any valuable constituent has been in whole or in part
omitted or abstracted therefrom . ,,"95 Perhaps of greater rele-
vance to genetically modified foods, section 402(b) (2) provides
that a food is deemed adulterated if "any substance has been sub-
stituted wholly or in part therefor....,196 A food is also deemed
adulterated if "damage or inferiority has been concealed," or if
"any substance has been added" to it "to increase its bulk or weight,
or reduce its quality or strength, or make it appear better or of
greater value than it is. ' ' 197 Although some genetic modifications of
foods have achieved the desired results by omitting constituents
from the plant, and at least some genetic modifications of plants
might arguably substitute a new substance for an existing sub-
stance, the agency has not invoked its authority under Section
402(b) to regulate GM foods.
A. Food Additives
In addressing GM foods, FDA has thus far relied almost exclu-
sively on its power to regulate food additives. Section 402(a) (2) (C)
193. Id.
194. Id. FDA's general reluctance to regulate naturally occurring substances in food is
understandable for two reasons. First, since manufacturers of foods not containing added
substances have no statutory obligation to test such foods or to notify FDA of the results of
any testing, FDA is likely to become aware of any adverse effects attributable to such non-
added substances only after illnesses or deaths have occurred and epidemiological investiga-
tions have identified the culprit. Second, as Professor Merrill has noted, in order to meet its
statutory burden of proving that a non-added substance in food would "ordinarily render it
injurious to health," FDA "would have to demonstrate a probability of harm to some signifi-
cant number of consumers." Richard A. Merrill, Regulating Carcinogens in Food: A Legislator's
Guide to the Food Safety Provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 77 MICH. L. REV.
171, 189 (1978); see also Noah & Merrill, Startingfrom Scratch, supra note 5, at 334 n. 15. Meet-
ing this burden might well require the agency to conduct extensive animal tests, exposure
analyses, and pharmacokinetic studies. As a result, FDA has tended to search for some way to
regard suspect substances in food as "added" so as to reduce the threshold for regulatory
action. Id.; Richard A. Merrill & Michael Schewell, FDA Regulation of Environmental Contami-
nants of Food, 66 VA. L. REV. 1357 (1980).
195. 21 U.S.C. § 342(b)(1) (1994).
196. 21 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2) (1994).
197. 21 U.S.C. § 342(b)(3)-(4) (1994).
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of the FDCA provides that a food shall be deemed adulterated if it
contains "any food additive that is unsafe within the meaning of
section 409," and that section provides that a "food additive" is
deemed unsafe for purposes of section 402(a)(2)(C) unless the
additive and its use or intended use conform to the terms of a
regulation promulgated by FDA allowing that additive in food.i
This broad grant of authority also allows FDA to regulate additives
to the feed and water of animals from which meat, milk and eggs
are derived for human consumption.199
Ordinarily, FDA issues a food additive regulation in response to
a petition filed by the manufacturer of the additive or food under
section 409(b). Among other things, the food additive petition
must contain "full reports of investigations made with respect to
the safety for use of such additive. . . .,,20 The regulation granting a
food additive petition must specify "the conditions under which
such additive may be safely used," including "labeling or packaging
requirements for such additive deemed necessary ... to assure the
safety of such use."20 ' The agency may not grant the petition if the
information available to the agency "fails to establish that the pro-
posed use of the food additive, under the conditions of use to be
specified in the regulation, will be safe .... As FDA interprets
section 409, the "safety" finding requires the proponent of a food
additive "to demonstrate to a reasonable certainty that no harm
will result from the intended use of the additive."2 3
The agency must publish notice of its receipt of a food additive




198. 21 U.S.C. § 348(a)(2) (1994). In addition to a regulation allowing the additive in
food, FDA may grant an "investigational use" exemption provided for under section 409(j).
For a good description of the food additive petition process, see generally Noah & Merrill,
Starting from Scratch, supra note 5, at pt. III.
199. See 21 C.F.R. § 573 (2001) (listing approved food additives permitted in feed and
water of animals).
200. 21 U.S.C. § 348(b) (1994); see also Noah & Merrill, Starting from Scratch, supra note
5, at 369.
201. 21U.S.C.§348(c)(1) (1994).
202. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994). In making the "safety determination," the agency
must consider "the probable consumption" of the additive and related substances, the cu-
mulative dietary effect of the additive and chemically similar substances, and (most
importantly) "safety factors which in the opinion of experts qualified by scientific training
and experience to evaluate the safety of food additives are generally recognized as appropri-
ate for the use of animal experimentation data." 21 U.S.C. § 348(c) (5) (1994).
203. See21 C.F.R. § 170.3(i) (2001). In addition, the agency may not issue a regulation if
the data show that "the proposed use of the additive would promote deception of the con-
sumer in violation of this [Act] or would otherwise result in adulteration or in misbranding
of food within the meaning of this [Act]." 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(B) (1994).
204. 21 U.S.C. § 348(b)(5)(1994).
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Although the statute does not provide explicitly for a period of
public comment on the petition, 0' FDA allows interested members
of the public to review the scientific information underlying the
petition at any time, and the preamble to its rules of practice and
procedure suggests a general willingness to consider any public
comments that it receives during the time that it is conducting its
review.' Any person aggrieved by an order approving or disap-
proving a petition may demand a formal rulemaking hearing,0 v but
2011
such hearings are extremely rare.
B. The GRAS Concept
The term "food additive" is defined in the statute to mean any
substance that is intended for use in or which may reasonably be
expected to become a component of or otherwise affect the char-
acteristics of any food, but only if the substance "is not generally
recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and ex-
perience to evaluate its safety, as having been adequately shown
through scientific procedures (or, in the case of a substance used
in food prior to January 1, 1958, through either scientific proce-
dures or experience based on common use in food) to be safe
under the conditions of its intended use ... .,,209 Thus, ingredients
derived from natural sources (e.g., salt, pepper, vinegar, and
spices) and a large number of chemical additives (e.g., artificial
flavoring agents) have escaped formal food additive review because
they are "generally recognized as safe" (GRAS).21° Since additives to
animal feed can become a component of or otherwise affect the
characteristics of food, they too are subject to FDA regulation to
the extent that meat, milk and eggs derived from such animals are
used for human consumption.
FDA's regulations define "common use in food" for purposes es-
tablishing a substance's GRAS status as "a substantial history of
205. See Noah & Merrill, Starting from Scratch, supra note 5, at 370.
206. Administrative Practices and Procedures; Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 40 Fed.
Reg. 40,682, 40,699 (Food & Drug Admin., Sept. 3, 1975).
207. 21 U.S.C. 348(f(1) (1994).
208. See Noah & Merrill, Starting from Scratch, supra note 5, at 374.
209. 21 U.S.C. § 321 (s) (1994).
210. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,989.
211. See 21 C.F.R. § 5 7 0.3(g) (2001) (defining "substance" in the definition of "food ad-
ditive" to include "a food or feed or a component of a food or feed consisting of one or
more ingredients"); 21 C.FR. pt. 573 (2001) (listing approved food additives permitted in
feed and water of animals).
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consumption of a substance for food use by a significant number of
consumers."2112 While the prior use route to GRAS status does not
require "the quantity or quality of scientific procedures required
for approval of a food additive regulation," it must "ordinarily be
based upon generally available data and information. "'3 The alter-
native "scientific procedures" route to GRAS status must be based
upon scientific studies of the "same quantity and quality" as the
studies generally required to obtain approval of a food additive pe-
214tition.
The primary distinction between the requirements necessary for
GRAS status and those necessary for food additive status is the
element of "common knowledge" that must characterize conclu-
sions about the former.1 5 The manufacturer must be prepared to
"show that there is a consensus of expert opinion regarding the
safety of the use of the substance. ,'2' Although unanimity is not re-
quired, 2 11 "the existence of a severe conflict among experts
regarding the safety of the use of a substance precludes a finding
of general recognition., 21 s A 1997 proposed clarification to the
GRAS regulations observed that "[t] he usual mechanism to estab-
lish that scientific information is generally available is to show that
the information is published in a peer-reviewed scientific jour-
nal." "1' The agency recognized, however, that common knowledge
in the scientific community could also be based upon "(1)
[p]ublication of data and information in the secondary scientific
literature, such as scientific review articles, textbooks, and com-
pendia; (2) documentation of the opinion of an 'expert panel' that
is specifically convened for this purpose; or (3) the opinion or rec-
ommendation of an authoritative body.220
212. 21 C.F.R. § 170.3(f) (2001).
213. 21 C.F.R. § 170.30(c)(i) (2001).
214. 21 C.F.R. § 170.30(b) (2001).
215. 21 C.F.R. § 170.30(a) (2001) (GRAS determination must be based upon "common
knowledge about the substance throughout the scientific community knowledgeable about
the safety of substances directly or indirectly added to food"); Substances Generally Recog-
nized as Safe, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 62 Fed. Reg. 18,938, 18,940 (proposed Apr.
17, 1997) [hereinafter FDA, 1997 GRAS NPRM].
216. FDA, 1997 GRAS NPRM, supra note 215, at 18,939; see also Noah & Merrill, Starting
from Scratch, supra note 5, at 352 (GRAS determination requires a "fairly high level of scien-
tific consensus").
217. See United States . Articles of Food & Drug, 518 F.2d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 1975)
("What is required is not unanimous recognition but general recognition."); see also FDA,
1997 GRAS NPRM, supra note 215, at 18,939 ("Unanimity among experts regarding safety of
a substance is not required.").
218. FDA, 1997 GRAS NPRM, supra note 208, at 18,939.
219. Id. at 18,940.
220. Id. at 18,941.
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Ultimately, the agency leaves it up to the manufacturer to de-
termine whether an added substance is GRAS.2   Manufacturers
frequently contract with private standard-setting agencies or panels
assembled by trade associations to make GRAS determinations for
particular substances.222 A manufacturer may even establish the
GRAS status of a substance based upon "scientific procedures"
223when the substance has never been used in food at all. Thus, it is
conceivable that a manufacturer could design a brand new food
additive (e.g., through genetic modification techniques), conduct
its own scientific studies, publish the results of those studies in the
scientific literature or circulate them widely (e.g., on the internet),
monitor comments from interested scientists, and allow a favorably
disposed panel assembled by a trade association to conclude on the
basis of the resulting "common knowledge" that the substance is
GRAS.
The manufacturer does not even need to tell the agency that it
has made a GRAS determination with respect to a substance that it
224has added to food. FDA has, however, established an "affirma-
tion" process under which a manufacturer may petition for and
receive an agency affirmation that a particular substance is GRAS,
thereby shielding the product from enforcement actions.2 5 Al-
though the affirmation process is time-consuming, the agency
refrains from taking enforcement during the time that it considers
the affirmation petition.22 7 If the manufacturer declines to consult
with FDA, the agency may exercise its powers to seize foods con-
221. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,989 ("[C]ompanies developing
new ingredients, new versions of established ingredients, or new processes for producing a
food or food ingredient must make ajudgment about whether the resulting food substance
is a food additive requiring pre-market approval by FDA."); Bohrer, Biotechnolog,, supra note
11, at 659; Noah & Merrill, Starting from Scratch, supra note 5, at 359 (noting that "FDA has
acknowledged, albeit with some reluctance, that the maker or user of a substance may reach
its own conclusion that a particular food use is GRAS").
222. Noah & Merrill, Startingfrom Scratch, supra note 5, at 359-62.
223. See General Recognition of Safety and Prior Sanctions for Food Ingredients, 39
Fed. Reg. 34,194 (Food & Drug Admin., Sep. 23, 1974) ("GRAS status may be achieved for
post-1958 food ingredients on the basis of scientific procedures even prior to any significant
history of marketing and use.").
224. FDA, 1997 GRAS NPRM, supra note 215, at 18,941 (FDA concludes that "a manu-
facturer may market a substance that the manufacturer determines is GRAS without
informing the agency").
225. 40 C.F.R. § 170.35 (2001); see Noah & Merrill, Starting from Scratch, supra note 5, at
364.
226. The GRAS affirmation process itself averages seven years to completion. Noah &
Merrill, Starting from Scratch, supra note 5, at 379; see also FDA, 1997 GRAS NPRM, supra note
208, at 18,941 (observing that "GRAS affirmation involves the resource-intensive rulemaking
process").
227. See Noah & Merrill, Startingfrom Scratch, supra note 5, at 364.
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taining the additive as adulterated -. 2 2 Although FDA takes the posi-
tion that a manufacturer claiming GRAS status for a substance has
the burden of proving that it meets the GRAS criteria in an en-
forcement action, '2 9 the agency may as a practical matter have the
burden of demonstrating to a court in an enforcement action that
the substance is in fact not GRAS and that the food is therefore
adulterated before a court will be willing to order food containing
that substance seized and held or destroyed.3 °
C. FDA Implementation Activities
On May 29, 1992, FDA issued a "Policy Statement" on "Foods
Derived from New Plant Varieties" providing detailed guidance for
voluntary compliance with the agency's regulatory requirements
for GM foods. The policy statement defined "genetic modifica-
tion" broadly to mean "the alteration of the genotype of a plant
using any technique, new or traditional." 232 Under this definition,
"most, if not all, cultivated food crops have been genetically modi-
fied."23 3 FDA thus specifically declined to allow the process used to
manufacture the food determine (or even significantly affect) the
regulatory approach that the agency applied.234 Acknowledging
that "[a]ny genetic modification technique has the potential to
alter the composition of food in a manner relevant to food safety,"
FDA was convinced that "based on experience, the likelihood of a
228. FDA, 1997 GRAS NPRM, supra note 208, at 18,939; 1992 FDA Policy Statement, su-
pra note 17, at 22,989; see also Noah & Merrill, Starting from Scratch, supra note 5, at 377
(warning that "[a] manufacturer that markets a food containing a novel and poorly studied
ingredient faces a significant risk that the FDA will challenge the product on the grotnd
that it contains an unapproved additive").
229. See FDA, 1997 GRAS NPRM, supra note 215, at 18,939. At least one court of appeals
has agreed with FDA's position. United States v. An Article of Food, 752 F.2d 11, 15 (1st Cir.
1985) (stating that "[t]he burden of proving general recognition of safe use is placed on the
proponent of the food substance in question").
230. See PETER BARTON HuTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG IAw 333 (2d
ed. 1991).
231. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17. On September 29, 2000, the District
Court for the District of Columbia dismissed a consumer group challenge to the 1992 policy
statement. Alliance for Bio-lntegrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D.D.C. 2000). Two im-
portant aspects of that opinion will be discussed below. See infra Parts III.C., III.D.4.
232. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,984.
233. Id. at 22,984 n.3.
234. Id. at 22,988 (taking the position that "[tihe regulatory status of a food, irrespec-
tive of the method by which it is developed, is dependent upon objective characteristics of
the food and the intended use of the food (or its components)").
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safety hazard is typically very low.,, 235 The policy statement noted
that "[p] lant breeders using well established practices have success-
fully identified and eliminated plants that exhibit unexpected,
adverse traits prior to commercial use,26 and it anticipated that
they would take the same precautions with GM plants.
The court in Alliance For Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, in a brief three-
paragraph analysis, held that FDA had not been arbitrary and ca-
pricious in affording a presumption of GRAS status to GM foods.237
The court noted that, under the 1992 Policy Statement, a manufac-
turer asserting GRAS status for a GM plant was required to meet
two criteria: "it must have technical evidence of safety, usually in
published scientific studies, and ... this technical evidence must be
generally known and accepted in the scientific community."238 Be-
cause the agency had not made them part of the official record,
the court ignored numerous internal agency documents produced
during discovery that strongly suggested that there was "significant
disagreement" among the agency's own scientists as to the safety of
GM foods. -39
FDA decided in late 1999 to hold a series of public hearings to
revisit the 1992 Policy Statement. The agency's apparent willing-
ness to consider a new approach inspired the same groups that
challenged the 1992 Policy Statement in court to file a petition on
March 21, 2000 demanding that FDA repeal that policy and prom-
ulgate rules requiring GM foods to be evaluated as food additives
and to be appropriately labeled. 240 The petition made liberal use of
internal FDA documents indicating that the agency staff did not
agree with many of the scientific assessments underlying the 1992
Policy Statement. In particular, it quoted from numerous internal
documents in which FDA scientists challenged the notion that
modern genetic engineering techniques were merely extensions of
traditional breeding techniques. 4'
On May 3, 2000, FDA announced that it would propose new
regulations governing genetically modified foods, in light of the
235. Id. at 22,986.
236. Id. at 22,987.
237. AllianceforBi-Integrity, 116 F Supp. 2d at 179.
238. Id. at 177.
239. Id.
240. Center for Food Safety Petition Seeking the Establishment of Mandatory Pre-
Market Safety Testing, Pre-Market Environmental Review & Labeling for All Genetically
Engineered Foods (Mar. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Center for Food Safety, FDA Petition,
3/21/2000].
241. Center for Food Safety, FDA Petition, 3/21/2000, supra note 240, at § I.B. The
documents also revealed staff concerns for the toxic and allergenic potential of GM plants
and the possibility of stimulating antibiotic resistant pathogens. Id. at § II passim.
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public hearings.42 The proposed regulations, along with guidelines
for labeling genetically modified foods, were published in the Fed-
eral Register on January 18, 2001 .243 The proposed regulations would
require manufacturers and importers to provide FDA with pre-
market notification of their intent to market GM foods that have
not been subject to a previous pre-market notification. The label-
ing guidelines do not require that GM foods be labeled, but
instead offer suggestions for statements that would be appropriate
on labels of foods consisting of or containing materials from GM
plants.
244
Immediately following the 2001 inauguration of President
George W. Bush, Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card wrote a memoran-
dum to the heads and acting heads of all executive agencies asking
them to withdraw from the Office of the Federal Register (OFR) all
proposed and final regulations that the departments and agencies
had submitted to the OFR but which hand not yet been published
in the Federal Register.24"' The FDA proposed regulations had already
been published, however, and they will presumably be reviewed by
the new Administration during the time allowed for the public to
comment on their contents. In the meantime, the agency appar-
ently continues to adhere to the 1992 Policy Statement.
D. The Role of Substantial Equivalence in FDA's Regulation of GM Foods
FDA's May, 1992 Policy Statement recognizes that "the trans-
ferred genetic material and the intended expression product or
products" in GM foods would ordinarily be "food additives" if those
materials were not GRAS.246 Although the agency may invoke the
FDCA's formal food additive procedures "in cases where safety
questions exist sufficient to warrant formal premarket review by
242. Press Release, Food & Drug Administration, FDA to Strengthen Pre-Market Review
of Bioengineered Foods (May 3, 2000), available at www.fea.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/
NEW00726.html.
243. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706 (Food &
Drug Administration, proposed Sept. 22, 2000) [hereinafter FDA Proposed Bioengineered
Food Regulations, 2000].
244. Draft Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have
or Have Not Been Developed Using Bioengineering, 66 Fed. Reg. 4839 (Food & Drug Ad-
ministration, Nov. 15, 2000).
245. Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies from Andrew H. Card, Jr., 66 Fed. Reg. 7702 (Jan. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Card
Memorandum,Jan. 20, 2001].
246. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,990.
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FDA to ensure public health protection,"247 it anticipates that "[i]n
most cases, the substances expected to become components of
food as a result of genetic modification of a plant will be the same
as or substantially similar to substances commonly found in food,
such as proteins, fats and oils, and carbohydrates" and would
therefore pass the GRAS test.248 The primary exceptions to the
agency's willingness to presume that added substances are GRAS
involve transfers of genes coding for proteins, carbohydrates, fats
or oils that: (1) can cause allergenic responses in some consumers,
(2) are known to be toxic, or (3) are likely to become a "macro-
constituent in the human or animal diet" and thereby affect the
nutritional value of the genetically modified food . 9
The guidance document that accompanied the policy statement
(the 1992 Guidelines) provides an "assessment scheme" that fo-
cuses on the "characteristics of the new plant variety, based on
characteristics of the host and donor species, the nature of the ge-
netic change, the identity and function of newly introduced
substances, and unexpected or unintended effects that accompany
the genetic change."250 The heart of the assessment scheme is a
group of flow charts that pose a series of relevant questions about
the host plants, donor species, and the introduced substances. The
flow charts lead to three possible endpoints-"(1) [n]o concerns,
(2) new variety not acceptable, and (3) consult FDA.' 25'1 The "scien-
tific concepts" underlying the guidance document are "consistent
with the concepts of substantial equivalence of new foods discussed
in [the OECD document] .2,2 Thus, the "substantial equivalence"
doctrine sets the tone for the agency's general approach to evaluat-
ing the food additive status of GM foods. The following analysis of
the agency's reasoning process suggests that the agency may have
allowed substantial equivalence to serve as a convenient vehicle for
avoiding its statutory responsibilities under the FDCA.
1. The Status of Proteins Produced by the Host Plant-The purpose
of a gene splicing exercise is usually to cause a plant to increase or
decrease the level of a protein that the plant previously produced
or to produce a protein that the plant had not previously pro-
duced. When a genetic modification causes the plant to produce
more or less of a protein that the plant previously produced, the
247. Id.
248. Id. at 22,985 (emphasis added).
249. Id. at 22,993 fig. 1.
250. Id. at 22,992.
251. Id.
252. Id. (emphasis added).
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genetic modification might change the amount of the protein in
the plant or change the amount of substances (carbohydrates, fats
and oils) produced by the action of protein enzymes.2' 3 The host
species itself is the primary focus of the safety inquiry in such cases,
and the 1992 Guidelines suggest that the manufacturers first exam-
ine whether the host species has a history of safe use.254
a. Host Species With a History of Safe Use-The 1992 Guidelines
reflect a "basic" premise, flowing from the substantial equivalence
principle, "that a long history of safe use of the host species in food
provides much information regarding the potential" of GM varie-
ties "to produce toxicants and antinutrients (substances that
adversely affect the nutritional quality of food) ." If the host plant
has a history of safe use and additional testing does not appear
"warranted," then the inquiry shifts to whether the concentration
and bioavailability of important nutrients in the food produced by
the modified plant are within the range ordinarily seen in the host
species.256 If so, "no concerns" are raised regarding the GRAS status
of the GM food.2'7 If not, appropriate labeling might be required
under the FDCA's labeling authorities.25
The Guidelines offer only the vaguest suggestions for determin-
ing whether testing is "warranted" for host species with a history of
safe use. Noting that it is "not possible to establish a complete list
of all toxicants that should be considered for each plant species,"
the Guidelines suggest that the naturally occurring toxicants in the
host species of highest concern are those that have been "docu-
mented to cause harm in normal or animal diets" or that have
been "found at unsafe levels in some lines or varieties of that spe-
cies or related species.",2 5 In many cases, "characteristic properties
(such as a bitter taste associated with alkaloids)" provide telltale
signs of the presence of specific natural toxicants. 26° When such
characteristics provide "an assurance" that such toxicants are not
present in unsafe levels, analytical or toxicological tests might not
261be necessary.
253. Bohrer, Biotechnology, supra note 11, at 657.
254. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,995 fig. 2. The Policy Statement
suggests that testing may be required if the host species is an "exotic species" that does not
have a history of safe use. Id. at 22,996.
255. Id. at 22,994.
256. Id. at 22,995 fig. 2.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 22,996.
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This wholesale delegation to the manufacturer of the safety as-
sessment process seems inconsistent with the regulatory regime
established by Congress for food additives. The Guidelines appear
to erect an extra-statutory generic presumption that any change
that results in an increase or decrease in the levels of a protein that
already exists in a food plant, whether or not it is known to be
toxic, is safe unless the manufacturer, in the exercise of its scien-
tific judgment, concludes that further testing is necessary. If the
legality of this subtle shift in the burden of proof from the manu-
facturer to the agency is questionable, its wisdom as a matter of
public policy is even less clear.
Modifying a food plant with a history of safe use to decrease the
level of a previously produced expression product might not at first
glance appear to raise a "food additive" question at all, because the
result of the modification is to take away, rather than add a sub-
stance to the food. A closer inspection, however, reveals that the
food additive provisions of section 409 are implicated. The modifi-
cation constitutes the addition of a substance (the gene) that
"otherwise affects the characteristics" of the food: The statutory
definition of "food additive" does not require that the change af-
fect the characteristics of the food in an adverse way. Thus, even
changes that decrease the level of an expression product raise the
GRAS question.
When the expression product being reduced is a substance that
is "already present at generally comparable or greater levels in cur-
rently consumed foods," the Guidelines apply the substantial
equivalence doctrine to conclude that there is "unlikely to be a
safety question sufficient to call into question the presumed GRAS
status of such naturally occurring substances. 2 63 The Guidelines
further apply the substantial equivalence doctrine to conclude that
"minor variations in molecular structure" in the expressed prod-
ucts that do not affect safety will not ordinarily affect the GRAS
262. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1994).
263. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,990. FDA's very first request for an
informal food additive consultation regarding a GM food-a request from Calgene Corp.
regarding the status of its new FLAVR SAVR® genetically modified tomato-involved a ge-
netic engineering exercise that reduced the level of a previously expressed protein. Calgene,
1992 Advisory Opinion Request. Calgene had inserted into its tomato an "antisense" gene
that inhibited the action of an enzyme that causes tomatoes to rot. As a result, ripe FLAVR
SAVR® tomatoes remained intact for a longer period of time, thus increasing their "shelf
life" and allowing them to ripen on the vine before being harvested for market. On May 17,
1994, FDA sent a letter to Calgene advising it of the agency's conclusion that "FLAVR SAVR®
tomatoes have not been significantly altered when compared to varieties of tomatoes with a
history of safe use" and were therefore GRAS. Availability of Letter Concluding Consulta-
tion, 59 Fed. Reg. 26,647 (Food & Drug Admin., May 23, 1994).
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status of those substances.264 This broad reliance on substantial
equivalence may prove unduly optimistic. Some enzymes in plants
digest toxins otherwise present in those plants. Reducing the levels
of such enzymes could result in a corresponding increase in the
level of the toxin, which could in turn result in adverse health ef-
265fects in consumers.
Adding a gene that increases the level of a previously produced
expression product in a food plant with a history of safe use clearly
raises the food additive question, because the modification consti-
tutes the addition of a substance (the gene) that "otherwise
affect[s] the characteristics" of the food. The agency apparently
assumes (no doubt accurately) that a manufacturer would not in-
tentionally attempt to make a food plant more toxic by increasing
the levels of previously produced toxic proteins, and the 1992
Guidelines do not address that scenario.26' They only briefly allude
to the possibility that gene splicing might inadvertently activate a
quiescent metabolic pathway to cause a plant to produce more of a
previously produced toxin, but they find the likelihood of such an
unexpected event to be "extremely lOW. ' 268 Invoking the substantial
equivalence concept, the Guidelines conclude that "the use of host
plants with a history of safe use, coupled with a continuation of
sound agricultural practice, will minimize the potential for adverse
public health consequences that may arise from increased levels of
unknown or unexpected toxicants."
2 6
The Guidelines adopt essentially the same posture with respect
to genetic modifications that result in increased levels of proteins
not known to be toxic. The Guidelines note that "characteristic
properties" of the host plant can provide telltale signs of the pres-
ence of specific natural toxicants and suggest that when such
characteristic properties provide "an assurance" that such toxicants
264. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,990.
265. See Bohrer, Biotechnology, supra note 11, at 672 (recognizing that reducing the level
of a protein could cause adverse health effects if "reduction [sic] in the target protein level
[resulted in the] diminution of an enzyme responsible for the breakdown of a natural plant
toxicant").
266. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1994).
267. Professor Bohrer likewise concludes that it is "unlikely that any producer of ge-
netically engineered food plants would choose to introduce a protein known to be toxic or
allergenic, or even one similar to known toxic or allergenic proteins." Bohrer, Biotechnology,
supra note 11, at 663.
268. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,987. The Guidelines note that, in
theory, "genetic modifications have the potential to activate cryptic pathways synthesizing
unknown or unexpected toxicants, or to increase expression from active pathways that ordi-
narily produce low or undetectable levels of toxicants." Id. at 22,991-92.
269. Id. at 22,992.
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are not present in unsafe levels, analytical or toxicological tests
might not be warranted)7 Otherwise, the Guidelines concede that
it is "not possible to establish a complete list of all toxicants that
should be considered for each plant species.", 71 Apparently, the
manufacturer is free to conclude without any testing whatsoever
that a plant with a previous history of safe use containing increased
levels of a previously produced protein not "known" to be toxic is
substantially equivalent to the unmodified plant and is therefore
GRAS. So long as qualified experts agree with the manufacturer's
conclusion, it need not subject the GM plant to the food additive
approval process.
b. Host Species Without a History of Safe Use-If the host plant
does not have a history of safe use, the substantial equivalence doc-
trine is largely inapplicable. Even if the modified plant is
substantially equivalent to the host plant, there is no basis for con-
cluding that the GM plant is safe, because there is no history of
safe use of the host plant. The Guidelines suggest that manufactur-
ers conduct testing to "provide evidence that toxicant levels" in the
genetically modified plant do not "present a safety concern." 2 The
Guidelines offer some broad suggestions for determining what
kind of tests could adequately "establish that the toxicant levels are
in a safe range.",21 This approach appears consistent with the statu-
tory definition of GRAS, which in the case of substances not
recognized by experts to be safe because of experience based on
common use in food still allows a GRAS determination to be based
upon "scientific procedures., 274 It may nevertheless be disturbing to
a public that is not inclined to trust manufacturers to make good
decisions about whether to test and about how to interpret the test
results.
First, the 1992 Guidelines allow the manufacturer to decide
whether a food has a history of safe use. In some contexts, this de-
cision can depend upon the resolution of technically complex and
policy-rich questions. The manufacturer's decision may, however,
be fairly transparent. A company attempting to market a geneti-
cally engineered plant without a significant history of use as a food
(e.g., an edible pinecone) would probably attract the attention of
the government and consumer activists. If, however, the manufac-
270. Id. at 22,996.
271. Id.
272. Id. 22,995 fig. 2. The Guidelines advise, for example, that "[i]f exotic species are
used as hosts, testing may be needed to assure the safety and wholesomeness of the food."
Id. at 22,996.
273. Id. at 22,996.
274. 21 U.S.C. § 321 (s) (1994).
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turer incorporated the GM plant into processed food (e.g., GM
seaweed used as a stabilizer in ice cream), the decision might not
be so transparent. Thus, to the extent that the decision raises close
technical and policy questions, FDA has placed the burden of
proof on itself to detect and prove that foods made from plants
without a history of safe use are not GRAS.
Second, the 1992 Guidelines allow the manufacturer to decide
what tests of the GM plant are appropriate for assessing a GM
food's safety and how to interpret the test results. If the manufac-
turer does not select appropriate tests for supporting that
determination or if the manufacturer is overly generous in inter-
preting the results of such tests, the government may still seize the
resulting GM food if it can prove to a court that the food is not
GRAS. While this should not be an especially difficult task in the
case of host plants that are not foods, the agency's approach still
leaves the product on the market during the time that it takes the
government to act, and it requires the government to put together
a convincing case.27"
2. The Status of Expression Products Not Produced by the Host Plant-
If the inserted gene results in an expression product that the host
plant did not previously produce, the 1992 Guidelines draw an im-
portant distinction between a protein that is a constituent of some
276
other food and all other proteins. Underlying this distinction is
the tacit conclusion, reflecting still another application of the sub-
stantial equivalence doctrine, that a protein that is a constituent of
a plant that has traditionally been consumed as food is presump-
tively GRAS when it becomes a constituent of another food plant.
277
a. Genes from Organisms Used in Foods-If the expression product
of a transferred gene was a constituent of some other food in exis-
tence prior to 1958, then the GRAS provision of section 409 is
applicable if experts qualified by scientific training and experience
agree that "scientific procedures or experience based on common
use in food" adequately demonstrate that the protein is "safe under
275. See supra Section III.B.
276. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,990. Before initiating that inquiry,
however, the manufacturer may avoid food additive status by concluding that the newly pro-
duced protein did not wind up in any food derived from the plant. Id. at 23,000. Once
again, it is apparently up to the manufacturer to make the critical determination whether or
not the new expression product is in fact not present in food derived from the GM plant.
277. The 1992 Guidelines take the position that the transferred genetic material itself is
normally GRAS, because "[n]ucleic acids are present in the cells of every living organism,
including every plant and animal used for food by humans or animals, and do not raise a
safety concern as a component of food." Id. at 22,990.
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the conditions of its intended use.,17s According to the 1992 FDA
Policy Statement, when the expression product is a substance that
was "already present at generally comparable or greater levels in
currently consumed foods," there is "unlikely to be a safety ques-
tion sufficient to call into question the presumed GRAS status of
such naturally occurring substances. ... 279) The agency also posits
that "minor variations in molecular structure" in the expressed
products that do not affect safety should not ordinarily affect the
GRAS status of the protein.28 ° The Guidelines urge the manufac-
turer to pay attention to (1) the characteristics of the plant or other
organism from which the transferred genes originated (donor spe-
cies), and (2) the proteins and any associated carbohydrates or fats
and oils expressed by the transferred genes in the host plant (ex-
pression products). 281
Donor Species. The 1992 Guidelines suggest that the manufacturer
make two safety-related inquiries about the donor species. First, the
manufacturer should ask whether "food from the donor [is] com-
monly allergenic," and, if so, whether it can "be demonstrated that
the allergenic determinant has not been transferred to the new
variety of host plant."2 2 Since the 1992 Guidelines do not suggest
any particular tests that might be useful in answering this question,
the manufacturer may apparently base its conclusion upon "avail-
able" information and/or the manufacturer's general knowledge.
If food from the donor species is commonly allergenic, the Guide-
lines imply that the manufacturer must be prepared to
demonstrate that the allergenic determinant was not transferred to
the host plant. Again, the manufacturer may rely upon its "knowl-
edge," rather than "scientific procedures," to support its
2823
conclusion.
278. 21 U.S.C. § 321 (s) (1994).
279. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17. at 22.990: see Bohrer Biotechnology, supra
note 11, at 657-58.
280. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,990. This appears to conflict with
the conclusion of Noah and Merrill that "general recognition of the safety of a substance in
a different product, or at a different level, [will] not suffice." Noah & Merrill, Starting from
Scratch, supra note 5, at 353.
281. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,997 fig. 3; 22,999 fig. 4; 23,001 fig.
5; 23,003 fig. 6. Interestingly, the Policy Statement applies the substantial equivalence ap-
proach to expression products derived from all "currently consumed" foods, and not merely
to foods in existence prior toJanuary 1, 1958. There is, of course, some possibility that
plants that are "currently consumed" in the year 2000 were not commonly used in food
prior toJanuary 1, 1958. Id. at 22,996. The Policy Statement apparently does not view this as
a troubling possibility.
282. Id. at 22,998.
283. Id. (concluding that "[k]nowledge of the identity of the allergenic determinant of
the donor, coupled with appropriate knowledge of the genetic fragment that has been trans-
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It is certainly conceivable that a manufacturer's "knowledge" of
the donor plant and the transferred gene could meet the "experi-
ence based on common use in food" half of the GRAS test for
substances commonly used in foods prior to January 1, 1958.
Rather than trusting the manufacturers to make this determination
accurately, however, consumers who are subject to food allergies
may prefer to be apprised of the fact that an item of food came
from a plant containing transferred genes from an allergenic do-
nor plant so that they can apply their own "knowledge" in deciding
whether to take the risk that the allergenic determinant has been
transferred to the food.
The second inquiry with respect to the donor species is whether
the "characteristics of the donor species, related species, or pro-
genitor lines warrant analytical or toxicological tests. ' ' 8 4 The 1992
Guidelines offer very little guidance on how a manufacturer trans-
ferring genes from donor species commonly used in foods to other
food plants would determine whether the characteristics of the
donor plant or related or progenitor lines would "warrant" analyti-
cal or toxicological tests. In discussing the potential health effects
of GM foods generally, the agency concedes that "genetic modifica-
tions have the potential to activate cryptic pathways synthesizing
unknown or unexpected toxicants, ' 2 15 but it finds the likelihood of
such an untoward result of a genetic exchange to be "extremely
low." 28 6 Thus, a manufacturer may generally rely upon the substan-
tial equivalence concept to conclude that gene transfers from food-
use species that do not contain known toxins will result in GM
plants that are as safe to consume as the unmodified plants.
If the donor species does contains a gene coding for a known
toxin, the manufacturer must be sure that the transfer does not
bring the "toxic" gene across in a way that allows it to be expressed
in a toxic protein, fat or carbohydrate. The Guidelines suggest that
manufacturers approach this situation in the same way that they
approach intraspecies transfers from food plants that contained
genes coding for toxins. Absent "sufficient evidence that the toxi-
cant has not been transferred to the new variety of host plant, such
transfer should be assumed, and analytical and/or toxicological tests
ferred from the donor to the new plant variety, may provide sufficient evidence that the
allergenic determinant has not been transferred to the new variety of the host plant").
284. Id.
285. Id. at 22,991-92.
286. Id. at 22,987.
287. Id. at 22,998.
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may be warranted., 28 Thus the Guidelines apparently take the po-
sition that in cases where the donor species contains a gene that
codes for a known toxin, the GRAS determination may not rely
upon "experience based on common use in food," but must in-
stead rely upon "scientific procedures.28 In cases involving such
"donor-associated toxicants," the Guidelines suggest that "analyti-
cal or toxicological studies" designed by the manufacturer may
"provide assurance that the new variety is safe," and FDA encour-
ages manufacturers "to consult with the agency on testing
protocols. '"2"0 This broad grant of discretion to manufacturers to
come up with protocols for providing that an added substance is
safe stands in stark contrast to the FDA's food additive regulations,
which specify in some detail the kinds of tests that proponents of
food additives must supply to the agency in order to obtain FDA
• • 291
approval of a food additive.
Expression Products. Having examined the characteristics of the
donor species, the manufacturer must next focus its attention on
the expression products of the transferred genes in the host plant.
If the introduced protein is derived from a food source that is not
known to be allergenic, the manufacturer must determine
whether any expressed protein is "reported to be toxic. 2 3 The
Guidelines do not suggest any sources for the manufacturer to
consult in conducting this inquiry. Apparently, anything from a
textbook example to a single citation in the worldwide literature
will suffice. The Guidelines do provide an example of certain
lectins in kidney beans that are known to be toxic but are inacti-
vated by cooking. Transfers of genes coding for such lectins from
kidney beans to foods, like tomatoes, that may be eaten raw would
294raise safety concerns. The Guidelines suggest that manufacturers
"[c]onsult FDA" in such situations. The 1992 Guidelines suggest
288. Id.
289. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1994).
290. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,998.
291. 21 C.F.R. § 171.1 (2002); see also Food & Drug Admin., Office of Premarket Ap-
proval, Guidance for Submitting Petitions and Notifications, available at
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-dms/opa-toc.html.
292. The 1992 Guidelines do not suggest that the manufacturer determine whether ex-
pression products from nonallergenic food sources are purported to be allergenic. The
agency may have assumed that proteins expressed by genes transferred from nonallergenic
foods are not likely to be allergenic, or it may have decided that it would be too difficult for
manufacturers to determine the allergenicity of individual proteins, given the current ab-
sence of generally accepted allergenicity testing models. See supra Part I.B.I.b.
293. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,994.
294. Id. at 22,994.
295. Id. at 29,999 fig. 4 at 17c. The next inquiry is whether the intake of the introduced
protein is "generally comparable to the intake of the same or similar protein in the donor or
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similar toxicity-related inquiries for carbohydrates, fats and oils
216that are expression products of introduced genes.
FDA has apparently made a generic determination that any in-
troductions of new proteins into the host species and any
alterations in the identity, structure, or composition of carbohy-
drates, fats and oils in the host plant due to gene transfers from
donor species that are used in foods are presumptively GRAS in
the host food based upon their common use in the donor food.
Such food-species-to-food-plant transfers raise "safety concerns"
that call for FDA consultation only if the new expression products
are known to be toxic or otherwise raise vaguely specified red flags.
Other than a general reliance upon the doctrine of substantial
equivalence, the Guidelines make no attempt to support a generic
conclusion that the addition of genes that affect the characteristics
of food by adding a new protein, altering the host plant's carbohy-
drate profile or changing the identity, structure, or composition of
host plant fats and oils are generally recognized by qualified ex-
perts to be safe. However reasonable this generic determination
may be from the prospective of the agency's scientists, it does not
comport with the statute under which the agency operates, because
it effectively relieves the manufacturer of the burden of demon-
strating that the food is GRAS.
b. Genes from Organisms Not Used in Foods-If the protein ex-
pressed by a transferred gene was not a constituent of some other
food in existence prior to 1958, there would presumably be no
"experience based on common use in food," and the GRAS provi-
sion of section 409 would apply only if the manufacturer
demonstrated through "scientific procedures" that experts quali-
fied by scientific training and experience have concluded that the
protein or other expression product was "safe under the conditions
of its intended use." 97 One might imagine that this would be an
exceedingly difficult showing and that such transfers would ordi-
narily require the manufacturer to file a food additive petition in
accordance with the regulations promulgated under section 409.'98
other food." Id. at 23,000. Again, the Guidelines do not suggest any scientific procedures or
protocols for comparing intake routes of proteins for purposes of this inquiry. If the human
intake of the introduced protein is not comparable, the Guidelines recommend that the
manufacturer assess the biological function of the introduced protein in the same manner
(discussed below) as if the protein had not been derived from a food source. Id. at 29,999
fig. 4 at 13.
296. Id. at 23,002.
297. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1994).
298. One substance that meets this description and is of obvious interest is the antibi-
otic-resistance enzyme that gene-splicers use as a "marker" to identify plants for which the
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The 1992 Policy Statement, however, applies the substantial equiva-
lence doctrine to support a much more optimistic view of the
possibility of GRAS status for transfers of genes from nonfood spe-
cies into plants used for food. Once again, the 1992 Guidelines
focus first on the donor species generally and then on the expres-
sion products of the transferred gene in the host food plant.
299
Donor Species. If the manufacturer has "knowledge" of a toxic
property of the donor species, a related species, or progenitor line,
it must determine whether further testing is needed, preferably in
consultation with FDA. Although it is certainly possible that a gene
transferred from a toxic donor plant would code for a toxic pro-
tein in the host plant, °° the 1992 Guidelines recognize that it is
also possible safely to transfer genes that do not code for toxic ex-
pression products.30 ' The Guidelines caution that "[u]nless there is
sufficient evidence that the toxicant has not been transferred to
the new variety of host plant, such transfer should be assumed, and
analytical and/or toxicological tests may be warranted."30 2 The
Guidelines suggest that "analytical or toxicological studies" de-
signed by the manufacturer could "provide assurance that the new
variety is safe," and the agency encourages manufacturers "to con-
sult with the agency on testing protocols., 30 3 The voluntary aspect
of these testing suggestions, however, differs dramatically from the
FDA's detailed testing requirements for food additives.
When the manufacturer does not have "knowledge" of any toxic
properties of the donor species or related species, the 1992 Guide-
lines suggest that "[t]he potential of the donor(s) to contribute
undesirable characteristics to the new plant variety should be as-
sessed 0 04 to the extent that information on attributes of the donor
gene-splicing operation has been successful. The gene coding from this enzyme does not
come from a species consumed as food, and some scientists have concerns about its aller-
genicity, its potential to reduce the therapeutic effect of the antibiotic in humans, and its
potential to hasten the development of antibiotic-resistant pathogens. See infra Part I.B.2.b.
In the case of the most prominently used antibiotic marker gene, a gene coding for an en-
zyme causing resistance to the antibiotic kanamycin, the manufacturer decided to file a full-
fledged food additive petition. FDA approved the petition almost four years later after an
extensive but controversial investigation. 1994 Kanamycin Resistance Gene Approval, supra
note 14, at 26,700-01.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 276-90.
300. The Guidelines offer the example of a transfer of a gene coding for a toxicant dur-
ing hybridization of a cultivated variety with a wild, poisonous relative. 1992 FDA Policy




304. Id. at 22,996.
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plant is "available."' 0° They do not, however, suggest how the manu-
facturer might determine the modified plant's potential for
allergenicity or other toxicity when there is no relevant experience
with human consumption of the donor species. They do not advise
any particular testing of the donor organisms to determine their
toxicological profiles. Indeed, they explicitly recognize that "rou-
tine procedures for testing foods derived from new plant varieties
for the presence of unknown allergens are not currently available,"
and they frankly acknowledge in a footnote that "[i]f the donor has
no history of use in food, the issue of allergenicity cannot be ad-
dressed at this time.0
0 6
If no "scientific procedures" capable of assessing the allergenic-
ity of a genetically modified food exist and the donor has no
history of use in food at all, then the statute rather plainly pre-
cludes a GRAS finding for the genetically engineered food. The
failure of the 1992 Guidelines to require manufacturers of such
foods to file food additive petitions suggests that manufacturers are
free to ignore the potential for allergenicity and find that such
foods are GRAS based upon such testing as the manufacturers
307deem appropriate. Similarly, manufacturers are apparently free
to employ the substantial equivalence doctrine and such informa-
tion as the manufacturer cares to gather on donor plant toxicity to
support a GRAS conclusion on the toxicity question. Although the
Guidelines do not erect a presumption in favor of the GRAS status
of foods containing genes from nonfood species, they give manu-
facturers a great deal of discretion to base GRAS determinations
on "scientific procedures."
Expression Products. The substantial equivalence doctrine plays a
surprisingly prominent role with respect to the expression prod-
ucts of genes transferred from nonfood species. The 1992
Guidelines suggest that manufacturers should ask whether a novel
protein introduced by the gene transfer is "substantially similar to
an edible protein."3 8 Since the Guidelines do not suggest that any
scientific testing or other procedures should precede this determi-
nation, a manufacturer may apparently conclude that an added
protein is GRAS on the basis of "experience based on common use
305. Id.
306. Id. at 23,000 n.6. The Guidelines offered that "[c]omparison of gene sequences to
data banks of known allergens may become increasingly useful as the information on such
proteins expands." Id.
307. See Bohrer, Biotechnoloy, supra note 11, at 664 n.56 (noting that under the 1992
Policy Statement "the potential for rare allergenicity is simply ignored").
308. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,999 fig. 4.
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in food" of a "substantially similar" protein that the manufacturer
determines to be "edible. 3 0 9 The Guidelines do not limit the term
"edible protein" to substances that have been commonly used in
food or even to substances that have commonly been eaten.
The legality of this aggressive use of the substantial equivalence
doctrine depends upon whether Congress meant for the term
"common use in food" in the GRAS exception to encompass not
only substances commonly used in foods, but also substances that
have never been used in foods but that are "substantially similar" to
substances that have been commonly used in foods. Arguably, the
statute does not preclude that interpretation, because it does not
say "experience based on the additive's common use in food." On
the other hand, one could persuasively argue that Congress in-
tended for the GRAS exemption to be a narrow one applicable
only to substances for which experience with the substances them-
selvesjustified a finding of safety.
If the introduced protein is neither derived from a food source
nor substantially similar to an edible protein, the Guidelines rec-
ommend that the manufacturer assess the "biological function" of
the introduced protein to determine whether it is "reported to be
toxic" or otherwise raises a "safety concern. ''3' Although they sur-
mise that proteins functioning as enzymes usually do not raise
safety concerns, they recognize that enzymes capable of producing
substances that are not ordinarily digested by vertebrates or that
are otherwise toxic (e.g., snake venom and the diphtheria toxin)
do raise safety concerns.3 1 As previously noted, the Guidelines do
not specify how broadly the manufacturer must inquire in its
search for "reports" of toxicity or if the manufacturer must consult
the published literature at all. Similarly, the Guidelines provide
very little insight into how the manufacturer might go about de-
termining whether the introduced protein raises a "safety
concern."
The 1992 Policy Statement ultimately leaves the relevant toxicity
inquiries to the manufacturer's discretion, and they permit manu-
facturers to ignore the potential for allergenicity in gene transfers
from nonfood species not known to be allergenic. While consum-
ers can probably rest assured that reputable companies will not
insert genes coding for diphtheria toxin or rattlesnake venom into
309. See Bohrer, Biotechnology, supra note 11, at 662 (concluding that "FDA will not re-
quire a premarket review of all inter-generic genetically-engineered food plants, even those
containing proteins not previously found in foods (in statutory terms, without a 'history of
safe use in food')").
310. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,999 fig. 4, 23,000.
311. Id. at 23,000 & n.7.
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food intended for human consumption, the Guidelines give manu-
facturers considerable leeway to rely upon their "knowledge" and
the substantial equivalence principle. Consumers could be forgiven
for worrying that at the margins, a manufacturer might expand or
contract the universe of "known" toxic activities of transferred pro-
teins to conclude that commercially valuable GM plants do not
raise "safety concerns." They cannot rest assured that such proteins
are subject to the full panoply of tests otherwise required of food
additives.
3. Notice of GRAS Determinations-Although manufacturers and
importers must provide notice to FDA of any change in GM food
that results in the addition of a "food additive" within the meaning
of section 409,312 the statute does not require manufacturers and
importers to inform FDA of any additions of substances that they
determine to be GRAS. The 1992 Policy Statement leaves the
GRAS determination up to the manufacturer or the importer and
merely offers guidance on situations for which a "consultation"
with the agency might be appropriate. As of late 2000, companies
had invoked the consultative process about 50 times, but only six of
those consultations occurred during 1999 and 2000. 13 It is not
unlawful for a manufacturer or an importer to fail to "consult" with
the agency or to fail to seek an "affirmation" of the GRAS status of
a genetic modification.
On January 18, 2001, FDA issued proposed regulations that
would require a manufacturer or importer to provide FDA with a
pre-market biotechnology notice (PBN) of its intent to market any
"bioengineered food" unless the food was derived from a previ-
314
ously addressed plant line for which FDA expressed no concerns.
After receiving the PBN, FDA would have 15 days to determine
whether the submission contained all of the required information
and 120 days to send the submitter FDA's evaluation of the submit-
ter's conclusion that the GM food was as safe as comparable food. 315
A conclusion that a GM food is as safe as comparable food is, un-
der the agency's application of the substantial equivalence
doctrine, equivalent to a GRAS finding.3 1 Expressing confidence
312. 21 U.S.C. 348(b)(5) (1994).
313. See Food & Drug Admin., Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties Derived through
Recombinant DNA Technology: Final Consultations tinder FDA's 1992 Policy (Nov. 2000).
314. FDA Proposed Bioengineered Food Regulations, 2001, supra note 243, at 4732-33.
315. Id. at 4733.
316. The proposal recommends that the manufacturer consult with FDA prior to sub-
mitting the PBN "to identify and discuss relevant safety; nutritional, or other issues." FDA
Proposed Bioengineered Food Regulations, 2001, supra note 243, at 4730. It also provides
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that the food industry had already been consulting with FDA with
respect to all GM foods,7 the agency believed that compliance
with regulations would not substantially burden manufacturers in
the future.
In explaining why pre-market notification was needed, the
agency appeared to depart somewhat from its prior embrace of the
substantial equivalence doctrine. Because of the "greater range of
sources of substances" that modern biotechnology could introduce
into plants, FDA found "a greater likelihood" that some introduced
substances "will be significantly different from substances that have
a history of safe use in food or may otherwise not satisfy the GRAS
standard." 31 8 Moreover, the agency acknowledged the greater po-
tential of genetic engineering techniques "for introducing
unintended effects through mutations. '31 9 FDA justified limiting
the pre-market notification process to GM foods on the ground
that the agency's fifty to sixty years' worth of experience with con-
ventional breeding techniques had not produced any foods with
unexpected adverse traits. ° Since a greater potential existed for
GM foods to "present legal status issues and thus require greater
FDA scrutiny" than for foods developed using traditional breeding
techniques, FDA decided to require manufacturers to notify the
agency prior to marketing GM products.
21
FDA cited as legal authority for the premarketing notification
requirement its power under Section 701 (a) of the FDCA to issue
regulations for the efficient enforcement of the Act. 322 The agency
concluded that this authority "extend[ed] to both regulations that
supplement a specific statutory mandate as well as regulations that
are justified by the statutory scheme as a whole., 32 3 Citing the 1978
D.C. Circuit opinion in National Confectioner's Association v. Cali-
fano,24 the agency argued that it was "important to consider both
the statutory purpose as well as the practical aspects of the situa-
tion, including the possible enforcement problems that may be
procedures for maintaining the confidentiality of trade secret information during the con-
sultation and evaluation process. Id. at 4733-34.
317. Id. at 4707.
318. Id. at 4709. The agency further believed that pre-market notification was important
to give it an opportunity to ensure that GM foods are properly labeled under section 403 of
the FDCA. Id. at 4709-10.
319. Id. at 4710.
320. Id. at 4711.
321. Id. at4711.
322. 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1994).
323. FDA Proposed Bioengineered Food Regulations, 2001, supra note 243, at 4712.
324. 569 F.2d 690, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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encountered by FDA.'W 2' Pre-market notification would, in the
agency's view, ensure that it was aware of all GM foods entering
commercial distribution that were subject to FDA's jurisdiction and
would "help to ensure that all market entry decisions by the indus-
try are made consistently and in full compliance with the law.",2
While the agency's very brief legal analysis of its authority to re-
quire pre-market notification of all GM foods is plausible, it is by
no means compelling. Section 701 (a) grants FDA general authority
"to promulgate regulations for the efficient enforcement of this
[Act] ,,327 Arguably, a broad pre-market notification requirement is
necessary for the efficient enforcement of the Act's food additive
provisions in the context of GM foods. Without premarketing noti-
fication, the agency cannot, as a practical matter, evaluate the
manufacturer's determination that a GM food is substantially
equivalent to a non-GM food and therefore GRAS, because the
agency lacks the resources to conduct the vast food monitoring
and testing program necessary to detect every possible GM food
that some manufacturer has determined to be GRAS.
In National Confectioners, a trade association challenged an FDA
regulation requiring candymakers to mark each shipping con-
tainer with a code identifying the plant where the candy was
packed and its production or packaging lot and to keep records of
the initial distribution of the candy for a two-year period.32 Al-
though the FDCA did not explicitly authorize such regulations, the
agency reasoned that it would advance the "efficient enforcement"
of the Act by expediting recalls of dangerous or potentially dan-
gerous products. 2 " The court upheld the regulations. Like the
regulations at issue in National Confectioners, the pre-market notifi-
cation regulations for GM foods imposed somewhat burdensome
requirements on all products to enhance effective enforcement
against the presumably small minority of products that might vio-
late the law.
Manufacturers might plausibly argue, however, that a general
requirement for pre-market notification of all GM foods is so
broad and burdensome that it cannot be justified as an exercise of
FDA's general enforcement powers. A substance added to food is
entirely outside of FDA's regulatory ambit so long as it is GRAS,
because the term "food additive" is defined to exclude substances
325. FDA Proposed Bioengineered Food Regulations, 2001, supra note 243, at 4712.
326. Id.
327. 21 U.S.C. § 371 (a)(1994).
328. 569 F.2d 690 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
329. Id. at 693.
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that are GRAS. Arguably, FDA should not be allowed to leverage its
authority to enforce controls that the statute empowers it to im-
pose to support an assertion of authority over activities that are
wholly outside its statutory reach. Noting that since 1992 FDA has
consistently taken the position that the vast majority of all GM
foods are likely to be GRAS, manufacturers could argue that it is
arbitrary and capricious for FDA to cast so broad a net to capture
so few fish.
At this point, the premarketing notification proposal is just that.
The agency has given interested parties an opportunity to com-
ment on the proposal, and it is subject to change or withdrawal.
Should the Bush Administration allow this Clinton Administration
proposal to go forward to final form, it would still be subject to ju-
dicial review for consistency with the FDCA and for arbitrariness
and capriciousness. As things currently stand, the state of law is
that manufacturers are free to market GM foods that they deter-
mine to be GRAS without consulting FDA.
4. Labeling GM Foods-Under section 403(a) (1) of the FDCA, a
food is misbranded if its labeling is "false or misleading in any par-
ticular",3 0 or if its labeling does not prominently feature "any word,
statement, or other information" that FDA lawfully requires with
"such conspicuousness (as compared with other words, statements,
designs, or devices, in the labeling) and in such terms as to render
it likely to be read and understood by the ordinary individual un-
der customary conditions of purchase and use." 33' A food is also
misbranded if its label does not bear "(1) the common or usual
name of the food, if any there be, and (2) in case it is fabricated
from two or more ingredients, the common or usual name of each
such ingredient.... Under section 201 (n), labeling is mislead-
ing if it fails to reveal all facts that are "material in the light of...
representations or material with respect to consequences which
may result from the use of the article to which the labeling... re-
lates under the conditions of use prescribed in the labeling ... or
under such conditions of use as are customary or usual. '33
The statute appears to grant FDA ample authority to require
manufacturers and importers to label GM foods. The agency
could, for example, conclude that the fact that a food derives from
330. 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)(1) (1994).
331. 21 U.S.C. § 343(f) (1994). The four main components of a food label as defined by
the FDCA are: the common name or identity of the item, the quantity, name, and location
of manufacturer, and ingredient and nutrition information. § 343.
332. § 343(i).
333. 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (1994).
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GM plants is "material" in light of implicit representations that it is
what it appears to be (i.e., food derived from nonengineered
plants). In addition, sufficient uncertainties surround the health
"consequences" of GM plants that the agency could reasonably
conclude that the fact that a food derives from GM plants is mate-
rial in light of those consequences. The agency has, however,
invoked the substantial equivalence doctrine to limit mandatory
labeling primarily to GM foods that differ significantly from un-
modified foods in ways that are nutritionally important.
In its 1992 Policy Statement, FDA specifically declined to require
labels for all foods containing GM constituents. 3 4 The Policy
Statement explains that modern genetic engineering techniques
are merely "extensions at the molecular level of traditional meth-
ods,"33 and it notes that the agency has not generally considered
the methods used in the development of a new plant variety "to be
material information within the meaning of section 201 (n) .
FDA is "not aware of any information showing that foods derived
by these new methods differ from other foods in any meaningful
or uniform way, or that, as a class, foods developed by the new
techniques present any different or greater safety concern than
foods developed by traditional plant breeding."
3
Public comments on the Policy Statement noted that in the con-
text of irradiated foods the agency had concluded that "[w] hether
information is material under section 201 (n) ... depends not on
the abstract worth of the information but on whether consumers
view such information as important and whether the omission of
label information may mislead a consumer."3 3 8 The Policy State-
ment explains that FDA had concluded that radiation could cause
changes in the organoleptic properties of the finished food that,
absent labeling, might mislead consumers into assuming that such
foods were unprocessed. It does not, however, explain how this
distinguishes GM foods, at least some of which also experience or-
ganoleptic changes as a result of the genetic engineering




338. FDA, Irradiation Regulations, 51 Fed. Reg. 13,376, 13,388 (Apr. 18, 1986); see also
Silbergeld Testimony, Oct. 6, 1999, supra note 130.
339. Food Labeling; Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 58 Fed. Reg. 25,837,
25,837-41 (Food & Drug Admin., Apr. 28, 1993) [hereinafter 1993 FDA Labeling Policy
Statement Request for Information].
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technology.34 Although the genetic engineering exercise unques-
tionably causes the engineered plant to be changed, the agency
believes that the changes are generally not so substantial as to be
"material" for purposes of the statutory labeling requirement.34'
The 1992 Policy Statement does acknowledge a limited role for
labeling in the context of GM foods. The agency reads section 403
to require manufacturers to inform consumers "by appropriate la-
beling, if a food derived from a new plant variety differs from its
traditional counterpart such that the common or usual name no
longer applies to the new food, or if a safety or usage issue exists to
which consumers must be alerted."042 In particular, the agency
might require labeling to put sensitive subpopulations on notice of
the possibility that a transfer from an allergenic donor plant to a
previously nonallergenic food plant might have transferred a gene
coding for an allergenic protein. 43 For example, labeling might be
required for a tomato genetically engineered to produce a peanut
protein absent sufficient information to demonstrate that the in-




On the other hand, the 1992 Policy Statement does not propose
to require labeling for gene transfers from species not known to be
allergenic. Since the agency is "unaware of any practical method
[to] predict or assess the potential for new proteins in food to in-
duce allergenicity,'" 5 it is apparently willing to assume either that
such changes could never occur or that they would not be "mate-
rial" if they did. This very aggressive reliance on the substantial
equivalence principle effectively deprives consumers, who are like-
wise unaware of practical methods to assess the allergenic potential
of such foods, of the option of playing it safe by avoiding such
foods.
The 1992 Policy Statement also envisions a role for labeling
when the "concentration and bioavailability of important nutrients
in the new variety" are no longer within the "range ordinarily seen
340. The report of an expert panel convened by the Royal Society of Canada noted that
"it could be argued that the case for labeling of GM food products is stronger than for irra-
diated ones, because genetic engineering may produce 'material changes' in the product
itself." ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 223.
341. 1993 FDA Labeling Policy Statement Request for Information, supra note 339, at
25,839.
342. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,991.
343. Id. at 22,987.
344. Id. at 22,991. The presence of the peanut protein gene "would be a material fact
whose omission may make the label of the tomato misleading tinder section 403 (a) .. " Id.
345. Id. at 22,987.
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in the host species." "6 Changes in bioavailability of a nutrient "due
to changes in form of the nutrient or the presence of increased
levels of other constituents that affect absorption or metabolism of
nutrients" could have "potential nutritional impact" and thereby
warrant changes in nutritional labeling:W For example, genetic
modification of a fruit or vegetable that "produce [s] high levels of
an indigestible carbohydrate that normally occurs at very low lev-
els, or ... convert[s] a normally digestible carbohydrate to an
indigestible form" could raise nutritional concerns. 348 The Guide-
lines urge manufacturers to consult with FDA when genetic
modifications result in any alterations that could affect the nutri-
tional qualities in a carbohydrate "or the composition of fats or oils
that are likely to be a macroconstituent in the diet.0
49
The court in Alliance For Bio-Integrity v. Shalala350 upheld the
agency's position on labeling GM foods. Rejecting the plaintiffs'
arguments that FDA should have considered widespread consumer
interest and the special concerns of religious groups and persons
with allergies, the court held that the agency's conclusion that
none of those concerns were "material" was not unreasonable. 5' In
particular, the agency could reasonably interpret the word "mate-
rial" to demand "unique risks to consumer health or uniform
changes to food derived through rDNA technology., 35' The court
346. Id. at 22,996.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 23,002.
349. Id. at 23,004. For example, "an alteration in the ratio of saturated to unsaturated
fatty acids" could "have significant nutritional consequences, or result in marked changes in
digestibility." Id. Surprisingly, the Policy Statement makes no attempt to define the critical
term "macroconstittuent," even by providing broad ranges of acceptable percentages in food.
See Noah & Merrill, Starting from Scratch, supra note 5, at 410 n.353.
350. 116 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D.D.C. 2000).
351. 116 F Supp. 2d at 181. The court applied the traditional Chevron two-step analysis.
The Court in Chevron held that courts should be deferential to the agencies' interpretations
of their own statutes:
[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question
for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute.... If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the leg-
islative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than
explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v' Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
352. 116 F Supp. 2d at 178-79.
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questioned whether FDA had the power under the FDCA to re-
quire labeling "in a situation where the sole justification for such a
requirement is consumer demand."'3 In rejecting the plaintiffs'
contention that the process of genetic modification was a "material"
fact, the court relied upon FDA's application of the substantial
equivalence principle to conclude that "foods produced through
rDNA techniques do not 'present any different or greater safety
concern than foods developed by traditional plant breeding.' "354
After Alliance For Bio-Integrity, FDA apparently has the authority
to require labeling of GM foods that pose "unique risks to con-
sumer health" or result in "uniform changes" to food. It is not at all
clear, however, what either of these two findings requires by way of
data and analysis. Surely, if some future GM food becomes ubiqui-
tous in the food pipeline and subsequent studies reveal serious
risks to the health of some human subpopulation (e.g., persons
allergic to a protein uniquely present in the GM food) that were
not anticipated by the manufacturer or importer, FDA would have
the authority to require that products containing that food be la-
beled. The agency may have been unwise to impose upon itself the
task of identifying and justifying "unique risks" attributable to a
GM food. The "uniform" changes standard, however, might be eas-
ier to meet because a particular GM plant line will uniformly
reflect changes induced by the genetic engineering process. Since
most GM plants are changed in some major or minor way by the
genetic engineering process, this avenue should allow FDA to jus-
tify labeling requirements for virtually any GM food. at the same
time, the Alliance For Bio-Integrity opinion gives the agency consid-
erable discretion not to require labeling of GM foods.
As previously noted, FDA issued draft guidelines for labeling ge-
netically modified foods on January 18, 2001.356 The agency noted
that during the eight intervening years since it had issued the 1992
353. Id. at 179.
354. Id.
355. The Policy Statement did not directly address the requirement in § 403(i) of the
FDCA that if a food product is fabricated from two or more ingredients, the label must con-
tain the "common or usual name of each such ingredient." 21 U.S.C. § 343(i) (1994). For
example, a tomato that has been genetically engineered to contain a gene from a peanut
plant seems to fit rather comfortably within the ambit of § 403(i). The agency's initial re-
sponse to comments on the policy statement, however, noted that FDA has historically
considered "ingredients" to be "substances from which a food is fabricated," and not "new
constituents of plants introduced via breeding." 1993 FDA Labeling Policy Statement Re-
quest for Information, supra note 339, at 25,840. The agency solicited comments on whether
there was a scientific basis for distinguishing between modern biotechnologies and tradi-
tional breeding technologies in defining the word "ingredient," but it has taken no further
action in light of those comments. Id. at 25,840.
356. See FDA Draft GM Food Labeling Guidance, 2001, supra note 244.
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Policy Statement, it had not become "aware of any data or other
information that would form a basis for concluding that the fact
that a food or its ingredients was produced using bioengineering is
a material fact that must be disclosed under sections 403(a) and
201 (n) of the act.' 57 The agency therefore reaffirmed its 1992 de-
cision not to require special labeling of all bioengineered foods.
Nevertheless, since it was clear to FDA that many consumers
strongly believed that information about the GM status of food was
"material," it decided to provide "guidance to assist manufacturers
who wish to label their foods voluntarily as being made with or
without the use of bioengineered ingredients.' 8 The agency's goal
was to "help manufacturers ensure that their labeling is truthful
and not misleading., 35 9 For that reason, FDA cautioned manufac-
turers against using the word "free," as in "biotech free," because
that term might imply that the food was superior to non-GM food,
an implication that FDA has consistently rejected. In addition, the
agency was not at all confident that manufacturers could deliver on
the implicit promise that not a single molecule of GM material was
present in food so labeled .3 w Thus, in FDA's view, "GM-free" label-
ing would be misleading to consumers and, hence, unlawful.
The guidance also warned that a manufacturer claiming that its
food was not developed using GM material would have to substan-
tiate that claim. It suggested that absent validated testing to ensure
that specific food was free of bioengineered material, manufactur-
ers would have to document handling practices in order to
substantiate such claims. 6' Ultimately, however, the agency left it
"to each firm's discretion to maintain appropriate documentation
to demonstrate that the food was produced using traditional
methods."
36 2
Instead of requiring manufacturers of products containing GM
foods to label those products, the labeling guidelines appear to
employ the substantial equivalence doctrine to discourage compa-
nies who market products not containing GM foods from
informing their consumers of that fact. Food suppliers are free to
market most GM foods at will, but food suppliers attempting to ap-
peal to consumers who are wary of GM foods must take great care
in processing and labeling their products not to mislead




361. Id. at 4841.
362. Id.
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consumers into believing that non-GM foods are any better than
GM foods. The document may have satisfied the demands of the
biotechnology and food manufacturing trade groups for guidance.
It did not respond to public interest group demands that consum-
ers be told which products on the grocery shelves contain GM
materials.
IV. EPA REGULATION OF GM FOODS
The Environmental Protection Agency exercises the primary au-
thority for regulating pesticides under the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 3 3 and the Food Drug and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA). Under FIFRA, no person may sell, distrib-
ute, or receive a pesticide unless it has been "registered" with EPA
or has been exempted from the registration requirements.365 The
Act defines the term "pesticide" very broadly to include any sub-
stance "intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or
mitigating any pest" or "intended for use as a plant regulator, defo-
liant, or desiccant., 36 6 To obtain a registration for a pesticide, the
registrant must demonstrate that when used in accordance with
widespread and commonly recognized practice, it will not gener-
ally cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.
'3 67
This ordinarily requires the registrant to submit to EPA extensive
information on the pesticide's identity, its environmental fate, its
potential toxicity to humans and other animals, and its potential
for ecological disruption.
EPA does, however, have the authority to exempt whole classes
of pesticides that the agency determines "to be of a character
which is unnecessary to be subject to this [Act] in order to carry
out the purposes of this [Act] ."" The agency interprets this au-
thority to allow it to exempt a pesticide or category of pesticides
363. 7 U.S.C. §§ 13 6 -136y (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
364. 21 U.S.C. § 346a (1994). EPA also has authority to regulate chemical substances
under the Toxic Substances Control Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2601-2629 (1994). The agency has,
however, apparently recognized that it would have to stretch the words "chemical substance"
beyond recognition to apply the TSCA to genetically engineered plants. Environmental
Protection Agency, Statement of Policy; Microbial Products Subject to the Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 51 Fed. Reg.
23,313, 23,324 (1986).
365. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1994).
366. Id. § 136(u).
367. 7 U.S.C. § 136c (1994).
368. 40 C.ER. §§ 158.165, 158.170, 162.153 (2001).
369. 7 U.S.C. § 136w(b) (1994).
[VOL. 35:3
Seeds of Distrust
that possesses "a low probability of risk to the environment, and
that is not likely to cause unreasonable adverse effects to the envi-
ronment even in the absence of regulatory oversight under
FIFRA.,
371
Under the FDCA as amended by the 1996 Food Quality Protec-
tion Act, a food is adulterated if it contains a pesticide residue,
unless EPA has established a "tolerance" for the pesticide residue
on that food or has exempted the food from the tolerance re-
quirement. 7 ' The tolerance must be set at a "safe" level, and safety
is defined to mean that "there is a reasonable certainty that no
harm will result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical
residue, including all anticipated dietary exposures and all other
exposures for which there is reliable information. 3 7 2 EPA may ex-
empt a pesticide residue from the tolerance requirement only if
the agency finds that the residue will remain "safe" in the absence
of a tolerance in accordance with the same "reasonable certainty of
no harm" standard. 73
A. EPA Implementation Activities
As previously mentioned, FDA announced in its 1992 Policy
Statement that it deferred to EPA all regulatory authority over
plants that were genetically modified to express pesticidal sub-
stances, so long as they were not also modified to express
nonpesticidal substances.374 In November 1994, EPA issued a Pro-
posed Policy Statement on GM pest-resistant plants (the 1994
Proposed Policy) that, inter alia, proposed comprehensive regula-
tions aimed at clarifying the agency's role in the 1986 Coordinated
Framework .37 Although the agency took many years to finalize the
370. Regulations Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act for
Plant-Incorporated Protectants (Formerly Plant-Pesticides), Final Rule 4, 66 Fed. Reg.
37,772, 37,773 (Envtl. Prot. Agency, July 19, 2001) [hereinafter EPA, FIFRA Plant-
Incorporated Protectants Regulations, 2001].
371. 21 U.S.C. § 346a (1994).
372. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(c) (2) (A) (ii) (1994).
373. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(c) (2) (A) (i) (1994).
374. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 23,011.
375. Plant Pesticides Subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; Proposed Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,496 (Envtl.
Prot. Agency, proposed Nov. 23, 1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 152, 174, and 180)
[hereinafter EPA 1994 Proposed Policy]. In May 1997, the agency published a supplemental
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to elicit additional public comments on its evaluation of the
requirements imposed by the recently enacted Food Quality Protection Act. Plant Pesticides;
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proposal, the 1994 Proposed Policy in fact guided the agency's day-
to-day decision-making process with respect to pest-resistant GM
376plants.
On January 16, 2001, EPA submitted three sets of final regula-
tions, promulgated under both the FIFRA and the FDCA,
regarding pest-resistant plants to the Office of the Federal Register
(OFR) and made them generally available to the public.377 at the
same time, the agency re-proposed for further comment regula-
tions relating to several exemptions from the FIFRA's registration
378and the FDCA's pesticide tolerance requirements. Immediately
following the 2001 inauguration, however, White House Chief of
Staff Andrew H. Card wrote a memorandum to the heads and act-
ing heads of all executive departments and agencies asking them
to withdraw from the OFR all submissions that had not yet been
published in the Federal Register pending further review by newly
appointed agency heads.3 79 All of EPA's submissions were with-
drawn pursuant to the Card Memo, and their current status
remains unclear.
B. The Role of Substantial Equivalence in EPA's Regulation of GM Foods
The broad definition of "pesticide" in FIFRA easily includes all
changes in a plant's genetic material that are "intended" to kill or
even "mitigate" pests. Thus, EPA's overall authority to regulate GM
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 62 Fed. Reg. 27132 (Envtl. Prot. Agency,
proposed May 16, 1997) (to be codified at40 C.ER. pt. 180).
376. See NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 30 (noting that
"[a]lthough the proposal has not been finalized, the agency has been implementing its
essential elements in registering or exempting plant-pesticides since 1995"). As discussed
below, the re-proposal of aspects of the 1994 proposal (along with the proposal of options
for replacing aspects of the 1994 proposal) raises the question whether EPA may legitimately
continue following the 1994 proposal in its day-to-day decisions.
377. EPA, FIFRA Plant-Incorporated Protectants Regulations, 2001 supra note 370; Ex-
emption from the Requirement for a Tolerance Under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act for Residues of Nucleic Acids that are Part of Plant-Incorporated Protectants
(Formerly Plant-Pesticides), 66 Fed. Reg. 37,817 (July 19,2001) [hereinafter EPA, FDCA GM
Plant Tolerance Exemptions, 2001]; Exemption from the Requirement of a Tolerance Un-
der the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act for Residues Derived Through Conventional
Breeding from Sexually Compatible Plants of Plant-Incorporated Protectants (Formerly
Plant-Pesticides), Proposed Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,830 (July 19, 2001).
378. Environmental Protection Agency, Plant-Incorporated Protectants (Formerly Plant-
Pesticides), Supplemental Proposal, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,855 (July 19, 2001) [hereinafter EPA,
Supplemental Proposal for FIFRA and FDCA GM Plant Exemptions, 2001].
379. Card Memorandum,Jan. 20, 2001, supra note 245.
[VOL. 35:3
Seeds of Distrust
pest-resistant plants is not open to serious doubt.8 10 Similarly, a
gene inserted into a plant to express a pesticidal protein and the
protein itself are rather clearly residues of a pesticide in the ge-
netically engineered plant for purposes of the FDCA tolerance
requirement.3 ' To the extent that harvested plants containing resi-
dues of genetic material and pesticidal expression products are
used in food or feed, they are also subject to the tolerance re-
quirements of the FDCA . EPA has in the past, however, invoked
the substantial equivalence doctrine to grant broad categorical ex-
emptions to some GM pest-resistant crops from both the FIFRA
registration and the FDCA tolerance requirements.
1. GM Plants as Pesticides-The November 1994 Proposed Policy
Statement acknowledged that most plants have some natural ability
to resist pests and disease, and it noted that companies had for
many years extracted substances with pesticidal properties from
384plants to sell as pesticides. Although the agency had always regu-
lated such extracted substances as pesticides, it had not in the past
directly addressed the use of traditional breeding techniques to
enhance a plant's pre-existing ability to produce pesticidal sub-
3815
stances. In addition to facilitating the manipulation of crops to
produce pre-existing pesticides, the agency recognized that mod-
ern genetic engineering techniques made it "possible to introduce
into plants mechanisms of pest and disease resistance that are not
found in the plant kingdom."
8 6
The 1994 Proposed Policy Statement coined the term "plant-
pesticide" to refer to "a pesticidal substance that is produced in a
living plant and the genetic material necessary for the production
of the [pesticidal] substance where the [pesticidal] substance is
intended for use in the living plant."38 7 The January, 2001 Final
Rule replaced "plant-pesticide" with a new term, "plant incorpo-
380. EPA 1994 Proposed Policy, supra note 375, at 60,499 ("[A1l1 plant-pesticides are po-
tentially subject to EPA's regulatory authority under FIFRA."); see Bohrer, Biotechnology, supra
note 11, at 666-67.
381. EPA 1994 Proposed Policy, supra note 375, at 60,499 ("Since FDCA defines pesti-
cides in terms of the definition in FIFRA section 2, EPA also has the authority to regulate
residues of plant-pesticides under FDCA sections 408 and 409 .. "); see also Bohrer, Biotech-
nology, supra note 11, at 668.
382. EPA, FIFRA Plant-Incorporated Protectants Regulations, 2001, supra note 370, at
37,785.
383. EPA 1994 Proposed Policy, supra note 375, at 60,496.
384. For example, pyrethrums extracted from chrysanthemums had for many years
been used as pesticides. Id. at 60,497.
385. Id. at 60,497.
386. Id. at 60,496.
387. Id. at 60,534.
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rated protectant," which referred to a "pesticidal substance, along
with the genetic material necessary to produce it, produced and
used in living plants." 38 The critical factor distinguishing plant-
incorporated protectants from chemical and other pesticides un-
der the new rule is the fact that they are "intended to be produced
and used in the living plant.,
389
EPA's determination to regulate pest-resistant plants under
FIFRA and FDCA is clearly appropriate, given the broad definition
of "pesticide" in that statute.390 The agency's decision in the January
2001 final rule to include both the genetic material inserted into a
plant and its pesticidal expression products is also fully authorized
by the statute. While some commentators have insisted that ma-
nipulating a plant's natural defense mechanisms through either
traditional or modern means should not subject the plant to regu-
lation under FIFRA,391 the agency quite properly concluded that
since the intent of the human being causing the manipulation is to
kill or mitigate a pest, both the genetic material used in the ma-
nipulation and the substances resulting from the manipulation are
392
"pesticides" under section 2(u) of FIFRA. The agency decided to
388. EPA, FIFRA Plant-Incorporated Protectants Regulations, 2001, supra note 370, at
37,774. The name change was motivated by two factors. First, the term "plant-pesticide" in
standard English means "plant killer," a term that strictly only applies to herbicides. Second,
many commenters from the biotechnology industry were concerned that applying the term
"pesticide" to the entire plant would attach a negative connotation to the plant in the minds
of the public, "and the public perception of a promising branch of science could be tar-
nished." See id. at 37,780. No doubt for similar reasons, the agency rejected suggestions that
the name be changed to "Franken-plants," "Pandora pesticides," "products-of-sexual-abuse,"
and "alien pesticides." Id. at 37,781.
389. Id. at 37,774. EPA meant for the term "plant incorporated protectant" to include
plants engineered through traditional breeding technologies to contain higher levels of
substances intended to kill pests. It then exempted all plant-incorporated protectants de-
rived through conventional breeding from sexually compatible plants from all FIFRA
requirements except the requirement that registrants report any observed adverse health or
environmental effects. Id. at 37,786. The agency reasoned that conventional breeding using
sexually compatible plants was unlikely to bring about quantitative changes in the levels of
pesticidal substances in the resulting plants. Id. at 37,801. Recognizing that this exemption
was based upon a process-oriented distinction betweenI GM plants and non-GM plants, EPA
explained that modern genetic engineering techniques made it possible to make "novel
genetic modifications never before possible" and that it might "give the public more confi-
dence that risk potential is being evaluated." Id. at 37,794.
390. A gene transfer typically involves more than the mere insertion of a single gene
from one organism into another. For example, the transfer that inserted the gene coding for
Bt toxin into corn also included promoters (genetic material that initiates transcription of
the gene) and terminators (genetic material which stops transcription of the gene) from a
virus and another bacterium. See CEQ/OSTP CASE STUDIES, 2001, supra note 15, at 1.
391. See EPA, FIFRA Plant-Incorporated Protectants Regulations, 2001, supra note 370,
at 37,773.
392. 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (1994 & Supp. IV 1986). EPA further decided to regulate as "in-
ert ingredients" selectable marker genes inserted into GM plants to facilitate identification
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cast its net broadly and use the exemptions process to address GM
pest-resistant plants that posed insignificant risks to health or the
environment.
2. EPA-Created Exemptions-Relying heavily upon the substantial
equivalence doctrine, the 1994 Policy Statement proposed to ex-
empt "certain categories" of pest-resistant plants that posed "low
probability of risk" and would therefore not cause unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment.9  In particular, EPA proposed
to exempt from the FDCA tolerance requirements "nucleic acids
produced in plants as part of a plant-pesticide" and "categories of
[plant-pesticides that would] not result in new dietary expo-
sures. ' The first exemption for nucleic acids was uncontroversial,
and EPA retained it in the January 2001 final regulations. 9 The
second exemption applied to the expression products of the trans-
ferred genes, and it contained two primary subcategories: (1)
plant-pesticides from closely related (i.e., sexually compatible)
plants; and (2) plant-pesticides derived from food plants that are
not closely related to the recipient plant that do not involve "sig-
nificantly different dietary exposures. ' 9" The agency's rationale for
these much more controversial exemptions relied heavily upon the
substantial equivalence doctrine.
With respect to the proposed exemption for closely related
plants, the agency reasoned that "most plant varieties developed by
plant breeders using genetic material from plants that meet the
sexually compatible standard produce food that is safe for human
consumption and/or that appropriate processing procedures are
widely known and routinely used by consumers in preparation of
food from such sources.,,397 The agency speculated that transfers
between closely related species would not result in levels of toxic
proteins that greatly exceeded the normal range of levels exhibited
in individual plants. It further noted that there were limits to which
of plants with desired traits. EPA, FIFRA Plant-Incorporated Protectants Regulations, 2001,
supra note 370, at 37,791.
393. EPA 1994 Proposed Policy, supra note 375, at 60,499.
394. Id. at 60,504. The agency also proposed to exempt coat proteins from plant viruses
"based on virus-infected plants having always been a part of the human and domestic animal
food supply without detectable adverse human health effects." Id. at 60,506.
395. EPA, FDCA GM Plant Tolerance Exemptions, 2001, supra note 377, at 37,820 (not-
ing that "nucleic acids are ubiquitous in all forms of life, including food plants"); see also
EPA, FIFRA Plant-Incorporated Protectants Regulations, 2001, supra note 370, at 37,797.
396. EPA 1994 Proposed Policy, supra note 375, at 60,505.
397. Id. at 60,505. For similar reasons, the 1994 Proposed Policy similarly exempted
from FIFRA's registrations requirements all "plant-pesticides derived from closely related
plants." Id. at 60,501.
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registrants could increase the levels of pre-existing toxic proteins in
food plants "without unwanted effects on other, desirable charac-
teristics of the plant (e.g., yield or palatability of fruit). 13 98 It
therefore anticipated that "the majority of plants with modified
levels of plant-pesticides will fall within existing ranges of pesticide
levels," and it did not anticipate that "increasing the level of a
plant-pesticide that is normally a component of a plant would lead
to significantly different spectrum of exposure to the plant-
pesticide."
39
Most of the comments on the proposal were quite negative. 40 0 It
is possible, for example, for a closely related donor plant to con-
tain a gene coding for much higher levels of a pesticidal protein
that is toxic or allergenic to some human beings at levels higher
than those encountered in the diets of persons consuming the
unmodified food plant. The increased levels of the protein in-
duced by the transfer of that gene to the food plant could cross
some threshold of allergenicity or toxicity. Reacting to the negative
comments, the January 2001 publication declined to finalize that
tolerance exemption. Instead, the agency re-proposed for further
comment the sexually compatible donor plant exemption along
with an alternative approach under which the agency would make
"case-by-case" exemption determinations based upon individual
demonstrations of "substantial equivalence.
40 1
The second proposed exemption for expression products em-
ployed the substantial equivalence doctrine to exempt plant-
pesticides derived from unrelated food plants that did not involve
"significantly different dietary exposures." The agency reasoned
that "there is experience with exposure [to such expression prod-
ucts] because both plants have contributed to the food supply."
4 2
So long as the gene transfer did not result in significantly different
dietary exposures to the pesticidal expression product, the agency
believed that the resulting plants should be safe to eat. 0 3 TheJanu-
398. Id. at 60,503.
399. Id. at 60,503. The agency's implicit assumption that consumers will continue to use
appropriate processing and preparation procedures with pest-resistant GM plants that result
from transfers between closely related species is probably a reasonable one. Since the trans-
ferred gene will come from a closely related species, the potential for "surprise" insertions
into unprocessed or unprepared foods of toxic proteins that are normally destroyed by
processing or preparation should be very low.
400. EPA, Supplemental Proposal for FIFRA and FDCA GM Plant Exemptions, 2001,
supra note 378, at 37,858.
401. Id. at 13-14.
402. EPA 1994 Proposed Policy, supra note 375, at 60,505.
403. Id. As an example of "significantly different dietary exposures," the agency sug-
gested the transfer of a gene that codes for a pesticidal protein that exists only in an inedible
portion of the donor plant. Id.
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ary 2001 final regulation did not adopt this proposed exemption,
either. Moreover, the supplemental proposal accompanying the
January 2001 regulation did not even make reference to the sec-
ond proposed exemption. It would therefore appear that the
agency in January 2001 abandoned altogether the 1994 proposed
exemption for expression products from food plants that do not
involve significant dietary exposures.
EPA promised to complete the rulemaking with respect to its
January 2001 supplemental proposal within nine to twelve months
after the mid-March close of the comment period.4 4 That promise,
however, was made by the Clinton Administration EPA, and the
status of the proposed rules in the Bush Administration is unclear.
None of the documents that the agency made public in January
2001 alluded to the fact that the agency had been adhering to the
1994 Policy Statement for the previous six years. More importantly,
none of the documents mentioned whether EPA would continue
to apply the exemptions proposed in 1994 and re-proposed but not
adopted in 2001 in the future. Given the agency's explicit determi-
nation that the available information did not warrant
promulgating the proposed exemptions as final rules, the re-
proposal could hardly be considered an affirmation of the exemp-
tions. at the very least, the agency's complete silence in 2001 with
respect to the proposed exemption for gene transfers that do not
involve significantly different dietary exposures cannot legitimately
be read as a continued recognition of such an exemption.
The January 2001 documents made it very clear that EPA re-
garded pest-resistant plants (now called "plant-incorporated
protectants") to be pesticides. The FDCA tolerance requirements
are therefore applicable to all such plant-incorporated protectants
absent a determination by the Administrator that particular resi-
dues are exempt. Since a proposed exemption that the agency has
explicitly refused to adopt can hardly be characterized as a genu-
ine exemption, it would appear that all plant-incorporated
protectants that do not come within the final exemptions promul-
gated in January 2001 must have a tolerance. It remains to be seen
whether the agency adopts this view of the status of genetically
modified food plants. If it does, then all GM pest-resistant plants
that EPA previously exempted from its tolerance requirements
must now have a tolerance, and the agency's previous heavy reli-
ance on the substantial equivalence doctrine will have ended. The
404. EPA, Supplemental Proposal for FIFRA and FDCA GM Plant Exemptions, 2001,
supra note 378, at 37,857.
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new Administration, however, may take an entirely different ap-
proach to the proposed exemptions.
V. THE FAILURE OF THE EXISTING REGULATORY REGIME
A. Introduction
The substantial equivalence principle has played a dominant
role in agency attempts to address the health risks of GM foods
within the contours of the existing statutory framework. The ex-
tensive reliance of both FDA and EPA on that doctrine has had
important consequences for the overall legitimacy of the regula-
tory program for GM foods. In the case of FDA, the agency's
adherence to the substantial equivalence doctrine has combined
with a statutorily mandated GRAS option to produce a system in
which FDA has no way of knowing whether companies are distrib-
uting or importing new GM foods and therefore no way of
managing the risks posed by those foods. Between 1994 and Janu-
ary 2001, EPA administered a similar program for pesticides
through an administratively created exemptions process in which
substantial equivalence played a prominent role.
The tentativeness with which the implementing agencies have
fulfilled their regulatory responsibilities contributed to a crisis of
public confidence in GM foods. As a result, both agencies pub-
lished documents in January 2001 designed to "reinvent" the
federal approach to regulating GM foods and to restore public
trust in the regulatory process. Substantial equivalence plays a less
prominent, but still important role in FDA's proposed notification
regulations. It plays a greatly reduced role in EPA's final regula-
tions for plant-incorporated protectants, but those regulations may
never go into effect, and serious questions remain about the status
of the previously allowed exemptions that have either been re-
proposed or abandoned altogether. This section of the Article will
analyze the weaknesses in the current regulatory regime and at-
tempt to explain why public trust in the existing regulatory regime
405. See NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 38 (noting that
"[many believe that transgenic crops present substantial human health and ecological risks,
and that these are not properly assessed by the regulatory framework"); Hearing Before the S.
Gov't Affairs Subcomm. On Oversight of Gov't Mgmt. Restructuring and the Dist. of Columbia, 106th
Cong. (Aug. 4, 1999) (testimony of Carol Tucker Foreman, Consumer Federation of Amer-
ica) (arguing that "[t]he regulatory structure for reviewing and approving genetically
engineered foods contributes to the confusion and fear").
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is flagging. The following section will offer some solutions for re-
pairing the existing regime.
B. The Crisis of Public Confidence
The agricultural biotechnology industry will succeed only if the
public is convinced that the industry and the regulatory agencies
that legislatures have created to protect consumers are trustwor-
thy.406 According to informed industry analysts, public distrust
poses the single most important threat to the new industry.4 7 No
matter how strong the scientific evidence appears to the propo-
nents of the technology, the ultimate test for the success GM foods
in the marketplace is whether the public trusts the decision makers
who interpret that scientific information and use it to assess and
manage risks.
The U.S. biotechnology industry entered the GM foods debates
with an arrogance reminiscent of the nuclear power industry in the
1950s. 40 8 Early in the highly contentious controversy in Europe over
GM foods, a public relations specialist hired by an American bio-
technology company told critics that "'people will have Roundup
Ready soya, whether they like it or not.',40" An executive for an-
other American company told the technical manager of a British
supermarket chain that he was a "backward European" who should
'just accept this is right for your customers."4'0 This arrogance
backfired in Europe (the supermarket chain made arrangements
with Brazilian suppliers of non-GM foods, as did many of its com-
petitors), and by the late 1990s, it was beginning to have a negative
effect in the United States as well.'
406. See ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 211 (observing that
"[sItudies of risk perception are uniform in the finding that even the most minimal risks
may be unacceptable if levels of trust in those who manage those risks are low or eroding");
EU-U.S. CONSULTATIVE FORUM, FINAL REPORT, supra note 149, at 10 (observing that the
"regulatory processes must be sufficiently strong to ensure public confidence").
407. Goldberg, Transforming Life, supra note 34, at 104 ("Escalating public opposition
poses the greatest single threat to the successful growth of the life-science business.").
408. See generally, ELIZABETH ROLPH, NUCLEAR POWER AND THE PUBLIC SAFETY (1979);
KRISTIN SHRADER-FRECHE-VrE, NUCLEAR POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY (1980).
409. Maria Margaronis, As Biotech "Frankenfoods "Are Stuffed Down Their Throats, Consumers
Rebel, THE NATION, Dec. 27, 1999, at 11 (quoting Ann Foster).
410. Id.
411. See Avery, Biotechnology Future, supra note 58, at 98 (complaining of "the shortsight-
edness-or arrogance--of modem agriculture and agribusiness"); Goldberg, Transforming
Life, supra note 34, at 104 (biotech companies "have either ignored or derided their critics,
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Well-publicized protests in Europe and (more recently) in the
United States have focused public attention on the ease with which
genetically modified foods found their way into the U.S. food sup-
ply, and many consumers are not pleased. In recent months,
several large food processors, including Frito-Lay, Seagram, Gerber,
and Heinz, have promised not to use GM foods in their products.
412
Whole Foods Markets, Wild Oats Markets, and the Iceland Super-
market Group have announced their refusal to market any GM
foods.' In perhaps the most significant blow to GM foods in the
United States, one of the two dominant grain distribution compa-
nies, Archer Daniels Midland, advised farmers in the Fall of 1999
414to segregate GM grain from non-GM grain. Reacting to the un-
certainties in the market for GM crops, farmers reduced the
percentage of genetically modified corn from thirty-three percent
in 1999 to twenty-five percent in 2000.415
The condescending attitude of many federal officials has done
416little to inspire consumer confidence in the GM food economy.
The critics of agricultural biotechnologies can easily appeal to a
general public distrust in large corporations, big science, and pli-
ant public officials.' 7 One of the dominant themes at the World
Trade Organization protests in Seattle and the Bio2000 protests in
Boston was that the federal government cannot be trusted to make
insisting that the technologies they are pioneering are perfectly safe and that concerns
about them are baseless").
412. Laura Tangley, Of Genes, Grain, and Grocers: The Risks and Realities of Engineered
Crops, U.S. NEws & WORLD REp., Apr. 10, 2000, at 49; David Stipp, Is Monsanto's Biotech Worth
Less than a Hill of Beans?, FORTUNE, Feb. 21, 2000, at 157 [hereinafter Stipp, Hill of Beans].
Not all companies have abandoned GM crops. Despite parodies of Kelloggs' Tony-the-Tiger
(a tiger called FrankenTony) and attempts to pass anti-GM resolutions at Kellogg share-
holder meetings, the company continues to purchase GM corn. See Kevin McCauley, BigFood
Companies Face Anti-Biotech PR Assault, O'DWYER'S PR SERVICES REP., Mar. 2000, at 1 [herein-
after McCauley, Big Food Companies]; see also Golden, Frankenfood, supra note 13.
413. Kriz, Global Fond Fights, supra note 34, at 688; Iceland Leads Non-Gm Drive, FARMING
NEWS, Feb. 25, 2000, at 1; Stipp, Hill of Beans, supra note 412, at 157. The Gerber action must
have been particularly unnerving for its parent company, Novartis International, one of the
world's largest agricultural biotechnology companies. See Goldberg, 7ansforming Life, supra
note 34, at 94.
414. Stipp, Hill of Beans, supra note 412, at 158.
415. Paul Raeburn, Biotech Foods Aren't Out of the Woods Yet, Bus. WK., Apr. 17, 2000, at 56
[hereinafter Raeburn, Out of the Woods]. Similarly, the percentage of soybeans planted with
genetically modified plants shrank from fifty-seven percent to fifty-two. Id.
416. See Foreman Remarks, Nov. 30, 1999, supra note 5 (arguing that "[i]t doesn't work
to sit there and say, 'Jane, you ignorant slut, if you don't believe this is safe it's because
you're stupid').
417. See, e.g., Ho, Dangerous Liaison, supra note 176, at 105 (arguing that "bad science
and big business, both out of control, have formed a dangerous liaison that is gambling with




protective decisions about genetically modified foods.1 s Unfortu-
nately, the existing U.S. regulatory agencies, with their heavy
reliance on the highly malleable substantial equivalence principle,
provided litde to undermine activist contentions beyond an un-
convincing appeal to "trust us because the experts know better
than you what is best for you."
Recent polls suggest that the American public is divided on the
question of the safety of GM foods, but a slight majority is favorably
disposed. A December, 1999 Gallup Poll found that fifty-three per-
cent of more than 1000 participants thought that GM foods were
not dangerous, twenty-five percent believed that they posed a seri-
ous health hazard, and twenty percent were uncertain. 41 9 A poll
conducted by Roper Starch Worldwide in July and August 1999,
found that seventy-three percent of the 1,002 adult consumers sur-
veyed said that they would eat GM foods if it meant that farmers
would use fewer chemical pesticides. 420 In a multi-year poll of
American consumers conducted by North Carolina State Sociolo-
gist Thomas Hoban, seventy percent of the respondents supported
agricultural biotechnology in 1992 and seventy-two percent sup-
ported it in 1994 and 1998.4 l at the same time, the fact that eighty-
one percent of the respondents in a January 1999 Time Magazine
poll and 70-90 percent of the respondents in other polls thought
that GM foods should be labeled may suggest that the public does
not have a great deal of faith in the federal regulatory agencies to
protect individuals from the health risks posed by GM foods.422
418. Kriz, Global Food Fights, supra note 34. The message has been especially well re-
ceived in Europe where recent food-related safety incidents (e.g., mad cow disease,
contaminated Coca-Cola, etc.) have undermined public trust in the regulatory authorities.
See Goldberg, Transforming Life, supra note 34, at 94. Environmental activists have also aimed
public education campaigns at companies like the Kellogg Corporation, Frito-Lay, and
McDonalds that purchase large quantities of agricultural commodities and that are espe-
cially sensitive to adverse publicity because they are in highly competitive markets. See
McCauley, Big Food Companies, supra note 412.
419. Deborah Silver, Biotech Food Safety Doesn't Worry Consumers, RESTAURANTS & INSTS.,
Dec. 15, 1999, at 66.
420. Robert Vosburgh, Consumers Prefer Biotechnology to Pesticides: Pol SUPERMARKET
NEws,Jan. 24, 2000, at 43. The survey indicated that consumers also preferred other options
to chemical pesticides, including paying higher prices (57%), smaller selection (68%), and
seasonal availability (72%). Id.
421. ThomasJ. Hoban, International Acceptance of Agricultural Biotechnology, in NAT'L AG-
RiC. BIOTECHNOLOGY COUNCIL REP. 10, AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: GENE ESCAPE AND PEST RESISTANCE 59, 60 (Ralph W.E. Hardy &
Jane Baker Segelken eds., 1998) [hereinafter Hoban, InternationalAcceptance].
422. See The Future of Food: Biotechnology and Consumer Confidence: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 106th Cong (2000) (testimony of Michael K.
Hansen, Ph.D., Research Associate, Consumer Policy Institute, Consumers Union); Silber-
geld Testimony, Oct. 6, 1999, supra note 130 (quoting Time Magazine poll).
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The biotechnology industry and its allies in the Administration
and Congress are beginning to recognize that its future depends
upon public acceptance of the technologies and public trust in the
processes through which the health and environmental risks they
pose are managed.423 In a widely publicized speech in July 1999,
Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman stressed that:
With all that biotechnology has to offer, it is nothing if it is not
accepted. That boils down to a matter of trust-trust in the
science behind the process, but particularly trust in the regu-
latory process that ensures a thorough review, including
complete and open public involvement.
424
The head of the NAS Committee on Genetically Modified Pest-
Protected Plants concluded that "[p]ublic acceptance of these
foods ultimately depends on the credibility of the testing and regu-
latory process. 425 It remains to be seen whether the current
regulatory regime can earn that trust.
C. Notice
One rudimentary element of any program for regulating health
and environmental risks is a requirement that entities proposing to
engage in new risk-creating activities provide notice of that fact to a
governmental agency. Pre-release notification helps protect public
health and the environment and ensure public trust by giving the
appropriate agency an opportunity to decide whether to exercise
its regulatory powers. Without pre-release notification, the agency
can only assume a reactive mode, attempting to stem any damage
that has already occurred and to prevent it from occurring in the
future. Indeed, absent such notice, the damage caused by the in-
troduction of a new technology may not even be detectable for
423. See Collins Testimony, Mar. 3, 1999, supra note 68 ("Another key aspect of accep-
tance must include nurturing a higher level of comfort that includes consumer groups,
environmental advocates and the scientific community in general."); Goldberg, Transforming
Life, supra note 34, at 94 (noting that "life-science companies are beginning to engage in
public dialogue").
424. Dan Glickman, Remarks at the National Press Club Newsmaker Luncheon with
Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman (July 13, 1999).
425. Adriel Bettelheim, Reluctant Congress Drafted into Bioengineering Battle, CQ WKLY,
Apr. 22, 2000, at 938, 939 [hereinafter Bettelheim, Reluctant Congress] (quoting Perry Adkis-




many years (if at all), because the appropriate monitoring entities
will not know to be looking for evidence of harm.
The regulatory regime prior toJanuary 2001 gave manufacturers
and importers broad discretion in deciding whether to notify regu-
latory agencies of their plans to introduce GM foods into
commerce. Although a company that desired to "play it safe" would
notify EPA and FDA in close cases, no serious consequences were
likely to befall a company that declined to provide notice to those
agencies if it could plausibly argue that its GM food was GRAS in
the case of FDA or exempt in the case of EPA. Consumers were
therefore at the mercy of the proponents of the technologies to
exercise their judgment wisely in deciding whether to inform regu-
latory agencies of their plans to introduce GM foods into
commerce.
Recognizing the weakness of the existing notice requirements,
both EPA and FDA took steps at the very end of the Clinton Ad-
ministration to ensure that they receive pre-market notification of
most GM foods. EPA accomplished this result in a straightforward
way by failing to finalize proposed exemptions from the FDCA tol-
erance requirements for GM pest-resistant plants involving gene
transfers from closely related plants and from edible portions of
unrelated food plants. 6 The legal status of this action, however,
remains unclear, because the document supporting the action was
never published in the Federal Register.27 FDA proposed regulations
requiring all manufacturers of GM foods to provide pre-market
notification to that agency. The agency has not yet finalized those
regulations, however, and its legal authority to promulgate them
remains in some doubt.4 28 At this point, it is not clear that either of
the recent reforms will actually go into effect.
D. Transparency
Most observers would agree with the conclusion of the 1999 Ed-
inburgh Conference that "risk analysis systems are only likely to
generate public trust if based on transparency, provision of infor-
mation (on monitoring, research results, etc.), and on greater
inclusiveness of the various stakeholders."4 29 To an informed
426. See supra Part IV.B.2.
427. See supra Part IV.A.
428. See supra Part III.D.4.
429. OECD EDINBURGH RAPPORTEURS' SUMMARY, supra note 33, at 8.
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citizenry that has grown quite skeptical of well-orchestrated public
relations campaigns and condescending assurances from profes-
sional risk assessors, the most effective way to restore public trust in
regulatory agency decision-making is to make the regulatory proc-
ess as transparent as possible and to give representatives of public
interest groups a direct role in any decisions to regulate particular
GM commodities.43 °
As currently administered, the regulatory process at the federal
level is not very transparent. FDA does not automatically invite the
general public to informal consultations between its staff and the
manufacturers of GM foods, and the recently proposed notifica-
tion process allows a company to prevent notice to the public by
claiming the fact of notice to be confidential business informa-
tion. 43' EPA publishes notice of pesticide registration and tolerance
432
actions in the Federal Register, and the public ordinarily has an
opportunity to request a public hearing to challenge those ac-
tions.433 EPA's past practice, pursuant to its 1994 Policy Statement,
of exempting most GM pest-protected plants, however, has to some
extent nullified these avenues to public participation. As discussed
above, the status of EPA's recently promulgated regulations, which
decline to finalize either of the exemptions, remains to be seen.
E. Data Collection, Data Evaluation, and Risk Assessment
Testing novel products in laboratory animals and/or other sur-
rogate systems before allowing them onto the marketplace is
usually necessary to protect human health. Careful testing also ad-
430. See ProfessorJohn Durant, Widening the Circle: Engaging the Public in Policymak-
ing for GM Food 11, presented at the OECD Edinburgh Conference on the Scientific and
Health Aspects of Genetically Modified Foods (Feb. 28-Mar. 1, 2000) (factors promoting
credibility include: openness to public scrutiny, procedural transparency, [and] inclusivity to
ensure mindfulness of public concerns); EU-U.S. CONSULTATIVE FORUM, FINAL REPORT,
supra note 149, at 6 (noting that "the transparency of decision-making processes and mean-
ingful participation-involving all stakeholders-are matters of rapidly increasing
importance").
431. See Public Meeting on Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (Nov. 30, 1999) (remarks of Rebecca Goldburg, Senior Scientist, Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund) [hereinafter Goldburg Remarks, Nov. 30, 1999] (arguing that
"because these consultations are outside the regulatory system, they are not subject to public
scrutiny and are not a satisfactory substitute for a regulatory program").
432. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(4)(1994); 21 U.S.C. § 346a(d)(3)(1994); see also CEQ/OSTP
CASE STUDIES, 2001, supra note 15, at 42.
433. 21 U.S.C. § 34 6a(g)(2) (19 9 4 ). In the case of initial pesticide registrations, the pub-
lic hearing will be in court by way of ajudicial challenge to EPA's action, and the pesticide
may remain on the market pendingjudicial action. 7 U.S.C. § 136n(a)
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vances the goal of scientific accuracy in consumer and regulatory
decision-making. A regulatory agency must be capable of assessing
the quality of testing data, analyzing the scientific studies, inter-
preting the results, and drawing scientifically valid conclusions.
Finally, assessing the risks posed by novel products requires both
scientific judgment and, when uncertainties cloud the science, pol-
icy judgment.434 In the context of GM foods, risk assessment
involves an assessment of probability and consequences of an ad-
verse health effect resulting from the introduction of a GM plant
into the food supply.
EPA and FDA have required very little long-term pre-market test-
ing of whole GM foods or of the expression products of the
inserted genes. In the vast majority of cases, the agencies have al-
lowed manufacturers to forego all testing except that which is
necessary to meet the threshold substantial equivalence showing
required for GRAS status or pesticide exemptions. Although the
industry and the agencies confidently assert that the risks posed by
GM foods are very slight, these assurances are not based upon
quantitative risk assessments of the sort that characterize federal
regulation of chemical contaminants in food. For the most part,
the agencies have based their safety determinations upon the as-
sumption that GM foods that are substantially equivalent to
existing foods probably pose no greater risks. Full-fledged scientific
assessments of risks posed by particular GM plants based upon real
435scientific data are surprisingly rare.
EPA has required no testing whatsoever for pesticides that come
within its broad exemptions for gene transfers between sexually
compatible plants and gene transfers between unrelated food
plants.436 For other GM pest-resistant plants, a category that in-
cludes all Bt pest-resistant plants, EPA has determined testing
requirements on a "case-by-case" basis.43 The agency has not
434. See NAS RED BOOK, supra note 151, at 3 (stating that risk assessment is "the use of
the [existing] factual base to define the health effects of exposure of individuals or popula-
tions to hazardous materials and situations"); see also Mark E. Shere, The Myth of Meaningful
Environmental Risk Assessment, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 409, 430-68 (1995) (providing a
comprehensive explanation of four steps involved in risk assessment).
435. See Bettelheim, Reluctant Congress, supra note 425, at 942 (noting that "[tihe body
of scientific work on potential problems is growing, but there is still very little risk assess-
ment" (quotingJane Rissler of the Union of Concerned Scientists)).
436. The 1994 Proposed Policy Statement provided no substantive criteria for determin-
ing what kinds of testing should be undertaken. See EPA 1994 Proposed Policy, supra note
375, at 60,508.
437. Hearing Before the House Comm. on Sci. Subcomm. on Basic Research, 106th Cong. (Oct.
19, 1999) (testimony ofJanet L. Andersen, Director, Biopesticides and Pollution Prevention
Division, Office of Pesticide Programs, EPA) [hereinafter Andersen Testimony, Oct. 19,
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prescribed even rudimentary protocols for testing such plants for
adverse health consequences, and it has made liberal use of the
substantial equivalence doctrine to waive testing requirements that
would otherwise be applicable to chemical pesticides.43 "8 Although
the agency has promised to write testing regulations sometime in
the future,430 its current posture stands in stark contrast to the ex-
tensive testing regime that the agency has established for chemical
pesticides.4 0
FDA may receive a limited amount of data from manufacturers
in voluntary "consultations" with them over the GRAS status of par-
ticular GM foods. These data, however, need not reflect any
particular testing protocols. Manufacturers are free to rely upon
published reports and the conclusions of panels of experts based
upon published reports or other information. When a manufac-
turer concludes that a GM plant contains a food additive that is not
GRAS, it must comply with the food additive testing requirements,
and they typically demand a great deal of testing. 1 So far, however,
1999] (EPA "has worked with each company or individual developing plant-pesticide prod-
ucts to determine the appropriate data requirements for the particular product."). EPA has
required some acute oral testing of GM plants in laboratory rodents. See CEQ/OSTP CASE
STUDIES, 2001, supra note 15, at 16. It has also ordered testing in laboratory animals of the
pesticidal proteins that the inserted genes express. Id. EPA may also order studies of diges-
tion of the protein in simulated gastric assays to determine its stability after ingestion on the
theory that proteins that resist digestion have a higher allergenic potential than those that
are easily digested. Id. at 17.
438. See Sharlene R. Matten, EPA Regulation of Plant-Pesticides and Bt Plant-Pesticide Resis-
tance Management, in NAT'L AGRIC. BIOTECHNOLOGY COUNCIL REP. 10, AGRICULTURAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: GENE ESCAPE AND PEST RESISTANCE 105-
123 (Ralph W.E. Hardy &Jane Baker Segelken eds., 1998) [hereinafter Matten, EPA Regula-
tion]. The 1994 Policy Statement provided "general guidance" for data gathering on product
analysis, environmental fate, ecological effects, and human health effects, while "maintain-
ing an appropriate flexibility to data needs for individual cases." EPA 1994 Proposed Policy,
supra note 375, at 60,511. The agency staff typically demands that registrants submit data on
five general topics: product characterization, toxicology, non-target organisms effects, expo-
sure, and environmental fate. Andersen Testimony, Oct. 19, 1999, supra note 437.
439. See Andersen Testimony, Oct. 19, 1999, supra note 437; Matten, EPA Regulation, su-
pra note 438, at 123. The January, 2001 final rule promised to establish "data requirements
specific to plant-incorporated protectants through a public notice and comment process-
sometime in the future. EPA, FIFRA Plant-Incorporated Protectants Regulations, 2001, supra
note 370, at 37,783.
440. EPA, Data Requirements For Registration of Pesticides, 40 C.F.R. § 158 (2001). EPA
has promulgated requirements for testing microbial pesticides, and these are constantly
being reexamined to meet changing needs. See40 C.ER. §§ 158.65, 158.170, 158.162 (2002).
441. 21 U.S.C. § 348(b) (1994). The reports and investigations frequently include toxi-
cological tests conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the agency's
"Toxicological Principles for the Safety Assessment of Direct Food Additives and Color Addi-
tives Used in Food," generally referred to as the FDA "Redbook." See FDA Proposed
Bioengineered Food Regulations, 2000, supra note 243, at 4708. By some estimates, manu-
facturers of novel food additives spend about $20 million to conduct the studies necessary to
obtain FDA approval, and the approval process can take five to seven years to complete. See
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FDA has received one food additive petition, and that was limited
to the kanamycin-resistance marker gene and its expression prod-
ucts. All other non-pest-resistant GM plants that are currently in
GM foods are apparently GRAS.442 Thus, manufacturers have con-
ducted very little testing and FDA has undertaken very little risk
assessment of GM plants.
The failure of the federal government to require manufacturers
of GM foods to conduct the kind of testing, evaluation and risk as-
sessment necessary for adequate safety regulation is perhaps the
most frequently articulated criticism of the existing regulatory re-
gime.443 The contrast between the EPA and FDA approach to GM
foods and the approach of the same agencies to chemical pesti-
cides and additives is striking. In both agencies, the substantial
equivalence doctrine provides the primary justification for the
radical differences in testing, evaluation, and risk assessment re-
quirements. If the substantial equivalence doctrine is not
appropriate in the context of some plants to which it is currently
applied, or if it has been misapplied by food manufacturers and/or
the agencies to waive otherwise applicable testing, evaluation, and
risk assessment requirements, then the existing regulatory regime
is, on its own terms, inadequate.
E Consumer Choice
In a mass market economy, accurate information about con-
sumer products is critical to ensuring public trust in the
marketplace, and modern democracies have generally substituted
for the strict laissez-faire model a regulatory approach in which gov-
ernment agencies play a prominent role in protecting consumers
Noah & Merrill, Starting from Scratch, supra note 5, at 375 (citing testimony of Rhona S. Ap-
plebaum, Exec. Vice President, Nat'l Food Processors Ass'n).
442. After conducting more than forty-five consultations with respect to GM plants
since promulgating the 1992 policy, the agency has not required a single expression product
of a genetic modification to be reviewed as a food additive. See NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED
PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 30 (observing that "FDA has not required that any of the
proteins added to transgenic plants be reviewed as food additives").
443. See Bettelheim, Reluctant Congress, supra note 425, at 942 (quoting Jane Rissler of
the Union of Concerned Scientists) (noting that "if you don't look for problems, you won't
find them"); Silbergeld Testimony, Oct. 6, 1999, supra note 130 (criticizing FDA for letting
"companies themselves answer [the relevant] questions and decide whether to talk to FDA
about the product").
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from fraud and misleading advertising.4 4 Informational require-
ments can be burdensome and, in the extreme, can discourage
technological advance. Product label requirements can also be
both economically and administratively inefficient if the value of
the information to consumers does not exceed the cost of the label
and the opportunity cost of the information that otherwise might
be conveyed in the limited space available on the label. Thus, le-
gitimate disputes frequently arise over the extent to which
government should force manufacturers to provide all consumers
with information that some consumers might deem relevant to
their purchase decisions, but is not needed to prevent deception
and is not directly related to latent dangers.445
EPA and FDA have applied the substantial equivalence doctrine
to relieve manufacturers of any obligation to label GM foods. EPA's
regulatory authority over pesticides is largely irrelevant to con-
sumer choice, because it focuses almost exclusively upon the
information that seed manufacturers must convey to growers, and
does not clearly empower EPA to require either seed manufactur-
ers or growers to inform consumers of the fact that raw agricultural
commodities or processed foods are composed of GM plants."
6
Only FDA has clear authority to require marketers and importers
of GM foods to inform consumers directly of the fact that such
foods have been genetically altered. However, FDA has very nar-
rowly interpreted its labeling authority to require labeling only
when GM food differs so greatly from its traditional counterpart
that "the common or usual name no longer applies to the new
food" and when "a safety or usage issue exists to which consumers
444. Kirsten S. Beaudoin, Comment, On Tonight's Menu: Toasted Cornbread with Firefly
Genes? 83 MARQ. L. REV. 237, 239-40 (1999) (arguing that "[a] regulatory structure that
monitors and labels GM foods will ... ease the current consumer hostility to genetic engi-
neering that threatens to obscure its potential benefits"); WINROCK REPORT ON TRANSGENIC
CROPS, supra note 12, at 8 (concluding that "[m]ost people agree that consumers should
have the right to know and choose products based on their personal values").
445. For example, FDA did not require manufacturers of food to provide nutritional in-
formation on the labels of mass-produced foods until the 1970s. See Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and Request for Public Comment, 54 Fed. Reg. 32,610 (Food and
Drug Admin., Aug. 8, 1989) (setting out history of FDA nutrition labeling requirements).
Congress later enacted the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
535 (1990), to require additional nutrition labeling.
446. EPA manages pesticide risks primarily through its initial registration decisions (and
some fairly rare pesticide cancellation actions) and through conditions that are specified on
the pesticide label. EPA 1994 Proposed Policy, supra note 375, at 60,510. EPA may also re-
quire informational labeling to inform farmers about the risks posed by the labeled
pesticides. Id. at 60,511.
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must be alerted. 447 Consequently, FDA has not required labeling
for a single GM food.
G. Risk Management
"Risk management" is "the process of weighing policy alterna-
tives and selecting the most appropriate regulatory action,
integrating the results of risk assessment with engineering data and
with social, economic, and political concerns to reach a deci-
sion."448 When a risk assessment suggests that particular agricultural
biotechnologies pose unacceptable risks if left unregulated, the
regulatory regime must be capable of reducing or eliminating
those risks.449 A wide variety of regulatory approaches exists to ad-
dress the risks posed by dangerous technologies, ranging from
outright bans to positive economic incentives.450 Although this is
not the proper place for an extended discussion of policy tools for
risk management, one frequently employed risk management
technique for new product risks is a licensing (or permitting) re-
gime in which the proponent of the technology must demonstrate
that it meets a prescribed test safety threshold.
Both EPA and FDA administer laws that could require manufac-
turers of GM foods to obtain permits prior to marketing them. As
is generally the case with permit regimes, both of the relevant stat-
utes place the burden of demonstrating that the GM food meets
the regulatory criteria on the permit applicant. Manufacturers of
pesticides must demonstrate that they will not have "unreasonable
adverse effects" under FIFRA and will provide a reasonable cer-
tainty of no harm under FDCA.45' The FDCA places the burden on
the manufacturer to demonstrate that a food additive passes the
reasonable certainty of no harm test.452 Yet both agencies have
447. 1992 FDA Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 22,991.
448. NAS RED BOOK, supra note 151, at 3.
449. See OECD EDINBURGH RAPPORTEURS' SUMMARY, supra note 33, at 6 (noting that
"we need systems in place, trusted by citizens, for managing risks that encompass those
measures that become effective after decisions on acceptability have been taken").
450. See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOLS:
A USER'S GUIDE ch. 3 (1995).
451. EPA has granted "conditional registrations" for all of the currently registered GM
plant pesticides, and it will review those registrations under the evolving standards for evalu-
ating the environmental risks and benefits of genetically modified organisms sometime in
2001. See Kriz, Global Food Fights, supra note 34, at 688.
452. FDA has approved one food additive petition for the kanamycin resistance gene
and its expression products. See supra note 298.
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relied upon the substantial equivalence principle to craft such
broad exemptions for GM foods that the permit requirements are
not a significant obstacle to marketing new GM foods. EPA has
freely granted exemptions from the registration and tolerance
requirements for gene transfers to food plants from sexually
compatible plants and from unrelated food plants.4 53 A food addi-
tive for which FDA has not granted a food additive petition is
subject to seizure, but FDA's 1992 Policy Statement encourages
manufacturers to conclude that changes brought about through
genetic engineering are GRAS and therefore not subject to FDA
approval. As previously discussed, the broad applicability of the
substantial equivalence doctrine in FDA's 1992 Policy Statement
has effectively shifted the burden of proof back to the government
for the vast majority of GM foods.
Consumer groups are strongly of the opinion that FDA approval
should be mandatory for all GM foods.4 4 In their view, FDA's "vol-
untary and secret process leaves the industry on the honor
system." 4 Biotechnology proponents argue that while the system is
essentially voluntary, companies have a strong incentive to consult
with FDA to avoid civil penalties and damaging accusations that
453. Matten, EPA Regulation, supra note 438, at 129. In 1999, EPA published a Federal
Register notice in connection with its review of a proposed expansion of a tolerance for a
variety of GM-corn (called StarLink® corn) soliciting public input on the potential for aller-
genicity of non-digestible proteins (Cry9C) expressed as plant-pesticides. Allergenicity
Assessment of Cry9C BT Corn Plant Pesticide, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,452 (Envtl. Prot. Agency,
December 21, 1999). The staff determined that, unlike other Bt proteins, the protein Cry9C
was stable to heat and gastric digestion and therefore could pose an allergenic risk to hu-
mans consuming Cry9C GM foods if the protein was in fact allergenic. Id. In the meantime,
however, EPA registered StarLink® corn for use only as animal feed on the optimistic as-
sumption that farmers would sell GM corn that appeared identical to non-GM corn at lower
prices on the animal feed markets. The unfortunate consequences of this decision are de-
tailed below. See infra Part V.H.
454. See Goldburg Remarks, Nov. 30, 1999, supra note 431 (urging FDA to subject GM
foods "to the same regulatory requirements as substances added to foods via more tradi-
tional means"); Public Meeting on Biotechnolgy in the Year 2000 and Beyond by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (Nov: 18, 1999) (remarks of Michael Jacobson, Executive Director, Cen-
ter for Science in the Public Interest) [hereinafter Jacobson Remarks, Nov. 18, 19991
(arguing that there should be a formal approval process). In late March, 2000, more than
fifty consumer and environmental groups petitioned FDA to regulate genetically modified
foods as food additives under section 409 of the FDCA. Neil Franz, Green Groups Want GM
Testing Mandates; Transgenic Crops, CHEMICAL WEEK, March 29, 2000, at 21.
455. Public Meeting on Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (Nov. 18, 1999) (remarks of Charles Margulis, Greenpeace Genetic Engineer-
ing Campaign); see alsoJacobson Remarks, Nov. 18, 1999, supra note 454 (arguing that "the
quasi-voluntary nature" of the FDA process "leaves questions in people's minds[:] are some
of these big companies telling the FDA to stuff it?"); Kristi Coale, Don't Look, Don't Find;
Genetically-Modified Agriculture, THE NATION, Dec. 27, 1999, at 19.
[VOL. 35:3
Seeds of Distrust
they are marketing unsafe products.""6 The critics respond that the
threat of civil penalties and bad publicity has not prevented manu-
facturers from marketing dangerous products in the past,47 and it
is not adequate to inspire public trust in the federal regulatory re-
gime in the future.
H. Monitoring and Enforcement
A regulatory regime should also be capable of monitoring regu-
lated activities to detect violations of existing requirements."8
Although monitoring can be burdensome, it is absolutely essential
if the relevant agencies are to have any hope of detecting violations
of food-related regulatory requirements. Hence, agencies con-
cerned with effective enforcement must think about monitoring
and enforceability when they promulgate regulations. Agency at-
tention to monitoring can be especially useful in the context of
GM foods, because it may be possible to use the tools of genetic
engineering to design into GM plants characteristics that enhance
that accuracy of monitoring for the presence of the plant or its off-
spring in the environment.
Neither EPA nor FDA has implemented an effective enforce-
ment program to back up its relaxed regulatory approach toward
the new agricultural biotechnology industry. For example, FDA has
no systematic monitoring program in place to determine whether
or not manufacturers and importers have been abusing the GRAS
process and marketing GM foods that are legally subject to the
food additive requirements.459 Although both FDA and EPA
456. Kriz, Global Food Fights, supra note 34, at 688 (quoting Eric Flamm, a molecular bi-
ologist and policy analyst at FDA). One company representative has observed that although
"[tihere is no requirement to get an FDA blessing for these products, ... if you're wrong,
there is a pretty heavy hammer at the other end." Id.
457. Critics point out that FDA paid little attention to sulfite preservatives, finding them
to be GRAS on the basis of historical use in wine and other foods. Yet, when the agency ex-
amined the issue closely in response to public criticism, it discovered that many people were
suffering severe allergenic reactions to sulfite preservatives that had previously gone unno-
ticed. SeeJacobson Remarks, Nov. 18, 1999, supra note 454.
458. Although an adequate regulatory regime must also be backed tip by sufficient civil
and/or criminal penalties to deter unlawful conduct, this Article does not focus upon the
penalty aspect of enforcement.
459. FDA has an inspectorate in place that monitors for violations of the food additive
requirements. SeeFood and Drug Administration, Center for Food Safety Applied Nutrition,
Food Compliance Program, Domestic Food Safety Program, Feb. 2, 2000, available at
http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/-comm/cp03803.html. The three categories for which the agency's
Domestic Food Safety Compliance Program establishes separate compliance monitoring
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conduct fairly extensive monitoring for and enforcement of viola-
tions of EPA tolerance requirements for chemical pesticides,460
neither agency has established a program for testing crops and im-
ports for pesticidal proteins produced through genetic
modifications.
In late September, 2000, Kraft Foods announced that it had ini-
tiated a nationwide recall of taco shells to interdict those that had
become contaminated with a Bt pest-resistant corn that EPA had
registered for animal feed, but not for human food use.46' The re-
call was precipitated by an environmental group's discovery of
StarLink® corn in the taco shells. 462 EPA had registered StarLink®
in 1998 for use in animal feeds and industrial processes, but it had
declined to register the plant pesticide for human use because of
concerns that the protein (Cry9C) that the inserted Bt gene coded
for was nondigestable and therefore might be allergenic in hu-
mans. As StarLink® was detected in additional taco shells around
the country and in exports to Japan, the registrant, Aventis Crop-
Science, petitioned EPA for permission to allow it in food for a
four-year period to prevent alleged widespread disruptions in the
food and grain industries.463 In the meantime, Aventis agreed to
stop selling StarLink® corn and to attempt to remove all such corn
produced during the year 2000 from the food supply.
464
Further investigation revealed that millions of bushels of Star-
Link® corn had been commingled with food corn in at least 450
465grain elevators. As food companies began to test individual ship-
ments for the presence of StarLink®, it became apparent that the
contamination was widespread throughout the food supply.466 Some
farmers maintained that the companies that sold StarLink® to
them did not inform them of the use restrictions, and others said
that they were told not to worry about segregation because EPA
regimes-food borne biological hazards, chemical contaminants, and food additives and
color additives-do not appear to encompass GM foods that are not pesticides.
460. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON ASSESSING
ExposURE FROM PESTICIDES IN FOOD: A USER'S GUIDE II.A.3. (2000).
461. See Andrew Pollack, Kraft Recalls Taco Shells with Bioengineered Corn, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
23, 2000, at B1.
462. Id.; Andrew Pollack, Corn Developer Appeals to EPA, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 20, 2000, at C4
[hereinafter Pollack, Oct. 20, 2000].
463. Kurt Eichenwald, New Concerns Rise on Keeping Track of Modified Corn, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 14, 2000, at Al [hereinafter Eichenwald, Oct. 14, 2000]; Pollack, Oct. 20, 2000, supra
note 462; Stephanie Strom, Bioengineered Corn Reportedly Detected in Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26,
2000, at C1.
464. Pollack, Oct. 20, 2000, supra note 462.
465. Eichenwald, Oct. 14, 2000, supra note 463; Kellogg Shuts Memphis Plant Over Geneti-
cally Altered Corn, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2000, at 24.
466. Eichenwald, Oct. 14, 2000, supra note 463.
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approval was expected shortly.4 67 Still others claimed that they had
innocently sold elevators StarLink@-contaminated corn when the
corn they planted became cross-fertilized by StarLink® corn from
neighboring fields. The press has reported at least two cases of
severe allergenic reactions associated with consumption of Star-
Link@ contaminated corn products.
4 9
The StarLink@ episode reveals in stark terms the size of the hole
in the regulatory regime that can result from general noncompli-
ance with registration requirements that are not clearly
communicated to the farmers who are actually planting, harvest-
ing, and selling GM plants. EPA's tiny pesticides inspectorate is
wholly incapable of monitoring the thousands of grain elevators
and the tens of thousands of cornfields for compliance with re-
quirements that are either written in tiny type or merely
incorporated by reference on the labels of bags of seed. As one
food industry executive observed: "This whole system has been self-




Any good regulatory program should periodically evaluate
whether past decisions to regulate particular activities (or to ex-
clude particular activities from regulation) have achieved the
desired regulatory goals. 7 ' Frequent monitoring can reveal
467. BarnabyJ. Feder, Farmers Cite Scarce Data in Corn Mixing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2000,
at Cl.
468. David Barboza, Gene-Altered Corn Changes Dynamics of Grain Industry, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2000, at Al. EPA later asked a scientific advisory committee to look into whether
the agency could allow the sale and use of the StarLink® corn that was already in the food
supply. The panel concluded that there was a "medium likelihood" that StarLink® was in
fact allergenic to humans, but that there was a low probability that the U.S. population as a
whole would suffer significant allergy problems. Andrew Pollack, Federal Panel is Wary on
Gene-Altered Corn, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2000, at C8. Citing many uncertainties in the existing
information on the allergenicity of CrygC, the panel called for further study of that protein's
allergenic properties. Id.
469. Kaufman, supra note 75.
470. Eichenwald, Oct. 14, 2000, supra note 463.
471. See Bernard Chevassus-au-Louis, Prevention, Precaution, Consumer Involvement: Which
Model for Food Safety in the Future, presented at the OECD Edinburgh Conference on the
Scientific and Health Aspects of Genetically Modified Foods 11 (Feb. 28-Mar. 1, 2000)
[hereinafter Chevassus-au-Louis, Prevention] (arguing that "an effective monitoring system
(traceability, biological monitoring) must be devised that provides for strong interaction
between risk assessment and management").
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whether regulated activities continue to pose unacceptable risks
despite past regulatory efforts and can identify activities that
should be subject to new regulatory requirements. at the same
time, retrospective evaluations can identify situations in which past
regulations have been too burdensome and can safely be modified
or waived. Monitoring the results of past regulatory decisions can
also increase the scientific accuracy of future decisions. Monitoring
and evaluation may be especially important for GM foods, because
the current regulatory regime was pieced together out of many dif-
ferent regulatory programs none of which envisioned the radical
changes that modern biotechnology was capable of bringing about.
Both the EPA and the FDA have in the past supported extensive
pesticide monitoring efforts for chemical pesticides in food beyond
those undertaken in support of their enforcement responsibili-
• 472
ties. The agencies have thus far not expanded those programs to
encompass GM pest-resistant crops.4 7s EPA's decision to register GM
plant-pesticides only "conditionally" until 2001 may yield retrospec-
tive data as the registrants attempt to support their applications for
full registrations and EPA conducts a "comprehensive reassess-
ment" of those registrations. EPA also ensures a limited degree of
retrospective evaluation through the general requirement that reg-
istrants report an), observed adverse health or environmental
effects of pesticides to EPA. To ensure that at least this degree of
monitoring occurs, EPA's January, 2001 regulations leave the ad-
verse effects requirement in place even for plant-incorporated
protectants that are otherwise exempted from FIFRA's registration
475
requirements. Given the current lack of any FDA labeling re-
quirements for GM foods, it is difficult to see how any monitoring
and retrospective health and safety evaluations could be under-
taken by the manufacturers, the agency, or anyone else.
472. Envtl. Prot. Agency Office of Pesticide Programs, Guidance for Performing Aggre-
gate Exposure and Risk Assessments 10 (Draft, Feb. 1, 1999).
473. It does not appear that the current registrations for GM pest-resistant crops re-
quire anything in the way of monitoring beyond the general requirement that registrants
report to EPA any evidence that they receive that their pesticides pose unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment. Envdl. Prot. Agency, Response of the Environmental Protection
Agency to Petition for Rulemaking and Collateral Relief Concerning the Registration and
Use of Genetically Engineered Plants Expressing Bacillus Thuringiensis Endotoxins, Submit-
ted by Petitioners Greenpeace International, International Federation of Organic
Agriculture Movements, International Center for Technology Assessment, at 2 (Apr. 19,
2000) [hereinafter EPA Greenpeace Response, Apr. 19, 2000].
474. EPA Greenpeace Response, Apr. 19, 2000, supra note 473, at 2.




VII. TOWARD A MORE PRECAUTIONARY REGULATORY APPROACH
In the preamble to its January, 2001 rules, EPA noted that "con-
sumer acceptance is key to the success of agricultural products,
and ... consumer acceptance is strongly influenced by confidence
that regulatory agencies have ensured the public safety."4 76 The
foregoing analysis suggests that EPA and FDA may not have
achieved the degree of consumer acceptance necessary to ensure
the continued viability of the industry, at the very least, it suggests
that a fresh look at the current regulatory approach and the poli-
cies underlying it may be in order. This section of the Article will
suggest some changes that may impede the progress of new bio-
technologies more than its proponents desire but should result in
greater public trust in the ultimate regulatory output.
A. Beyond Substantial Equivalence
The foundation upon which the U.S. agencies have erected the
current relaxed regulatory approach to GM foods is the "substan-
tial equivalence" doctrine. While its viability as a "scientific"
principle is debatable, as a risk management policy, substantial
equivalence is extremely vague. It thus presents a troubling under-
pinning for a regulatory regime that, as a practical matter, has not
successfully regulated. Put simply, expert-assessed similarities be-
tween a GM food and its natural counterpart do not provide an
especially convincing assurance for ordinary consumers that the
GM food is safe.
Although the substantial equivalence doctrine was adopted with
little fanfare in the United States, Japan, and Canada soon after it
was adopted by the OECD,4 7 many are having second thoughts
about its appropriateness as a regulatory tool. The NAS Plant Pest
Report noted that "the use of 'familiarity' as a guideline to mini-
mize testing can sometimes be inappropriate and warrants
476. Id. at 37,804.
477. See Anne Mackenzie, GM Food Safety: Facts, Uncertainties, and Assessment, pre-
sented at the OECD Edinburgh Conference on the Scientific and Health Aspects of
Genetically Modified Foods (Feb. 28-Mar. 1, 2000); Ryoji Takahara, Administrative Oversight
to Ensure Safety of Biotechnologically Produced Foods in Japan, in GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS:
SAFETY ISSUEs 33, 42 (Karl-Heinz Engel et al. eds., 1995).
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caution., 478 The March 2000 OECD-sponsored Edinburgh Confer-
ence concluded that it was "timely now, after six years of using the
tool, to undertake a more detailed review., 479 The Conference ap-
peared to reject the doctrine in at least one regulatory context
when it reached a consensus that all genetically modified foods
should be labeled, even if they appeared identical to unmodified
food.4s° The U.S.-EU Consultative Forum that arose out of one of
the Edinburgh Conference's recommendations concluded that
"[t]he fact that a biotechnology food is held to be substantially
equivalent to a conventional food should not be taken automati-
cally to mean that it needs less testing or less regulatory oversight
than 'non-substantially' equivalent biotechnology foods."
481
In perhaps the most thoroughgoing rejection of the substantial
equivalence doctrine to date, the January, 2001 report of an expert
committee convened by the Royal Society of Canada recom-
mended that "[a]pproval of new transgenic organisms for
environmental release, and for use as food or feed, should be
based on rigorous scientific assessment of their potential for caus-
ing harm to the environment or to human health," and "[s]uch
testing should replace the current regulatory reliance on 'substan-
tial equivalence' as a decision threshold."48 2 With the impending
demise of the substantial equivalence doctrine as a credible theo-
retical underpinning, the fragile veneer that has protected the
regulatory process in the United States from overwhelming criti-
cism is cracking.
The documents published by EPA and FDA in January 2001 rep-
resented the Clinton Administration's attempt to address the
rapidly eroding level of public confidence in federal regulation of
agricultural biotechnology. If successfully implemented, FDA's
hastily crafted proposal will ensure that it receives pre-market noti-
fication of plans to introduce new GM foods into commerce, but it
will not adjust the agency's strong reliance on the substantial
equivalence doctrine in any substantial way. EPA's final rule ap-
pears to abandon the substantial equivalence principle for
purposes of granting across-the-board exemptions from its testing
478. NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 73. The report defined
"familiarity" as "indirect knowledge or experience obtained from similar gene products,
plant varieties, or progenitor varieties grown under similar conditions and used for the same
purposes in the same way," a definition that fits the "substantial equivalence" concept to a
tee. Id.
479. Krebs, Chairman's Report, supra note 74, at 3.
480. OECD EDINBURGH RAPPORTEURS' SUMMARY, supra note 33, at 3 (noting that
"[a] lmost all participants recognized the value of labeling in enabling consumer choice").
481. EU-U.S. CONSULTATIVE FORUM, FINAL REPORT, supra note 149, at 13.
482. ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 191.
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and risk management requirements, but the doctrine may still af-
fect case-by-case decision-making at the staff level. The agency's
curious re-proposal of one exemption that depends heavily upon
substantial equivalence, combined with its historical adherence to
proposed regulations in day-to-day decision-making, suggests cau-
tion in concluding that it has abandoned that principle altogether.
The Bush Administration has attempted to withdraw both ac-
tions and has signaled its intention to undertake its own re-
evaluation of the regulatory process for agricultural biotechnology.
Whether or not it allows the last-minute piecemeal efforts of the
preceding administration to go into effect, the new administration
should discard the poorly aging 1986 Coordinated Framework al-
together and abandon the heavy role that the substantial
equivalence doctrine has played in the United States regulatory
regime. If the executive branch agencies are unwilling to replace
the existing administratively crafted regulatory regime with one
that will command the public's trust, then Congress should con-
sider whether the time has come to implement a new statutory
regime for GM foods. The recommendations below presume that
Congress and the relevant regulatory agencies will be willing to ex-
amine seriously regulatory options that do not rely upon
substantial equivalence, despite the predictable opposition of the
regulated industries.
B. The Precautionary Principle and the Risk of Over-Regulation
Despite the efforts of some biotechnology proponents to charac-
terize the critics as Luddites, most consumer and environmental
groups are not inalterably opposed to GM foods.483 Instead, they
offer the "precautionary principle" as an alternative to the subjec-
tivity of substantial equivalence for managing the health risks of
GM foods.484 The precautionary principle generally permits gov-
ernment to impose restrictions on activities that pose risks to
483. See LAPPE & BAILEY, supra note 14, at 17 (authors "do not reject all manipulations
as being intrinsically wrong because they alter nature"). The Center for Science in the Pub-
lic Interest, for example, has recognized the benefits of agricultural biotechnology, has not
identified any serious safety concerns with current GM food products, and has endorsed
labeling on the condition that it does not lead people to conclude that GM products are
inferior to non-GM products. News from CPSI: Biotech Foods: Friends or Foes?, Nutrition Action
Health Letter (Ctr. For Sci. in the Pub. Interest, Washington, D.C.),June 2000, at 2.
484. See Goldburg Testimony, Oct. 5, 1999, supra note 135 (genetic engineering "should
proceed with appropriate precautions"); Chevassus-au-Louis, Prevention, supra note 471, at 1.
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health and environment in the absence of "scientific" proof con-
cerning the nature and severity of those risks. When substantial
uncertainties prevent accurate risk assessments, the precautionary
principle suggests a protective policy of erring on the side of
safety.
4 5
The Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the French Health
and Food Safety Agency recently offered a sophisticated articula-
tion of the precautionary principle that provides for regulatory
decision-making based upon four broad precautionary criteria:
proportionality, consistency, reversibility, and comparative analy-
sis. s6 The proportionality criterion suggests that the decision maker
take action that is proportionate to the nature of the potential
481
risk. In applying the consistency criterion, the government should
not discriminate unfairly against one regulated entity or unfairly
advantage another, and it should take consistent positions with re-
488
spect to risks of similar magnitude. The reversibility criterion
demands greater precautions for irreversible risks and suggests that
the agency carefully monitor to detect reversible adverse effects of
past decisions.4 89 The comparative analysis criterion obliges the deci-
sion maker to compare the extent to which alternative
precautionary requirements advance or detract from the relevant
societal goals.
In applying these criteria, the decision maker should carefully
analyze all of the available information and pay attention to the
opinions of all of the relevant experts, even those whose opinions
are in the minority.491 The agency should employ a multi-
disciplinary approach to eliciting expert opinion to ensure against
decisions driven by a consensus of expert opinion in one narrow
discipline that is not shared by experts in other disciplines.4 9 2 Most
importantly, the decision-making process must be broadly inclusive
so as to bring before the decision maker the legitimate ethical and
485. See ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 194 (precautionary
principle "advises that, in the face of scientific uncertainty or lack of knowledge, it is better
to err on the side of protecting human and environmental safety than to err on the side of
the risks").
486. Chevassus-au-Louis, Prevention, supra note 471, at 6.
487. Id. at 7.
488. Id.
489. Id. at 7-8.
490. Id. at 8.
491. Id. at 9 (arguing that decision makers "must take into account all minority or non-





public policy concerns of nonexperts who are affected by the deci-
~193
sions.
The precautionary principle finds, few champions among the
proponents of agricultural biotechnology. Positing that sufficient
"scientific" evidence is available to resolve most disputes over the
health risks posed by GM foods, they argue that the regulators
should focus upon "probable, not hypothetical, risks. 494 The prin-
ciple is, in their view, too vague and arbitrary to provide a basis for
case-by-case regulatory decision-making. " They warn that stringent
regulation under the precautionary principle will stifle research
and thereby reduce the potential of agricultural biotechnology toS 496
improve human existence.
Proponents respond that the precautionary principle by no
means disavows the scientific method when data exist and scientists
agree on how to interpret those data.497 They do not, however,
share the industry's faith in the powers of risk assessment, given the
current incomplete state of information on the risks posed by agri-
cultural biotechnologies.49" The precautionary principle simply
implements a cautious public policy of looking before we leap
when the scientific studies that would allow for accurate assessment
of the particular risks posed by particular products have not yet
been undertaken.49" In their view, biotechnology industry's
493. Id.
494. U.S. House Seeds of Opportunity Report, supra note 25, at 69; see also Public Meeting on
Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (Nov. 18,
1999) (remarks of Ralph Hardy) (arguing that policymakers should focus "on what is rather
than the nebulous and never-ending what if").
495. See U.S. House Seeds of Opportunity Report, supra note 25, at 69; ROYAL SOCIETY OF
CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 195 (critics of precautionary principle believe that
it "lacks a uniform interpretation....").
496. See Per Pinstrup-Andersen & Rajul Pandya-Lorch, Securing and Sustaining Adequate
World Food Production for the Third Millennium, in NAT'L AGRIC. BIOTECHNOLOGY COUNCIL
REPORT 11, WORLD FOOD SECURITY AND SUSTAINABILITY: THE IMPACTS OF BIOECIINOLOGY
AND INDUSTRIAL CONSOLIDATION 45 (Donald P. Weeks et al. eds., 1999) (arguing that "[tihe
attitude toward risk among the non-poor in both industrialized and developing countries is
a constraint to the use of agricultural biotechnology in and for developing countries");
Stipp, Voice of Reason, supra note 34, at 166 (interview with Gordon Conway of the Rockefel-
ler Foundation) (suggesting that "[i]f the GM controversy caused a real curtailment of
private investment in biotech, a lot of the potential for using it in the developing world
would be lost").
497. See Chevassus-au-Louis, Prevention, supra note 471, at 6.
498. Id. at 4-5. The unfortunate proliferation of StarLink® corn in the human food
supply, despite the fact that EPA has registered that product only for use as animal feed, is a
dramatic demonstration of the risk of the kind of human error that human risk assessors
frequently ignore. See supra Part V.H.
499. See ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 81, at 198 (noting that
the precautionary principle "counsels restraint in proceeding with the deployment of a
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rejection of the precautionary principle is not really a demand for
the application of sound science; rather, it is a call for the applica-
tion of a less protective regulatory policy.
C. Notice
It is hard to instill public trust in a regulatory regime that articu-
lates a vague and highly manipulable test for entry and then leaves
it to the discretion of the regulatees to decide whether their prod-
ucts meet that test. Although many biotechnology companies
continue to question the advisability of pre-market notification 
some companies and trade associations have expressed support for
making the governmental notice and consultation process manda-
tory.501 Perhaps more than any other action, FDA could enhance
public trust in its ability to protect consumers from the risks of GM
foods by finalizing as rapidly as possible its proposed pre-market
notification requirements. Failing that, Congress should consider
"rifle shot" legislation clarifying that GM foods are not generally
recognized as safe. That change would ensure not only that FDA
received notice of all GM foods, but it would also place on FDA the
responsibility for promulgating testing requirements for GM foods.
In a similar vein, EPA should issue a guidance document clarifying
that it no longer recognizes its previously proposed exemptions for
gene transfers from sexually compatible donor plants and from
unrelated food plants and therefore expects to receive full-fledged
registration and tolerance applications for all GM pest-resistant
plants.
technology in the 'absence of evidence,' and requires that the greater the potential risks, the
stronger and more reliable be the 'evidence of their absence' ").
500. See Public Meeting on Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (Nov. 18, 1999) (remarks of Dr. Val Giddings) (finding "no evidence
based on science, no evidence based on experience for any requirement to change" the FDA
procedures).
501. See Public Meeting on Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (Nov. 18, 1999) (remarks of Don Fitz, National Food Processors Associa-
tion) (American Soybean Association states that if "replacing this voluntary process with a
mandatory approval would strengthen FDA's ability to reassure consumers regarding the
safety of these products we would endorse such a change").
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D. Transparency and Public Participation
Consumer groups complain that the industry in the mid-1990s
quietly introduced genetically engineered crops into the food sup-
ply without a full public debate."2 As one observer noted, " [m] any
people might be perfectly happy to eat genetically modified foods,
but nobody likes to be fooled. 50 3 A similar attempt to move geneti-
cally modified crops quietly into the European food supply ran
into sharp protests by environmental groups who successfully
tapped a general distrust of American multinational corporations
to produce a strong political reaction against GM foods.0 4 Follow-
ing this rough public reception in Europe, a consensus appears to
be emerging that "[t]he general public-consumers and citizens-
not only have the right to know, but they also have valid points of
view, which need to be effectively voiced, understood, and given




There is little agreement, however, on the details of how to in-
crease the transparency and inclusiveness of the existing decision-
making process.
Some biotechnology proponents apparently believe that suffi-
cient transparency can be achieved through broad-based industry-
sponsored efforts to educate the public about the large benefits
and comparatively small risks associated with GM foods.0 Con-
sumer and public interest groups worry that industry- and
502. See Kriz, Global Food Fights, supra note 34, at 688 (quoting Charles Margulis of
Greenpeace, International) (contending that "[ilt's obvious that the food industry wanted
to keep this a secret from the consumers"); LAPPE & BAILEY, supra note 14, at I (arguing
that "[m]any of the key innovations have occurred behind academic and corporate doors
with little public input."); Raeburn, Out of the Woods, supra note 415, at 56 (noting that most
consumers did not find out that they were eating genetically modified foods until 1999, long
after GM foods had become ubiquitous in the food supply).
503. Paul Raeburn, Where Do We Go from Here? The View from imes Square, in NAT'L AG-
RIc. BIOTECHNOLOGY COUNCIL REPORT 11, WORLD FOOD SECURITY AND SUSTAINABILITY:
THE IMPACTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL CONSOLIDATION 151 (Donald P. Weeks et
al. eds., 1999).
504. See Kriz, Global Food Fights, supra note 34, at 688.
505. OECD EDINBURGH RAPPORTEURS' SUMMARY, supra note 33, at 2.
506. See U.S. House Seeds of Opportunity Report, supra note 25, at 4 (arguing that "the Ad-
ministration, industry, and scientific community have a responsibility to educate the public
and improve the availability of information on the long record of safe use of agricultural
biotechnology products"). In April 1999, a coalition of food producers and marketers called
the Alliance for Better Foods hired the public relations/lobbying firm of BSMG to conduct a
$50 million per year campaign to convince the public and lawmakers that GM foods were no
different from foods derived through traditional breeding techniques. Bettelheim, Reluctant
Congress, supra note 425, at 938; McCaule); Big Food Companies, supra note 412.
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government-sponsored public information campaigns can easily
degenerate into boosterish propaganda that hype unproven bio-
technologies and belittle legitimate concerns about health and
environmental risks.5' In their view, "public education" is too often
a top-down process in which supposedly objective experts convey
their conclusions about the nature and magnitude of health and
environmental risks to a supposedly confused and ignorant pub-
lic. °
Communication about matters of great concern to consumers
cannot be a one-way street. As defined by the Codex Committee on
General Principles, "risk communication" is "the interactive ex-
change of information and opinions concerning risk among risk
assessors, risk managers, consumers, and other interested par-
ties., 50 9 Consumers may not be educated on the fine points of the
biology of GM foods, but they are capable of understanding infor-
mation about risks, and they resent being treated in a
condescending fashion. If manufacturers of GM foods and the
government expect consumers to trust governmental decisions
about those foods, they will have to treat consumer representatives
as equals in the debates about the nature and magnitude of the
510
risks they pose.
In the age of the Internet, there is simply no excuse for the
opacity of the existing process. FDA should publish notice of in-
formal GRAS consultations on its website, make the relevant
information available to the public via the website, and elicit public
507. See Public Meeting on Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (Nov. 18, 1999) (remarks of Edward Groth, Consumers Union) [herein-
after Groth Remarks, Nov. 18, 1999] (arguing that public educational efforts by federal
agencies and the biotechnology industry are "designed essentially to make the public think
the way the FDA and the industry think about the issues"); Public Meeting on Biotechnology in
the Year 2000 and Beyond by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (Nov. 18, 1999) (remarks of
Marion Nestle, New York University) (complaining that "the industry is treating consumer
perceptions as a public relations problem, one that can be fixed by an advertising or educa-
tion campaign").
508. See Cornelia Butler Flora, Agriculture Biotechnology: Social Implications and Integration
of Landscape and Lifescape, in NAT'L AGRIc. BIOTECHNOLOGY COUNCIL REPORT 11, WORLD
FOOD SECURITY AND SUSTAINABILITY: THE IMPACTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL
CONSOLIDATION 62 (Donald P. Weeks et al. eds., 1999) (industry response to consumer con-
cerns about risk "was to state that they did not understand the science involved, thereby
heightening opposition"); Groth Remarks, Nov. 18, 1999, supra note 507 (arguing that much
public cynicism about GM foods is the result of"top down arrogant.., communication that
says, consumers, you don't understand this problem").
509. Chevassus-au-Louis, Prevention, supra note 471, at 12.
510. See Daniel E. Wueste et al., Workshop Report: Regulatory and Public Policy Perspectives,
in NAT'L AGRIC. BIOTECHNOLOGY COUNCIL REPORT 10, AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY
AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: GENE ESCAPE AND PEST RESISTANCE 23, 28 (Ralph W.E.
Hardy & Jane Baker Segelken eds., 1998) (noting that "effective communication" must "be
in the form of dialogues among concerned and impacted parties").
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comments via snail or e-mail. EPA's pesticide registration proce-
dures seem reasonably well tailored toward eliciting public
participation in registration decisions to the extent that plant-
pesticides are not exempt. Both agencies should continue to make
liberal use of advisory committees, but they should recognize that
advisory committees are not an adequate substitute for full public
participation. The agencies should also err on the side of making
health and safety testing data public despite industry trade secrecy
claims.1
E. Data Collection, Data Evaluation, and Risk Assessment
The contrast between the substantial equivalence doctrine and
the precautionary principle is readily apparent on the question
whether the government should require manufacturers of GM
foods to engage in health and safety testing prior to marketing
them to consumers. Scientists can attempt to assess the direct risks
that GM foods pose to human health with standard bioassays in
laboratory animals,5"2 but it is often difficult or even impossible to
feed the animals sufficient quantities of whole foods to achieve a
desirable margin of safety for human beings. One solution is to
switch from mice and rats to animals that consume large quantities
of feed like cows and hogs, but it is not clear whether the results
may be extrapolated to humans."4 Biotechnology proponents
therefore argue that testing of whole GM foods in laboratory ani-
mals "is not feasible, and would be wasteful in terms of laboratory
animal resources.
5 15
Normally, the toxicological concern with respect to GM foods is
for the toxicity of the proteins or other expression products of the
transferred genes. Toxicity testing of such expression products is
511. See ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 214 (observing that
"the more regulatory agencies limit free access to the data upon which their decisions are
based, the more compromised becomes the claim that the regulatory process is 'science
based"').
512. NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 69.
513. See id. at 69; ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 48.
514. NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 70. Cows, for example,
have a four-chambered stomach that can "serve as a buffer from the effects of some pro-
teins." Id.
515. U.S. House Seeds of Opportunity Report, supra note 25, at 38; Public Meeting on Biotech-
nology in the Year 2000 and Beyond by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (Dec. 13, 1999)
(remarks of Susan L. Hefle, University of Nebraska) [hereinafter Hefle Remarks, Dec. 13,
1999.
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possible in theory,516 but sometimes problematic in practice, be-
cause it is difficult and expensive to isolate sufficient quantities of
expressed proteins, fats, and oils for effective toxicity testing.' 7 In
addition, no universally applicable laboratory animal tests exist for
assessing the allergenic potential of foods5' s Although a number of
standardized tests exist for testing in human volunteers, such test-
ing is also quite expensive, and it will not necessarily identify
substances that are allergenic in small subpopulationsY. Thus bio-
technology proponents argue that the substantial equivalence
approach is a sensible way to ensure that GM foods are reasonably
safe without going to a lot of expense on potentially useless testing.
Advocates of the precautionary principle, by contrast, believe
that the scientific uncertainties surrounding GM foods are suffi-
ciently large to warrant full-scale testing, not approval by analogy.
While it may be expensive in the short run, testing is the only way
to know whether the foods are not likely to be harmful when con-
sumed by human beings.20 If adequate animal models do not exist
for allergenicity testing, the food industry and government scien-
tific agencies should expend some of their considerable resources
developing such tests.5 2 ' To allow manufacturers to market untested
GM foods to unsuspecting consumers because the tests are expen-
sive or unavailable is to use human beings as involuntary guinea
pigs.
It is unlikely that the present testing regime, in which a manu-
facturer can avoid virtually all testing by simply concluding that its
product is substantially equivalent to existing food, is sufficient to
command public trust in the efficacy of the regulatory process. In
the future, GM foods should be tested comprehensively in accor-
dance with prescribed testing protocols designed to detect risks of
522unintended and unanticipated adverse health effects. Although
516. See Hefle Remarks. Dec. 13, 1999, supra note 515 (noting that "[tioxicological tests
targeted to the novel protein are most appropriate").
517. See supra Part l.B.1.d.
518. See Goldburg Remarks, Nov. 30, 1999, supra note 431 (observing that "for most
proteins, including those from foods that are not commonly allergenic and those from non-
food sources such as bacteria, no such testing is possible").
519. NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 67.
520. See Public Meeting on Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond by the in U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (Nov. 30, 1999) (remarks of Steve M. Druker, Alliance for Bio-Integrity)
(asserting that rigorous long-term animal feeding studies are the only viable approach to
determining whether GM foods meet the reasonable certainty of no harm test).
521. See Goldburg Remarks, Nov. 30, 1999, supra note 431 (complaining that FDA "has
not used its scientific resources to develop and publish guidance to industry on how to assess
the allergenic potential of proteins").
522. See ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 189-90 (recom-
mending that newly developed GM plants be "subjected to intense scrutiny at six relevant
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allergenicity testing is in its infancy, some form of allergenicity as-
sessment should be required for all GM foods.2 s The testing
guidelines should be flexible enough to allow for changes as scien-
tists learn more about allergenicity. at the very least, such a
requirement could stimulate further industry-funded research
aimed at developing dependable allergenicity testing in animal or
other models. 4
F Consumer Choice
Perhaps the most contentious of the public policy debates over
GM foods is the debate over whether GM food products should con-
tain labels. Biotechnology proponents argue that since GM foods are
substantially equivalent to unmodified foods, there is no legitimate
reason to require special labeling for those products.5' They main-
tain that labeling will "mislead" or "confuse" consumers,2 by sending
levels (genomic, transcript, protein, metabolic, health impacts, environmental impacts)
before they [are] approved for commercial production").
523. See ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 73 (recommending
"a specific, scientifically based, comprehensive approach for ensuring that adequate aller-
genicity assessment will be performed on a GM food...."); NRC GM PEST-PROTECTED
PLANTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 66 (noting that "[t]he strong likelihood that gene products
currently found in commercial transgenic pest-protected plants are not allergens does not
remove the need for a minimum of properly planned and executed tests").
524. Codex Alimentarius has established an Ad Hoc Task Force on Foods Derived from
Biotechnology that is drafting guidelines for the conduct of safety assessment of GM foods.
See Peter Menyasz, Ottawa Meeting Produces Little Progress on Labels for Genetically Modified Foods,
25 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 836 (May 15, 2001). These guidelines, once completed, will not
be binding on manufacturers and importers. EPA and FDA could, however, use the guide-
lines as a model for promulgating specific protocols for safety assessment of GM foods.
525. Public Meeting on Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (Nov. 18, 1999) (remarks of Rhona Applebaum, National Food Processors
Association) (Association supports FDA's labeling policy); Public Meeting on Biotechnology in
the Year 2000 and Beyond by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (Nov. 18, 1999) (remarks of
Lisa Katic, Grocery Manufacturers of America) [hereinafter Katic Remarks, Nov. 18, 1999]
(reporting support of Grocery Manufacturers of America for FDA labeling policy); Public
Meeting on Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(Nov. 18, 1999) (remarks of Carl Loop, Vice President, American Farm Bureau Federation)
(reporting views of American Farm Bureau Federation); Industry Opposes Biotech Labeling,
CHEM. MKT. RPTR., Feb. 28, 2000, at 5 (quoting Michael Phillips of the Biotechnology In-
dustry Association).
526. U.S. House Seeds of Opportuniy Report, supra note 25, at 53 (arguing that "labeling of
agricultural biotechnology products would confuse, not inform, consumers"); Katic Re-
marks, Nov. 18, 1999, supra note 525 (arguing that "[s]pecial mandatory labeling could
mislead consumers into believing that foods produced through this technology are either
different from conventional foods or that they present a risk").
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an implicit message that consumers should be worried about geneti-
• 527
cally modified foods.
Biotechnology skeptics argue that accurate labeling is essential
to informed consumer choices about the quality, safety, and other
important aspects of the food they eat. Even if GM foods pose only
tiny health risks, many consumers see no reason why they should
be subjected to those risks without their consent:5s Unwilling to
trust paternalistic companies and agencies to decide for them, con-
sumers may want to await further testing of or broader experience
with GM foods before consuming them.2 9 Consumers with severe
allergies or special dietary limitations may want to avoid foods that
are not "tried and true.",30 Some consumers may want to discour-
age the trend toward environmentally damaging monocultures by
refusing to purchase GM foods. Others may have moral or reli-
gious reasons for avoiding GM foods containing genes from
particular species of host organisms.52 Finally, if GM foods are not
identified by labels, it may be impossible for future epidemiologists
527. See William P. Barrett, Food-Label Follies, FORBES, Dec. 27, 1999, at 30 [hereinafter
Barrett, Food-Label Follies] (labels "would ... imply incorrectly that the buyer needs to be
warned of unspecified dangers"); Kriz, Global Food Fights, supra note 34, at 688 (quoting
Gene Grabowski of the Grocery Manufacturers Association) (a labeling requirement would
be "telling consumers that there is something wrong with this product").
528. Stipp, Voice of Reason, supra note 34, at 172 (interview with Gordon Conway of the
Rockefeller Foundation) ("What people really object to is being exposed to risks without
their choice.").
529. Silbergeld Testimony, Oct. 6, 1999, supra note 130 (alluding to consumers who
"want to wait until there is greater experience demonstrating long-term food and environ-
mental safety before they try genetically engineered varieties").
530. See Goldburg Remarks, Nov. 30, 1999, supra note 431 (arguing that "should an al-
lergen added to a genetically engineered food not be detected by industry's current
screening procedures, allergic consumers will likely not be able to avoid foods containing
the allergen");Jacobson Remarks, Nov. 18, 1999, supra note 454 (arguing that without label-
ing "[p]eople with multiple or severe allergies, or with general safety concerns, fear that
foods they were always able to safely consume might harbor new, unsafe substances").
531. See ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 220 (referring to
the "alleged right of consumers to participate intelligently in the marketplace and to exer-
cise the 'power of the pocketbook' in support of the technologies and industries they
prefer").
532. See id. at 7 (noting that "[rieligious and ethnic groups that observe religious die-
tary rules prohibiting the eating of certain animals have obvious problems with the
consumption of vegetable or other animal foods that may carry genes taken from the pro-
hibited animal"); Jacobson Remarks, Nov. 18, 1999, supra note 454 (noting that
"[v]egetarians and people with certain religious beliefs may not want to eat foods containing
gene products derived from animals"); LAPPE & BAILEY, supra note 14, at 125 (noting that
"many religious persons for whom diet is a significant part of their practice want assurances
that the food they eat is not adulterated").
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to design adequate studies to compare populations of exposed in-
dividuals with populations of unexposed persons.'"
Noting that labeling necessarily requires segregation, the indus-
try points to practical difficulties in keeping GM grain separate as it
moves from field to elevator to processor to grocery stores. " Al-
though few, if any, studies of the cost of segregation have been
undertaken, labeling opponents argue that segregation is likely to
be so expensive that processors and distributors will discourage
farmers from growing GM crops: Labeling advocates, however,
point out that the $4 billion per year organic foods industry segre-
gates and labels organically grown crops at every stage of
production and still manages to make a profit.5b
Supporters of agricultural biotechnology are confident that the
market will provide non-GM foods that are labeled for people who
are willing to pay for labeling in the same way that it has created
niches for kosher and organic foods:. 7 They would, however, de-
mand that any explicit claims that a food is GM-free and any
implicit claims that GM-free foods are superior to GM foods be
substantiated to protect consumers from fraud.5" Consumer advo-
cates maintain that uniform federal labeling requirements would
533. See KRIMSKY & WRUBEL, supra note 40, at 109 (food labels "make possible post hoc
epidemiological studies"); LAPPE & BAILEY, supra note 14, at 2 (noting that in the absence of
labeling, "epidemiologists are hamstrung").
534. Giddings House Testimony, Mar. 3, 1999, supra note 29 (arguing that "[flor most
food products, segregation from farm to grocery store would be impracticable and expen-
sive"); Barrett, Food-Label Follies, supra note 527 (arguing that "[t]he need to segregate gene-
spliced foods, especially the thousands of processed foods that contain small amounts of
derivatives of corn or soybeans, would raise production costs in a low-profit-margin sector").
535. Giddings House Testimony, Mar. 3, 1999, supra note 29 (noting that "segregation
would be a major disincentive for farmers, shippers, grain processors and food processors to
grow or utilize the newer variety").
536. TEITEL & WILSON, supra note 24, at 67; Raphael Thierrin, Placing Several Eggs in Our
Basket: Keeping Diversity in Agriculture, in NAT'L AGic. BIOTECHNOLOGY COUNCIL RE'. 9,
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CHALLENGED ENVIRONMENTS 71, 77 (Ralph W.E. Hardy et al.
eds., 1998) (noting that "[tihe organic industry is able to move a great diversity of certified
organic products in a labeled, segregated environment, and it believes that distributors of
bioengineered products can do the same").
537. Barrett, Food-Label Follies, supra note 527, at 30 (arguing that "[i]f large numbers of
people really want to avoid gene-spliced food, niche markets will arise ... as they do for
kosher, halal and organic products"); Hoban, InternationalAcceptance, supra note 421, at 71.
538. Public Meeting on Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (Nov. 30, 1999) (remarks of Richard Frank, attorney for Food Distributors
International) (arguing that "[i]f the context implies that a food labeled biotech-free is safer
or higher in quality, then that claim is misleading unless it can be substantiated"); Public
Meeting on Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(Nov. 30, 1999) (remarks of Kendal Keith, President, National Grain and Feed Association)
(arguing that "voluntary labeling means that FDA will be called upon to develop guidelines
to ensure that such labeling is not false or misleading").
SPRING 2002]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
be far preferable to sporadic and most likely inconsistent market-
driven efforts by some companies to label products as GM-free.9
Despite the concerns of the biotechnology industry, there ap-
pears to be an emerging worldwide consensus that GM foods
should be labeled to allow consumers to choose whether or not to
purchase such foods. at the OECD Edinburgh Conference
"[a]lmost all participants recognized the value of labelling in ena-
bling consumer choice.,540 The resulting U.S.-EU Consultative
Forum concluded that "at the very least, the EU and U.S. should
establish content-based mandatory labelling requirements for fin-
ished products containing novel genetic material., 54' Even many
observers who generally support greater availability of GM foods
believe that the industry could eliminate a great deal of needless
controversy if it would simply place a discrete label on GM foods.542
The decision to require labeling, however, is not the end of the
matter. Difficult questions remain concerning the content of the
label and the kinds of GM foods to which the labeling requirement
should apply. Given the fact that GM crops are already quite preva-
lent in some markets, it may be impossible to guarantee that a
processed food contains not a single molecule of a GM constitu-
ent.543 The European Union, for examlyle, exempts from its
labeling requirements foods containing no more than one percent
material from GM plants. 44 Another possible approach would be a
539. Groth Remarks, Nov. 18, 1999, supra note 507 (arguing that mandatory standards
for labeling would be far more uniform and fairer to producers and consumers than relying
on a voluntary system to grow up with market forces driving it).
540. OECD EDINBURGH RAPPORTEURS' SUMMARY, supra note 33, at 3.
541. EU-U.S. CONSULTATIVE FORUM, FINAL REPORT, supra note 149, at 19.
542. See Paul Raeburn, Warning: Biotech Is Hurting Itself BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 20, 1999,
at 78 (suggesting that "putting a discreet label on GM foods somewhere near the ingredients
list might be the smartest thing the industry could do").
543. See Public Meeting on Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (Nov. 18, 1999) (remarks of Robert Lake, U.S. Food and Drug Admin)
("[H]ow small does it have to be before one calls it free?"); Keith Remarks, Nov. 30, 1999,
supra note 538 (arguing that "there has to be some reasonable tolerance established if we
are going to go to... [a GM food labeling] standard").
544. European Commission, Commission Regulation 1139/98 of 26 May 1998, 1998
O.J. (L 159) 4, amended by Commission Regulation No. 49/2000 of 10jan. 2000 Amending
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1139/98 Concerning the Compulsory Indication on the Label-
ing of Certain Foodstuffs Produced from Genetically Modified Organisms of Particulars Other
Than Those Provided for in Directive 79/112/EEC, 2000 O.J. (L 6) 13-14 , art. 1.2(b); Euro-
pean Commission, Commission Regulation No. 50/2000 of 10Jan. 2000 on the Labeling of
Foodstuffs and Food Ingredients Containing Additives and Flavourings That Have Been
Genetically Modified or Have Been Produced From GMOS, 2000 O.J. (L 6) 15-17.
The Australia New Zealand Food Authority (ANZFA) recently adopted a similar provision
requiring mandatory labeling in food that is produced with, or contains an ingredient de-
rived or developed from, a GMO. See Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code, Standard
1.5.2(2001), available at http://www.anzfa.gov.au/foodstandardscodecontents/standard15/
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technology-based requirement that unlabeled foods be as free of
GM-products as is technologically feasible. A regulatory regime
that requires labeling will have to grapple with these questions, and
the answers that it provides will no doubt fail to satisfy individuals
on both sides of the labeling debate. The answer, however, should
not be a generic label, inspired by the difficulties of segregation,
that says that the labeled food "may or may not contain" GM in-
gredients. Such a label would not only be uninformative, it would
provide food manufacturers and importers an excuse to ignore
consumer demands for GM-free food.
Since FDA is the only agency with relevant labeling authority, it
should require manufacturers and importers of all foods contain-
ing more than a prescribed percentage of material from GM plants
to place appropriate labels on or near such foods.4" FDA could at-
tempt to accomplish this result by expanding its interpretation of
the "materiality" concept in Section 201 (n) to include changes that
are in fact material to most consumers and especially to those with
food allergies. This strategy, however, risks reversal in court at the
behest of manufacturers of GM foods who read the materiality re-
quirement very narrowly) 4 Failing that, FDA should explore its
authority under Section 403(i) to require labeling for GM foods on
the ground that they are fabricated from two or more ingredi-
ents.
547
If FDA does not quickly initiate a rulemaking to require labeling
of GM foods, Congress should enact a separate labeling
standard152.cfm. See generally ANZFA, LABELING GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS, ANZFA
FACT SHEET (Aug. 2000). Flavors that are present in a concentration of no more than 0.1%
are exempted from the labeling requirement, as are foods, ingredients, and processing aids
in which genetically modified food is "unintentionally present in a quantity no more than
lOg/kg per ingredient." SeeANZFA Standard 1.5.2, § 4(1) (f).
545. At the very least, FDA should require labeling for GM foods if they derive from GM
plants containing genes transferred from plants that are known to be allergenic. Under the
current regulatory regime, manufacturers may apply their "knowledge" to conclude that
such gene transfers does not increase the allergenic potential of the host plant. See supra
Part lII.D.2.a. Consumers should at least be put on notice that manufacturers have drawn
this conclusion, so that they may avoid such products if they disagree with the manufactur-
ers' application of their own knowledge.
546. The court in Alliance For Bio-Integrity v. Shalala questioned in dicta FDA's authority
to rely upon consumer demand to require labeling of GM foods. 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 179
(D.D.C. 2000).
547. 21 U.S.C. § 343(i) (1994). A labeling strategy that focuses exclusively upon FDA
must recognize that FDA does not attempt to regulate plants that have been genetically
engineered to be plant-pesticides because FDA defers to EPA in that regard. Therefore, if
FDA does decide to require labeling, it must expand its labeling regime to include plant-
incorporated protectants. This should not be difficult as a legal matter, because FDA's au-
thority under sections 403 (a) (1), 201 (n), and 403(i) clearly encompasses such foods.
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requirement. In 1999, Rep. Dennis Kucinich introduced a bill that
would have required labeling of all foods containing genetically
modified substances. In introducing a companion bill in the
Senate , Sen. Barbara Boxer stressed that in the absence of any
FDA decisions to require pre-market testing of GM foods, "the least
we can do is label the products.' 55 Although more than a dozen
public interest groups supported the bill, 5 ' the Clinton Admini-
stration joined the industry and farm state representatives in
opposing it,552 and it was not enacted. If GM foods are to be be-
come a part of the national diet, the 107th Congress should enact
labeling legislation as quickly as possible.
548. H.R. 3377,106th Cong., 2d Sess. (1999).
549. S. 2080, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. (2000); see Bettelheim, Reluctant Congress, supra note
425, at 939.
550. Bettelheim, Reluctant Congress, supra note 425, at 939 (quoting Sen. Barbara
Boxer).
551. Amy Borrus, The "Frankenfood" Monster Stalks Capitol Hil Bus. WK., Dec. 13, 1999,
at 55 [hereinafter Borrus, Frankenfood Monster].
552. Id. at 55; Kriz, Global Food Fights, supra note 34, at 688. An intense industry lobbying
effort paid off when twenty-seven House members who originally signed a letter requesting
FDA to require labeling for GM foods declined to sponsor the Kucinich bill after being
contacted by industry lobbyists. Borrus, Frankenfood Monster, supra note 551, at 55.
553. A company that does not want to label GM foods may claim that the labeling re-
quirement is inconsistent with its First Amendment right "not to speak." In International
Dairy Foods v. Amestoy, several dairy companies and industry associations challenged a Ver-
mont statute requiring dairy manufacturers to identify products that were, or might have
been, derived from dairy cows treated with rBST. 92 F3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996). The court held
that the statute "contravene[d] core First Amendment values," because it "indisputably"
required dairy producers "to speak when they would rather not." The state had not claimed
that the labeling statute was intended to protect public health and safety; the governmental
interest underlying the statute was only the public's "right to know." Id. at 73. The court
found that consumer curiosity was "insufficient to justify compromising protected constitu-
tional rights." Id. at 73. Absent "some indication that.., information bears on a reasonable
concern for human health or safety or some other sufficiently substantial governmental
concern, the manufacturers cannot be compelled to disclose it." Id. at 74.
There are good reasons to believe that Amestoy was wrongly decided. The Supreme Court
has explicitly stated that the Constitution "accords a lesser protection to commercial speech
than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression," Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980), and state and federal governments have
considerable leeway in requiring corporations engaged in commerce to make information
available to consumers to ensure that consumer decisions are "intelligent and well-
informed." Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Consumers Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976). The
Federal Trade Commission has promulgated rules requiring labeling aimed an informing
consumers without any serious constitutional objection. See, e.g., FTC Care Labeling of Tex-
tile Wearing Apparel Rule, 16 C.FR. § 423 (1991). The Court has also recognized a
distinction between mandatory disclosure requirements on foods and products and regula-
tions preventing companies from communicating with consumers. See Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985). The Amestoy court afforded very little defer-
ence to the state legislature's determination that the informational interests of its consumers
were substantial and warranted protection.
In any event, Congress or the FDA could legitimately conclude that the health conse-
quences of human exposure to GM foods are not sufficiently well-understood to support a
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G. Risk Management
Risk management is largely a matter of public policy, and sug-
gestions for changes in risk management aspects of the current
regulatory regime will necessarily reflect some underlying view of
proper regulatory policy. The following analysis assumes that re-
cent indications of public distrust in the regulatory system will
move policy in the direction of a more precautionary approach.
1. Product Bans and Moratoria-Some critics of GM foods are
opposed to them for moral, religious, or other reasons or have so
little trust in the regulatory process that they would ban all sale and
distribution of GM seeds and GM crops. A ban would unques-
tionably protect consumers from any risks posed by GM foods, but
it would also deprive growers and consumers of the potential bene-
fits of GM crops. In the long run, it might prove self-defeating as
other countries employed agricultural biotechnologies and ex-
ported GM foods to the United States. Rather than exploring
whether a ban on GM foods is warranted, it is probably more useful
(and more realistic) to explore how the regulatory regimes that are
in place can better manage the health and environmental risks of
GM foods. 54
The conclusion that a universal ban is unwarranted does not,
however, imply that the ban is an inappropriate regulatory tool in
all cases. Product bans can play a very useful role in protecting
consumers from some especially dangerous aspects of some GM
plants and in stimulating alternative ways to produce and grow GM
crops. For example, there are very few reasons, beyond familiar-
ity and cost, to continue using antibiotic resistance marker genes in
GM plants when alternative marker technologies are available. The
British Medical Association, an expert panel appointed by the
Royal Society of Canada, and the OECD Edinburgh Conference
finding that they may be safely consumed in all cases even if, by the manufacturer's estima-
tion, they are generally recognized as safe. For example, so little is known about how to
measure the allergenic potential of novel proteins in foods that Congress or the FDA could
reasonably conclude that food labels should contain information about GM content to allow
persons with allergies to make informed decisions about whether to consume them. Thus, a
labeling requirement for GM foods is easily justifiable tinder the health and safety rationale
that the Arestoy court clearly acknowledged as appropriate under the First Amendment.
554. See Krebs, Chairman's Report, supra note 74, at 4 (concluding that "the strongly
expressed demand for GM technology in developing countries casts substantial doubt on
proposals for a worldwide moratorium made by some participants").
555. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Radical Technology-Forcing in Environmental Regulation, 27
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 943 (1994).
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have all concluded that it is no longer necessary to use antibiotic-
resistance marker genes to achieve effective gene transfers in
plants, and they have recommended that biotechnology companies
phase out such markers. S5 This is a sound application of the pre-
cautionary principle, and it should be implemented as rapidly as
possible.
An alternative to a product ban is a moratorium for the period
of time required to accomplish some necessary intermediate step.
Skeptics who do not favor an outright ban on GM foods might still
demand a moratorium on the sale of some or all GM foods while
the relevant government agencies put an adequate regulatory re-
gime in place and while industry and academic scientists
undertake the studies necessary to write detailed protocols for
conducting appropriate safety studies. For example, a serious at-
tempt to implement the precautionary principle might impose a
moratorium on the marketing of GM foods in the United States
pending the promulgation of adequate protocols for allergenicity
testing and the implementation of an effective monitoring regime
for GM foods in the marketplace.
2. Universal Pre-Market Approval-The recent Royal Society of
Canada report suggested that "substantial equivalence" should not
be employed as a threshold screening device through which GM
foods are exempted from pre-market testing and review. 57 In par-
ticular, risk management decisions should be based upon thorough
testing of GM plants for any adverse health or environmental ef-
fects. 55s The substantial equivalence concept could, however, prove
useful as a benchmark of acceptable "background" risk.559 The U.S.-
EU Consultative forum recommended that all products of modem
agricultural biotechnologies "be subject to a mandatory pre-market
examination by the appropriate regulatory authorities and ap-
proved for sale only after they are found to meet the standard of
presenting a reasonable certainty of no harm." 56° at least one major
U.S. trade association has similarly taken the position that the fed-
556. OECD EDINBURGH RAPPORTEURS' SUMMARY, supra note 33, at 3.
557. ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 206 (recommending
that "those who are responsible for the regulation of new technologies should not presume
its safety unless there is a reliable scientific basis for considering it safe").
558. Id. at 206 (suggesting that "the primary burden of proof is upon those who would
deploy these food biotechnology products to carry out the full range of tests necessary to
demonstrate reliably that they do not pose unacceptable risks").
559. Id. at 205 (suggesting that a GM plant should be approved for commercialization
only after thorough testing has demonstrated that the GM food is substantially equivalent
"in the types and magnitudes of health or environmental risks to those posed by the em-
ployment of its traditional, non-GM alternative").
560. EU-U.S. CONSULTATIVE FORUM, FINAL REPORT, supra note 149, at 8.
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eral government should require manufacturers to "obtain clear-
ances for new varieties in both the United States and in major
export markets" before they are allowed to market GM food prod-
ucts in the United States."'
All of these recommendations share a common rejection of the
substantial equivalence doctrine as a risk management policy and a
preference for a regulatory process that more closely approximates
the precautionary approach that Congress clearly envisioned when
it enacted the Food Additive Amendments to the FDCA. FDA
should implement these recommendations by abandoning the sub-
stantial equivalence justification for its liberal use of the GRAS
concept and concluding that all GM foods contain food additives.
Failing that, Congress should enact a "rifle shot" amendment to
the FDCA providing that GM foods are food additives subject to
the statutory approval process for those substances. Since both
FDA in its food additive regulations and EPA in its tolerance setting
actions apply the "reasonable certainty of no harm" test for prod-
uct approval, this would ensure that all GM foods passed a safety-
based threshold that did not allow the potential benefits of agricul-
tural biotechnologies to overwhelm safety concerns. 2 Congress
could alleviate FDA's understandable reluctance to launch a major
new regulatory program with no new resources by requiring peti-
tioners to pay application fees of sufficient magnitude to cover the
cost of the approval process.
H. Monitoring and Enforcement
FDA has no systematic monitoring program in place to deter-
mine whether or not manufacturers and importers have been
abusing the GRAS process. To protect consumers from further
StarLink® episodes, FDA should establish a monitoring regime,
similar to the regime currently in place for monitoring pesticide
residues, for testing domestic and imported foods for the presence
of GM food. FDA should begin by initiating (perhaps in a coopera-
tive agreement with EPA) a monitoring program for GM
561. Hearing Before the House Comm. on Agric. Subcomm. on Risk Mgmt., Research, and Spe-
cialty Crops, 106th Cong. (Mar. 3, 1999) (testimony of Mike Yost, President, American
Soybean Association).
562. See EU-U.S. CONSULTATIVE FORUM, FINAL REPORT, supra note 149, at 11 (taking
the position that "[r]isk/benefit considerations should not be introduced until the basic
threshold of reasonable certainty of no harm to human health has been reached").
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pest-resistant plants using available tests for the presence of Bt en-
dotoxins in food. The agencies should expand the program as tests
for other proteins that are characteristic of GM foods become avail-
able. Since neither FDA nor EPA have adequate resources to
conduct random testing of foods for the presence of illegal GM
residues, Congress should allocate substantial additional resources
to EPA and FDA for the purpose of monitoring and enforcement.
Finally, both agencies may be able to come up with innovative ways
for simplifying enforcement at the time that they conduct pre-
market clearance for GM plants. For example, EPA could require
that the seeds for any GM pest-resistant plant that is not registered
for general food use must be colored differently from normal
seeds. It could even explore requirements that the GM plant itself
be genetically engineered to ensure that the plant and all edible
constituents are easily identified by color. Implementation of such
innovative approaches could prevent future StarLink® fiascoes.
L Retrospective Evaluation
Nearly all observers of the current regulatory regime in the
United States believe that the government needs to do more to en-
sure that someone is undertaking long-term assessments of the
health consequences of large-scale introduction of GM plants into
the food supply. The Canadian Royal Society expert panel recom-
mended the "development of mechanisms for after-market
surveillance of GM foods incorporating a novel protein.'- 63 The
U.S.-EU Consultative Forum recommended that "[g]overnments
should undertake to develop and implement processes and
mechanisms that will make it possible to trace all foods, derived
from GMOs, containing novel ingredients or claiming novel bene-
fits.,,5 4 at this point, attempts to monitor for the presence of GM
material in foods are facilitated by the presence of particular pro-
teins and/or DNA in most GM foods that are detectable through
relatively inexpensive monitoring techniques. EPA and FDA should
563. ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA REPORT, 2001, supra note 14, at 73.
564. EU-U.S. CONSULTATIVE FORUM, FINAL REPORT, supra note 149, at 12; see also LAPPE
& BAILEY, supra note 14, at 134 (recommending establishment of a "formal tracking mecha-
nism to ensure at least a statistically meaningful subset of transgenic crops entering the
marketplace be closely followed, and that consumers who are at the end of the transgenic
food chain be monitored for possible adverse effects").
[VOL. 35:3
Seeds of Distrust
insist at the time of pre-market approval that new GM foods are
identifiable through similarly inexpensive analytical tests.
CONCLUSIONS
Public trust is essential to the future of the agricultural biotech-
nology industry in the United States. While the benefits of
agricultural biotechnology may never match the high expectations
of its proponents, it can produce changes in the world food supply
that will make all of our lives easier and healthier. But agricultural
biotechnology poses potential risks to human health, some of
which are well-known and largely avoidable, but many of which are
poorly understood and unanticipated. The fact that agricultural
biotechnology, like any ubiquitous modern technology, poses risks
is, of course, no reason to deny society its benefits. Its potential
risks are grounds, however, for proceeding ahead with humility
and caution.
The public will not trust the agricultural biotechnology industry
to establish and enforce its own health and environmental stan-
dards. Government must play a strong and highly transparent role
in regulating the growth, processing and sale of GM foods. Unfor-
tunately, the statutes that form the underlying foundation for the
current federal regulatory regime were not enacted with biotech-
nology in mind and therefore leave several serious institutional
and interpretational questions unresolved. More importantly, the
agencies that have been administering the existing regulatory pro-
grams have relied far too heavily upon the "substantial
equivalence" principle to allow the agricultural biotechnology in-
dustry to proceed full-speed-ahead with new products. The
increased reluctance of consumers and major food processors and
distributors to accept GM foods and the recent StarLink® fiasco
suggest that significant changes in the current regulatory regime
are in order.
The relevant regulatory agencies should not allow GM foods
onto the market until the manufacturers have demonstrated with
real scientific data, not broad and largely untestable assumptions,
that there is a reasonable assurance that no harm will result to the
people who eat those foods. The regulatory process should be
565. See OECD EDINBURGH RAPPORTEURS' SUMMARY, supra note 33, at 6 (urging further
inquiry into the "practicalities of tracing GM food products throughout the food chain").
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transparent so that watchdogs in the public interest groups can
participate in and evaluate the decisions that the regulatory agen-
cies reach. The agencies should have sufficient resources available,
preferably from permit fees, to undertake serious evaluations of
the data, to enforce the requirements that they impose, and to un-
dertake retrospective evaluations of past decisions. Finally,
consumers should, through fair and accurate labeling of GM foods,
be given the right to choose whether or not to consume particular
GM products. This may require significant changes in the agricul-
tural distribution system to facilitate segregation of GM crops, and
this may for a time increase the costs of both GM and non-GM
foods. The alternative is a food distribution system that has lost its
most valuable asset-the trust of the American consumer.
